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ABSTRACT
The action of individual securities is characterized 
by the unexpected. Fortunes are frequently created by 
investing in unwanted instruments and lost by committing 
funds to issues in strong demand. Stock purchase warrants 
and convertible bonds also offer unusual and even erratic 
performance. This study focuses on the ingredients of fair 
value in these instruments and develops'models to assist-in 
appraising the merits of both warrants and convertible bonds.
' An evaluation model for warrants is created by
normalizing basic components-of warrants in terms-of their 
exercise prices. The price of the common stock is divided 
by the exercise price, and this ratio is used in predicting 
normal prices for warrants. Time to expiration is viewed as 
an important element in valuing individual warrants, and six 
time categories are created. A mathematical relationship 
between the common stock and the warrant price is calculated 
by using a statistical technique frequently referred to as a 
"power function."
The model's predictive efficiency is tested by com­
paring its attractively priced warrants to average warrants. 
Results show the warrant model to select warrants offering
greater upside and downside leverage. Average warrants 
are-shown'to provide a higher rate of return over the test
i
period from 1960 through 1969 than those selected by the 
warrant model. Bear markets in the first and last years 
of the study lowered the model's performance. Downside 
leverage in 19 69 resulted in huge percentage losses for 
warrants selected by the model.
The warrant model appears versatile in that it 
tends to signal generally inflated markets. Percentage­
wise, few warrants are deemed attractively priced prior to 
■ bear markets. Avoidance of bear markets is shown to signifi­
cantly increase the overall return from these securities.
An evaluation model is created for convertible 
bonds. Straight debt value is ascribed as offering the 
foundation for the model, and it is used to normalize con­
version value and conversion feature value. The resultant 
conversion value ratio is used in predicting the value of 
the conversion feature. Time to expiration of convertible 
features is given special attention by structuring three 
separate time categories. A fourth category is created for 
long-term conversion features and straight debt values less 
than $700. Mathematical equations are developed for each 
category and are used in predicting normal prices for these 
instruments.
xii
The convertible bond model is tested by comparing 
its-performance to that of one hundred convertible bond ob­
servations. The model is shown to select thirty-four of 
the observations for purchase. Twenty-eight of them appreci 
ate in value while only six decline. Model selections are 
found to be decidedly superior to average convertibles. 
Moreover, the model seems to provide a device for signaling 
generally overpriced markets.
Special trading tactics are employed for warrants 
and convertible bonds. The models are used to locate candi­
dates for arbitrage-hedge techniques. Actual transactions 
are simulated. Warrants are found well suited for arbitrage 
hedge tactics, but convertible bonds are currently not well 
suited for these techniques.
The study concludes by discussing other uses of 
empirically designed models. For example, issuing companies 
may find the models useful in quantifying the trade off 
between higher prices for warrants and greater flexibility 
of the convertible feature. It is concluded that refine­
ments and updating of the designed models should be under­
taken as data become available.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
At one time common stock purchase warrants and converti­
ble bonds were usually associated with highly leveraged or 
unseasonal business firms. The warrant or convertible fea­
ture is often described as being a "sweetner" to a bond 
issue in making it more palatable to the investing public.
By 1969, however, warrants and convertibles were being 
utilized by some of the most prestigious firms in the United 
States. More than $4.5 billion in convertible bonds was 
issued by American Telephone & Telegraph from 1913 through 
1958. AT&T recently announced plans to offer an additional 
$1.57 billion in bonds with 5 year warrants attached.
"Mother Bell's" decision to utilize the warrant as a direct 
source of capital has caused the Board of Governor's of the 
New York Stock Exchange to consider revoking its rule pro­
hibiting listing of the speculative instrument known as a 
warrant.^
1
^•"Big Board Mulls Listing AT&T Warrants, Wall Street 
Journal, Vol. 45, No. 16 (January 23, 1970), p. 2.
1
2Historical Use of These Securities
AT&T's proposed financing plan may alter the invest­
ment image of warrants. The warrant may be listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange and could come to be considered as 
a sophisticated way of participating in the growth of 
America. Before categorizing the warrant as investment 
grade, an examination of its historical use as a medium of 
acquiring capital is required. At the same time financing 
through the convertible bond witnessed a similar surge. 
Consequently, data pertaining to convertible bond issues 
will be reviewed concurrently with data concerned with 
warrants. Table I represents the correlation of the growth 
of convertible bond and warrant financing during the late 
1920's. After the sharp stock market decline in the early 
1930's both warrant and convertible bond financing declined 
precipitously.
The economic depression that followed "Black Thursday" 
nearly ended the use of warrants as a financing device. 
Similarly, convertible bond issues, after reaching a peak 
of more than 46% of the total bonds issued in 1929, showed 
a marked decline as a source of capital. Interest in these 
securities among corporate issuers revived in the 1960's 
with convertible bond financing reaching an all-time high 
in 1967. It seems likely that warrant financing will es­
tablish a new high in 1970 with the AT&T debt issue.
Table II outlines the growth of convertible and warrant 
public financing in the 1960's.
TABLE I
VOLUME OF PUBLIC CORPORATE DEBT SECURITIES 
C1924-1930) (DOLLAR FIGURES IN MILLIONS)
Total Debt Convertible Debt Debt with Warrants
Num­ Num­ Num­
Year ber Amount ber Amount ber Amount
1924 822 $2,227.0 45 $128.8 25 $ 82.0
1925 773 2,202.4 55 191.4 69 183.6
1926 897 2,724.8 107 329.2 55 1B7.7
1927 857 3,856.8 88 253.3 79 147.0
1928 810 2,997.0 83 390.5 64 262.7
1929 509 1,957.7 149 909.6 48 365.1
1930 552 2,978.3 95 682.9 18 68.9
Source : W. B>*addock Hickman. Statistical Measuresi of Cor-
oorate Bond Financing Since 1900 , a study by the National
Bureau of Economic Research (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton
University Press, 1960), pp. 210 -223.
TABLE II
VOLUME OF DOMESTICALLY UNDERWRITTEN PUBLIC
FINANCING (1964-1969) (DOLLAR FIGURES
IN MILLIONS)
Total Issues Convertible Debt Debt with Warrants
Num- Num­ Num­
Year .ber Amount ber Amount ber Amount
1964 552 $5,747.7 49 $ 372.0 14 $ 54.0
1965 619 8,971.8 61 1,183.0 8 38.0
1966 6 30 11,778.1 96 1,761.0 11 122.0
1967 1,034 19,147.1 230 4,062.0 26 304.0
1968 1,548 17,748.6 202 2,699.0 30 381.0
1969 2,242 21,703.5 176 3,022.0 38 657.0
Source: Investment Dealers1 Digest, Section II, March 3,
1970, pp. 10-16.
Tables I and II should be viewed as indicators of the 
importance of warrants and convertible bonds as sources of 
capital. They are not intended to be vehicles of comparison 
between the late 1920’s and the late 1960's. However, it 
should be noted that more of these securities were floated 
in these years than during any previous time periods.
Table II fails to disclose the fastest growing type 
of warrant usage. Attaching warrants to common stock offer­
ings has soared in recent years. In 1967 only 11 new common 
stock issues valued at $12,325,000 had warrants accompany 
the issues. The number of companies issuing warrants with 
common stock increased to 85 in 1969, and these issues were 
valued at $644,845,475.2 Combining warrants with common 
stock is a relatively new approach to financing. It often 
enables the issuing company to realize net proceeds in ex­
cess of the existing market value of the common stock.
On a conjectural basis it may be stated that war­
rants and convertible features provide flexible instruments 
tailored to meet a business climate characterized by huge 
Capital expenditures, thin profit margins, and diminishing 
equity positions. Because renewed interest in these securi­
ties has created a much greater supply than existed at any 
period in the past, a method for evaluating these securities 
is more important today than heretofore.
2
Investment Dealers1 Digest, Section II (March 3,
1970)i p. 16.
5Purpose of the Study
Alan Abelson, one of Barron's weekly writers, recent­
ly devoted the following paragraph to a specific warrant.
Ever get the feeling that you're missing some­
thing? That's the sensation we have about Elgin 
National Industries warrants. The securities (which 
expire in 1974) represent an option to buy 0.4 
shares of common at $8.75. Viewed another way, they 
offer the opportunity to purchase a share of Elgin 
common at $21,875. Okay? Well, on Friday, the 
common closed at $8,125. But the warrants closed 
at $2,625. A little arithmetic indicates that any­
one buying a warrant at the going price winds up 
with the right to pay a total of $28.44 ($6.56 plus 
$21,875) for a stock that's selling at 8.125.
That's a premium of around $20, or something over 
250%. What's bothering us, simply, is why?^
Mr. Abelson's reference to the Elgin warrants may 
save his readers from commiting money to an overpriced in­
vestment, but it does not assist non-subscribers in apprais­
ing the investment value of these securities. Stock purchase 
warrants offer vastly different risk-reward potentials, and 
the marketplace needs an approach to assist in the evaluation 
of the attractiveness of any given price.
Convertible bonds also trade at prices that appear 
highly inconsistent with their risk-reward potentials. The 
uneven premiums over straight debt value leaves the average 
investor with the difficult task of selecting convertibles 
that are priced fairly. In Chapter V these market incon­
sistencies will be examined in greater depth.
•^Alan Abelson, "Up and Down Wall Street," Barron1 s , 
Vol. 50, No. 2 (January 12, 1970), p. 23.
6The primary purpose of this study is to develop 
valuation models that will assist the average investor in 
determining the fair value of stock purchase warrants and 
convertible debentures. This study is also an attempt to 
augment the existing knowledge related to these security 
forms. Another purpose of this study is to assist issuing 
corporations in determining the optimum investment package 
to be offered in acquiring new capital through the use of 
either stock purchase warrants, convertible bonds, or both. 
Finally, an attempt will be made to analyze various trading 
techniques that may be used with warrants and convertible 
bonds in order to generate profits.
Scope of the Study
Although many forms of convertible securities and 
options are in existence, this study will concentrate on 
stock purchase warrants and convertible bonds. The results 
of this study may be extended to other types of similar 
securities. For example, premiums on warrants with 6 months 
to expiration may be compared with prices of six month call 
options.
Empirical data utilized will be taken primarily 
from the period 1960 through 1969. Prior to that time the 
supply of listed convertible bonds was too restricted. 
Furthermore, warrants were in very short supply prior to the
1960's except for a span from the late 1920's to the middle 
1930's.
The primary focus of this study will be on invest­
ment-oriented goals, with an attempt to enhance the effi- 
cicency of investors taking positions in warrants and
convertible bonds. Issuing corporations may also benefit 
since an understanding of investor preferences will be 
sought.
This research effort is restricted to actively traded 
securities. Over-the-counter securities are eliminated from 
the study due to the inconsistencies in reporting bid and 
asked prices for similar securities. These markets have 
less-perfect information when compared with listed markets, 
and, deviations in prices of similar securities may be too 
great for significant conclusions. For these reasons only 
the New York and American Stock Exchange securities will be 
studied.
Methodology
The objectives of this study will be sought in the 
following four steps: (1) the basic ingredients of warrants 
and convertible bonds will be specified; (2) empirical models 
will be designed for warrants and convertible bonds; (3) 
these models will be compared with existing models and aver­
age securities in determining their relative efficiency; and
(4) special trading tactics will be analyzed using these 
securities.
The first step will require a theoretical presenta­
tion of the interaction between the common stock price and 
the value of the call on the common. Each warrant will be 
stripped of its individual dignity by reducing it to a 
common denominator. The convertible bond will also be dis­
sected by analyzing the determinants of its straight debt 
value apart from its option value.
The second step will be to design an empirical model 
that will assist in determining representative values for 
individual securities— all of the warrants listed on the 
American Stock Exchange from 1960 to 1969 will be analyzed. 
The relationships between their exercise prices, prices of 
the common and prices of the warrants will be calculated by 
utilizing a "power function" of the form:
Yc = a{X)b
The "power function" provides a curvilinear relationship be­
tween the independent and dependent variables by transform­
ing these data to natural logarithms. The method of least 
squares is then applied to these data in obtaining solutions 
for the two unknown constants a and b.
Each constant requires a separate equation in order 
to obtain a solution; therefore, two normal equations of the 
form
9I ^ l og y = (n) (log a) -f (b) (£log x)
II £(log x) (log y) = (log a) (£log x) +  (b) [£{log x)2 l
are used in obtaining solutions for a and b. These solu­
tions will be generated through use of the LSU Computer 
Center.
The resultant values will be plotted for various 
levels of option price relative to the common stock. These 
derived values then will become expected or derived fair 
values of warrants given the ratio between the common stock 
and the exercise price. Thus, the models are expected to 
be described as empirically derived models or flexible models 
based on existing empirical data.
Convertible bonds from the New York Stock Exchange 
will be analyzed by comparing the debt value of a bond to 
its conversion value and conversion premium. These empiri­
cal relationships will again be determined through using 
the same least squares program as described for the warrants. 
The ratio between the convertible bond's straight debt value 
and its conversion value will be the independent variable 
used in determining expected or fair values for convertible 
bonds•
The third step for testing the efficiency of the 
models will be accomplished by determining the performance 
of average warrants and convertible bonds. The efficiency
10
of previously designed models will be tested along with the 
empirically designed models. Each simulated purchase will 
assume an equal dollar investment in order to avoid pricing 
difficulties.
The fourth step, analyzing various trading techniques, 
will be accomplished by examining specific warrants and con­
vertible bonds. Hedges will be simulated for these securi­
ties and the empirical models will be used to locate 
candidates for hedging. Thus, the empirical models will be 
tested for their flexibility in locating fair-priced, under- 
priced, and over-priced securities.
Preview of the Study
This chapter serves as an introduction to the sub­
ject of this research project, and defines the approach to 
be utilized. It serves to introduce the timeliness of the 
study— both warrants and convertibles have recently reached 
new heights in the capital market.
Chapter II discusses the basic elements of warrants 
and convertible bonds. The important variables that deter­
mine market valuation are identified.
Chapter III reviews the literature pertaining to the 
techniques of evaluating these securities. Strengths and 
weaknesses of the individual models are described.
Chapter IV is concerned with the development of an
IX
empirical model for evaluating warrants. The testing of 
the model is also included. Chapter V involves the develop­
ment and testing of an empirical model for convertible bonds.
Various trading tactics that can be applied to these 
security forms are reviewed in Chapter VI. An attempt is 
made to simulate actual trading.
General conclusions derived from this study are dis­
cussed in Chapter VII along with the merits and limitations 
of the method of research. Comments are offered on the 
manner in which the findings may facilitate future research 
projects.
CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF WARRANTS AND CONVERTIBLE BONDS
i
Introduction
This chapter involves an attempt to establish the 
basic elements related to warrants and convertible bonds. 
Attention is first focussed on warrants; subsequent com­
ments concern the basic elements of convertible bonds.
The study of warrants begins with a basic defini­
tion of the term and then proceeds to an analysis of warrant 
pricing. The impact of leverage on the speculative values 
of warrants is discussed concomitant with the methods through 
which these instruments come into existence. The rationale 
of Lerner Stores' use of warrants is also analyzed.
Convertible bonds are herein defined according to 
their basic ingredients, and premiums are properly categor­
ized. Due to its importance in Chapter V, the straight-debt 
value of a convertible receives special attention. The 
yield curve concept is briefly reviewed.
The importance of anti-dilution provisions is exam­
ined for warrants and convertible bonds. Specific methods 
of dilution are briefly reviewed. Chapter II is concluded
by reviewing the accounting practices relative to these
12
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securities.
Basic Elements Of Stock Purchase Warrants 
A common stock purchase warrant is a certificate 
which a holder may exchange into residual ownership of a 
corporation. Exchange into residual ownership may be ac­
complished by surrendering the certificate and a specific 
amount of money or par value of a specified security. 
Exercise of the warrant is usually limited by the certifi­
cate, and most contain a prearranged expiration date. 
However, a limited number of these securities are deemed 
to have a perpetual existence.'*'
The warrant exists as a trading mechanism because 
most holders are unwilling to pay the necessary price to 
become residual claimants. If warrants were purely con­
vertible securities, their existence would be short— holders 
would immediately convert them to common shares. Thus, the
^In 19 43, the SEC required that the United Corpora­
tion change its capitalization to a single class of common 
stock and cease to be a holding company with respect to each 
of its subsidiaries. United's reorganization plan required 
an exchange of its outstanding perpetual warrants to warrants 
with a 5 year expiration date. The exchange called for one 
new warrant to be issued for 5 existing warrants. The new 
warrants had an exercise price of $7 while the old warrants 
had a $27.50 exercise price. For further details, see Moody1s 
Manual of Investments, Banks— Insurance Companies— Investment 
Trusts— Real Estate (New York, N.Y.: Moody's Investor Service, 
1950), p. 1276
14
cost of exchanging a certificate for a common stock gives 
life to a warrant as a separate instrument and is a critical 
element in the evaluation of warrants. This cost is typical­
ly referred to as the exercise or option price. Through the 
remainder of this paper these terms will be used interchang- 
ably.
Unique Features of Warrants
Complicating the study of warrants are the varie­
ties of contractual provisions offered by individual certifi­
cates. The most significant of these differences are: (1)
there are various maturity provisions; (2 ) exercise prices 
remain constant or increase at pre-specified intervals; (3) 
the exercise price may be satisfied with cash or the par
r
value of another security type; (4) one warrant may acquire 
a fraction of a share, one share only, or any number of 
shares; and (5) the warrant may have different degrees of 
protection against dilution.
The length of time to expiration appears to be an 
important variable affecting warrant values as the specula­
tive value of a warrant approaches zero near expiration. 
Moreover, the warrant becomes worthless if the exercise 
price exceeds the price of the common upon expiration. 
Logically, a warrant’s speculative value should be enhanced 
with long expiration dates. Thus, some warrants are issued
15
with infinite expiration dates and are referred to as per­
petual warrants. A major goal of this research is to iso­
late the impact of the time to expiration as a function of 
warrant value.
Numerous warrants offer fixed exercise prices; some 
provide step-ups in exercise price at specified intervals. 
For example, Alleghany Corporation warrants offer a fixed 
exercise price to perpetuity while Textron warrants have an 
exercise price that increases every five years until their 
expiration in May of 19 34. McCrory Warrants, issued in 
1961, had a fixed exercise price of $20 to run through 1976. 
The company decided in 1966, to offer holders the right to 
exchange the old warrants for new warrants with a final 
expiration date in 19 81. The new warrants had an increase 
in exercise price to $22.50 from 1976 to 1981. McCrory's 
decision created an excellent opportunity for studying step- 
ups in exercise price, since over 300,000 of the warrants 
were not extended by the holders. Today, McCrory has both 
an old and a new issue of warrants, the only difference 
being the additional five years to expiration and a $2.50 
increase in exercise price.
An interesting and new feature of structuring exer­
cise prices was designed by the financial innovators of LTV. 
Warrants issued by them offer a reduction in the exercise 
price, at the company's option, of as much as one-third—  
for a minimum period of 21 days. These warrants provide a
16
potential step-down in exercise price.
A common characteristic of warrants attached to bond 
issues is that of having their exercise price payable in 
cash or in par value of the bonds. The exercise price is 
often effectively lowered by paying with bonds rather than 
cash, since the bonds frequently trade below par. TWA war­
rants provide an example of this arrangement as they have 
recently traded at 65% of par, which means the exercise 
price could be lowered by 35% through using bonds rather 
than cash.
Most warrants trade on the basis of one warrant being 
exercisable into one share of common stock. Numerous war­
rants trade on the basis of varying amounts of stock ac­
quired through a given warrant. For example, the Rio Algon 
warrant, traded on the American Exchange from 1961 to 1966, 
was exercisable into .13 shares of common for $2 3.0 7 per 
share. The mathematics in calculating a logical speculative 
value was next to impossible. Moreover, some of these rela­
tionships change frequently. Tri Continental has instituted 
a practice of paying periodic stock dividends and the terms 
of the warrant have changed frequently in recent years.
The Theoretical Value of a Warrant
A warrant, as previously defined, offers value only 
through its contractual right to be exchanged for common stock.
17
Theoretically, a high cost of exchange should reduce the 
value of this right. However, one must recognize the ulti­
mate value of this right is predicated on the value of the 
common stock. If the market price of the common stock ex­
ceeds the exercise price, the warrant will have an arbitrage 
or intrinsic value. The intrinsic value, common price minus 
exercise price, will be the minimum price of a warrant due 
to the availability of instantaneous profits realizable 
through arbitrage activity at any lower price. For example, 
the Gulf & Western warrant has an exercise price of $55. If 
the common stock were trading at $70, the warrant would not 
sell much below $15 because arbitrageurs will short the 
common at $70 and cover by buying the warrant and exercising 
it for a small but quick profit. (Brokerage costs and time 
to exercise have been ignored in this example.) The prac­
tice of arbitrage requires that a warrant sell at its in­
trinsic value or higher.
The Gulf & Western warrant did not have an intrin­
sic value in January, 1970, because its common traded at 
$20. The warrant, however, traded at $6. This value may 
be referred to as the speculative value, and its level de­
pends on the anticipated performance of the common. The 
speculative value of a warrant to buy one share of common 
stock will have as its upper limit the price of the common 
stock itself. Knowledgeable investors would never pay more
18
for an option on the common than they would pay for the
share itself. The only exception to this rule would be an
investor who has become caught in a short squeeze after
2
selling warrants short.
The maximum speculative value and the minimum intrin­
sic value may be described graphically. Chart 1 depicts these 
relationships.
CHART 1
SPECULATIVE AND INTRINSIC VALUES OF WARRANTS
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2William Schwartz and Julius Spellman, Guide To Con­
vertible Securities (New York: Convertible Securities Press, 
1968), p. 28.
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Chart 1 indicates that the price of the warrant is 
confined to speculative value when the price of the common 
is less than $1, and consists of intrinsic value and possibly 
speculative value at all levels greater than $1. It is 
logical that a warrant with a speculative value of $.35 
when the common stock is at $.99 will not totally lose its 
speculative value when the common is at $1.01. Moreover, 
it does not appear theoretically feasible that the specula­
tive value that existed at $.99 for the common will continue 
to exist when the common trades at higher levels. Therefore, 
one may conclude that the speculative value should be at the 
highest for a given warrant when the common stock price equals 
the option price. Also, the speculative value should be at 
its minimum when the common stock price approaches zero and 
when it approaches infinity.
Dr. Paul Samuelson has written an excellent article 
on rational pricing of the warrant,^ His contention is that 
warrants may have numerous ranges of rational prices— with 
the ranges dependent on the underlying nature of individual 
warrants and the expectations of the warrant buyers.
Samuelson's Figures la and lb4 are approximately reproduced
^Paul A. Samuelson and Henry McKean, Jr., "Rational 
Theory Of Warrant Pricing," Industrial Management Review,
Vol. 6, No. 2 (Spring, 1965), pp. 13-39.
4Ibid,, p. 20.
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in Chart 2.
Samuelson's charts are based on the expectations of 
warrant buyers in relation to common stock buyers. He de­
fines a to be the mean expected growth rate of the common 
stock per unit in time and 8 to be the mean expected growth
5
rate of the warrant. Samuelson's Figure la then assumes that 
a*&. Moreover, he shows with liiie A that a perpetual warrant 
will be equal to the price of the common because they are 
priced to have identical expected growth rates.
Line B is priced less than the common because it is 
limited by a 25 year maturity. Lines C and D describe war­
rants with maturities of 4 and 1 years, respectively. 
Samuelson's Figure la is pertinent to the present study due 
to his identification of time as a major variable affecting 
a warrant's price. He also contributes an important idea 
concerning the value of warrants with his graphic and mathe­
matical presentation— namely, that warrants with expected 
mean growth rates equal to those of their corresponding 
common will never be converted (or rest on their intrinsic 
value) as long as a positive period of time exists before 
maturity.
Samuelson's Figure lb6 also provides excellent dis­
cussion for warrant valuation. Two reasons are introduced
^Ibid., p. 19.
6Ibid., p. 20.
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CHART 2
SAMUELSON 'S THEORETICAL VALUES OF WARRANTS
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to show why a warrant will have aP>a to represent as at­
tractive a purchase commitment as the common stock. Ac­
cording to Samuelson, investors may require a higher mean 
return to hold the warrants because warrants are not pro­
tected against dividend declarations on the common, and,
7
warrants represent more volatile instruments than common.
Samuelson's Figure lb shows that a warrant will be 
converted at some range of x (or rest on its intrinsic value) 
regardless of its time horizon. This is due to the fact 
that investors expect a higher yield from the warrant than 
from the stock, and it must be priced accordingly. At 
some price of the common the warrant will be at its intrin­
sic value. At that point it should be converted into 
common as it will no longer satisfy the return differential. 
Theoretically, a small return differential and a large 
exercise price may create an extremely high value of x 
causing the warrant to be priced at its intrinsic value.
The empirical model that appears in Chapter IV 
closely follows Samuelson's Figure lb. There may be other 
reasons why a warrant will require a high mean return other 
than dividends and volatility. The warrant may not be
i
fully protected from dilution via small stock splits, ad­
ditional options being issued, and benefits (both psychic 
and material) accorded stockholders. Samuelson's presentation
“^Ibid., pp. 19-22
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must be described as an innovation in thinking about warrant 
price behavior.
An existing perpetual warrant may be applied to his 
two models. For example, the Atlas Corporation perpetual 
warrant has an exercise price of $6.25. If one assumes an 
investor purchases the warrant with the intent of holding 
for 10 years, one finds that the price can approximate 
either Samuelson's Figure la or lb. Under the assumption 
that the market place has an equal required rate of return 
of 10% annually in both the common and the warrant, the 
common stock will be priced in anticipation of its future 
performance. If the common were expected to appreciate to 
$20 in 10 years, it should be priced at $7.72 to provide
O
the desired rate of return (assuming no dividends). The 
warrant could also be priced at $7.72 if investors at all 
periods of time had the same desired rate of return. This 
can be reconciled somewhat by considering the present value 
of the exercise price discounted at 10% over an infinite 
period of time. The present value of $6.25 discounted at 
10% for 50 years is only $.056. Investors, therefore, who 
consider a perpetual warrant to remain unconverted forever 
have little reason for penalizing the warrant's value
p
The $7.72 price is determined by multiplying the 
present value of $1 received 10 years hence and discounted 
at 10% by $20. Thus .386 times $20 equals $7.72.
relative to the stock.
Consideration can now be focussed on the instance 
where the market place has different required rates of re­
turn for these securities. When the desired rate of return 
on the common remains at 10%, but the warrant's rate is 
raised to 15%, investors still view the present value of 
the exercise price to be nil. The common will still be 
priced at $7.72, but the warrant will now be priced at 
$4.94 ($20 discounted @ 15% for 10 years). The warrant 
will be at its intrinsic value in 10 years because the $20 
price assumes the market price will grow to $51.82 at the 
end of the next ten years, and $51.82 discounted at 15% 
for 10 years is only $12.80 (which is less than the intrin- 
sic value). It is possible that the desired rates of re­
turn will not maintain an equal distance as the stock grows 
in value, since stock and warrant movements will become 
highly correlated. Therefore, a higher price may be requir­
ed to bring the warrants's price to its intrinsic value.
9
The intrinsic value at the end of 10 years is $13.75 
($20.00 market price minus 6.25 exercise price), and the esti­
mated price assuming a 15% desired rate of raturn is $12.80 
($51.82 multiplied by .247, the discount factor at 15% for 10 
years.
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Leverage. The speculative value of a warrant is 
primarily related to the leverage offered by the individual 
security. A high speculative value in relation to the price 
of the common actually retards the degree of leverage for a 
given warrant. The actual leverage in a warrant may be 
closely associated to the mechanical leverage observed by 
Archimedes, a third century s c i e n t i s t . H e  observed that 
less force was required to move a given weight as one moved 
further away from the fulcrum (the base which supported the 
lever). The leverage afforded by a warrant may be analo­
gous to mechanical leverage in this way: the relationship 
of the common stock price to the warrant value can be con­
sidered the lever, with equality between the two resting 
at the exercise price, viewed as the fulcrum. An increase 
in the price of the common stock will generate a higher rela­
tive move in the warrant when the price of the common is high 
relative to the price of the warrant and greater than or equal 
to the exercise price. An illustration may be helpful at 
this point.
Assume that the XYZ common trades at $20 and its 
warrant, which is exercisable at $10, trades at $10. In
*°David Jenkins, The Power of Leverage (Larchmont,
New York: Investors Intelligence, 1966), p. 1.
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this case a given percentage increase in the common will 
result in twice the percentage increase for the warrant.
If the common appreciates 10 per cent to $22, the warrant 
will increase 20 per cent to $12. The leverage for the 
warrant in the first example is calculated to be 2, since 
the warrant rises twice as fast as the common. If the stock
were trading at $30 with the warrant at $20 and still exer­
cisable at $10, the degree of leverage would have dropped 
to 1.5 which can be proved by hypothesizing percentage in­
creases for these securities.
The proceeding example definitely shows leverage to 
be a function of the stock's price relative to the warrant's 
price, but it ignores speculative value altogether. What 
happen's when the price of the common is equal to or less 
than the exercise price? Will a given increase in the common 
have a direct impact on the price of the warrant? These 
are some of the questions that the empirical model in Chap­
ter IV attempts to answer.
Leverage indicator. William Schwartz recognised that 
the degree of leverage would be a valuable tool in determin­
ing the attractiveness of individual warrants.^ Schwartz
^William Schwartz, Using Warrants For Leverage (New 
York: Investing and Management Compass, Inc., 1967), pp. 14- 
20.
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also recognized that exact degrees of financial leverage 
were impossible to calculate when warrant prices included 
speculative values or premiums. Therefore, Schwartz develop­
ed an indication of leverage which he expressed with the
12following formula.
Leverage = Price of optioned stock_____
Indicator Price of warrant on one share
Schwartz contends that the leverage indicator can be 
effectively used to locate warrants with attractive upside 
potential. He is of the opinion that the more attractive 
warrants are those with no intrinsic value and leverage in­
dicators of 4 or more. He further feels that warrants with 
leverage indicators of less than 2 should be avoided because 
of the great downside risks relative to small upside poten­
tials .
Warrants also have downside leverage which results 
in a greater percentage decline in individual warrants than 
in their associated common stock. Sidney Fried describes 
the danger of downside leverage with an example of the Uni­
versal Pictures warrants which declined from $39 in 19 45 to 
$1.50 in 1947.^ The percentage decline in the common was
12Ibid.f p. 19.
13Ibid.f p. 19.
14
Sidney Fried, The Speculative Merits of Common Stock 
Warrants (New York: R.H.M. Associates, 1961), p. 2.
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significantly less.
Two recent examples of unfavorable leverage occurred 
during the market decline of 1966. McCrory*s warrant de­
clined 46.8% from $5,875 to $3,125 while its common stbckk 
declined 2 3.1% from $22.75 to $17.50. Thus, McCrory's war­
rants experienced negative leverage of greater than 2 from 
the beginning to the end of 1966. The 1966 performance of 
the Universal American warrant provides a different example 
of downside risk. The warrant had 15 months left before 
expiration at the beginning of 1966. It had an exercise 
price of $13.75 and the common was trading at $10,875. The 
warrant was traded at $4. At the end of 1966, the common 
traded at $11,125 for a percentage gain of 2.3%, but the 
warrant traded at only $1.25 for a percentage decline of 
68.7%.
The preceeding examples suggest the following con­
clusions: (1) speculative values on warrants may magnify
the percentage decline of a warrant when the common de­
clines; and (2) speculative values on soon-to-expire warrants 
may result in sharp market losses from warrants, even when 
the common stock appreciates.
One can see that leverage in warrants offers an ad­
vantage on the upside but also generates a high degree of 
downside risk. The volatile nature of these instruments,
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especially when speculative values are temporarily out of 
line, is justification for establishing valuation models 
that will assist in determining the degrees of positive 
and negative leverage. Trading tactics aimed toward taking 
advantage of these discrepancies are explored in Chapter VI.
The Origfn of Warrants
Warrants enter the market place in numerous ways.
As seen in Chapter I, many warrant issues accompany bonds. 
The desire of the issuing company to lower the coupon rate 
on the bonds, while creating an avenue for acquiring equity 
capital upon exercise of the warrants, accounts for this 
occurrence. Twenty-six warrants listed on the American Ex­
change at the end of 19 68 had six different ways of coming 
into existence. Half of them were issued with debentures 
to acquire capital for various purposes; 7 were used in a 
package of securities to effect an acquisition; 3 of the 
warrant issues were tendered for the issuing company's out­
standing shares of common stock; and one was used in each 
of the following ways: (a) as part of the reorganization
package, (b) to pay a dividend in warrants to common stock­
holders, and (c) to be used as a package in selling common 
stock and bonds to the public. Hayes and Reiling discussed 
the flexibility of the warrant in a Harvard Business Review
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article.^ They showed how small growth companies may avoid 
underpricing a common stock issue by attaching warrants.
The attached warrant may enable the company to completely 
avoid underpricing and eventually issue additional stock 
upon exercise of the warrants.
Warrants may be paid to investment bankers for 
floating an issue of securities or for locating a merger 
candidate. The taxation rules pertaining to warrants re­
ceived as compensation for underwriting services led the 
Investment Bankers Association to conduct an empirical 
study of these i n s t r u m e n t s . ^  The investment bankers con­
cluded that fair values could be determined for taxation 
purposes. The approach used in their empirical study is 
pertinent to the present study.
All of the enumerated methods of using warrants seem 
appropriate except for the tender offers to retire existing 
shares of common stock. The LTV companies have used this 
method of recapitalization in at least three separate offer­
ings. The primary objective was to increase reported earnings
^Samuel Hayes and Henry Reiling, "Sophisticated 
Financing Tool: The Warrant," Harvard Business Review, Vol.
47, No. 1 (January-February, 1969), pp. 137-150.
^ Federal Income Taxation of Compensatory Options 
(Including Warrants) Granted To Underwriters and Other Inde­
pendent Contractors (Washington, D.C.: Investment Bankers
Association, 1963), pp. 1-85.
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per share through lowering the shares outstanding by more 
than the decline in net income. The decline was produced by 
the interest expense of the bonds accompanying the warrants.
Lerner Stores also used warrants and debentures as a 
package in offering to buy its own stock. As a matter of 
fact, Lerner Stores pre-dated LTV's use of this approach.
The Wall Street Journal of May 19, 1967, carried an announce­
ment stating that Lerner intended to repurchase all of its 
shares of common not owned by McCrory Corporation through 
issuing $10 par of 6-1/2% debentures and 1 warrant to pur­
chase common at $15 for each share of Lerner Stores. The 
market price of Lerner common on that date was $10,625.
On October 2, 1967, Lerner announced the completion of the 
offer and stated that 9 85,000 shares had been acquired by 
issuing $9,850,000 in 6-1/2% debentures and 985,000 warrants 
exercisable at $15 per share. The following statistical 
presentation (Table III) illustrates the impact of the 
tender offer.
Table III was prepared by adding the after-tax cost 
of interest on the debentures to the reported net income for 
1968 and 1969. The shares that were acquired through the 
tender offer were also added back. These data show earnings 
per share to have been substantially stimulated by the tender 
offer. The actual data reported show earnings per share
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increased more than 80.3% over 1967-1969 while the adjusted 
data, assuming the tender offer did not occur; showed a 
growth of only 50;8%. The tender offer to reacquire Lerner's 
common through a combination of debt and warrants substanti­
ally increased earnings growth as reported by the company. 
This ability to create earnings per share growth through ac­
quiring ones own stock was probably one motivating force in 
bringing about the Accounting Principles Board Opinion N o . 15 
on earnings per share.'1'7
TABLE III
EARNINGS PER SHARE STIMULUS THROUGH TENDER OFFER
ACTUAL DATA REPORTED 1967 1968 1969
After tax income $6,734,516 $8,549,958 $10,054,097
Shares outstanding 5,110,912 4,150,475 4,222,055
Earnings per share 1.32 2.06 2.38
WITHOUT TENDER OFFER
After tax income $6,734,516 $8,882,888 $10,387,027
Shares outstanding 5,110,912 5,135,475 5,207,055
Earnings per share 1.32 1.73 1.99
Source: Moody1s Industrial Manual (New York: Moody's In­
vestors Service, 1969), p. 2670.
1 n
APB Opinion No. 15 focuses on the proper accounting
determination and presentation of earnings per share data.
It includes provisions to adjust these earnings in lieu of
potential dilution through various forms of convertible se­
curities. The last section of this chapter discusses ac­
counting for these instruments.
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Basic Elements of Convertible Bonds 
The convertible bond is an investment package offer­
ing two distinct claims: (1) a claim to interest via owning
the bond and (2) a claim on the common stock through the 
conversion feature. The bond provides normal bond features 
of periodic interest and terminal repayment of the principal 
at some prespecified date. The conversion privilege enables 
the bondholder to participate in the appreciation of the 
common stock. The conversion privilege is similar to a 
stock purchase warrant with the exception that the bond 
must be surrendered in order to effect a change into common 
stock. Thus, the bond and the conversion privilege are in­
separable until conversion or expiration of the claim on the 
common.
Premium on Convertible Bonds
This "inseparable" nature of straight debt value and 
option value presents a dilemma when determining fair values 
for this unique investment package. Investors must decide 
on a fair price by simultaneously considering the straight 
debt value and the conversion v a l u e . I t  is frequently 
difficult to decide whether one is basically buying straight
I Q
•'■'’Conversion value refers to the immediate market 
value of the shares of stock that may be acquired by sur­
rendering the bond.
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debt value with an equity "kicker" (conversion value poten­
tial) , or whether conversion value is more important with 
the debt value only providing a degree of downside protec­
tion. Either way, the convertible bond purchaser will 
usually be faced with paying a premium over one of these 
values in order to acquire the instrument. The determina­
tion of a proper price for a given premium is a primary 
element in evaluating convertible bonds. Chart 3 is a 
pictorial illustration of the nature of these premiums.
As can be seen from Chart 3, three separate possibil 
ities may arise when considering convertible bonds. The 
debt value may be greater than the conversion value; the 
debt value may equal the conversion value; and, the con­
version value may exceed debt value. Situations A, B, and 
C provide respective examples of these three possibilities. 
It is proposed that situations A and C force an investor 
to decide on the proper approach to valuation. The inves­
tor must decide if A's conversion value is worth $140 and 
if C's debt value is worth $140.19 How should one analyze 
Situation B, since the premium is the same for debt value 
as it is for conversion value? This question will be 
further explored in the following section, and in Chapter
It is common practice to refer to the premium of 
a convertible bond as being the market price of the bond 
less the highest of either straight debt value or conver­
sion value.
o,
dj
< 1
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V of this paper.
Theoretical Valuation of Convertible Bonds
Potential purchasers of convertible bonds desire to 
obtain both the features of debt and the features of conver­
sion value, or they would surely put their money into common 
stock or bonds directly. However, a given investor may be 
primarily interested in acquiring a claim to interest through 
the bond and would be secondarily interested in the conversion 
opportunities. His order of priority would require him to 
first determine the straight debt value of the security 
package and then add the value of the conversion feature.
An investor primarily interested in conversion opportunities 
would approach the investment package by determining the 
value of the conversion feature and then including the hy­
pothesized value of the straight debt value.
The two separate approaches to convertible bond 
valuation lead to confusion as to the fair value of a given 
security package. Perhaps a graphic examination of a con­
vertible bond's range of possible values will facilitate 
a decision as to the proper approach to utilize in deter­
mining fair value. Chart 4 provides that graphic presenta­
tion by depicting the possible range of convertible bond 
prices.
Chart 4 shows a convertible bond to be priced at its 
debt value only when the common stock is priced at zero. If
C 
TJ
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CHART 4
THEORETICAL PRICE RANGE FOR CONVERTIBLE BONDS
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the common price increased to $15, the conversion value of 
$450 (30 shares X $15) would be worth something more than 
the bond's straight debt value. The convertible bond price 
could vary from a maximum of $1,250 ($800 DV plus $450) to 
a minimum of $800.
The maximum value of a convertible bond can be con­
ceptualized in the following manner. Assume that a particu­
lar convertible bond is perpetual and the corresponding 
common stock does not pay dividends. The package can then 
be hypothesized to provide fixed interest receipts, a bond 
value, and equal claims on the common through the convertible 
feature. Moreover, the1 present value of the debt surrendered 
at some distant time horizon must be zero in order for the 
price of the bond to approach the maximum value. Few con­
vertibles come close to these conditions, but the maximum 
value of a convertible bond is illustrated through adding 
debt value and conversion value. The minimum value of a 
bond is described by the debt value until conversion value 
becomes greater than $800. The minimum value is then re­
flected by conversion value alone.
The dilemma of evaluating the proper approach to 
convertible bond valuation remains. However, the possible 
range of bond prices provides the basic model for evaluating 
convertible bonds. This model is developed in Chapter V.
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Analysis of debt value. Chart 4 shows a convertible 
bond price to be based on two elements, the potential con­
version value as a function of the price performance of the 
common stock, and the debt value as a function of interest 
rates and time to maturity. The expected performance of the 
common stock may be analyzed through both fundamental and 
technical approaches. Although the methodology of these ap- 
proachs is beyond the scope of the present study, a brief 
outline of how to evaluate the downside risks of straight 
debt values is considered pertinent to this study.
Eugene Brigham's graphic model of a convertible 
bond assumes interest rates to be constant and describes 
straight debt value as constantly moving toward par over 
the bond's maturity.^0 Actually, the ultimate value of 
the straight debt value depends on the level of interest 
rates over the maturity of the bond. The market direction 
of straight debt value will be an inverse function of 
changes in interest rates. The degree of fluctuation will 
furthermore diminish with a given interest rate change as 
the bond approaches maturity.
Yield curve concept. Straight debt value and in­
terest rate relationships can be appropriately described
^Eugene f . Brigham, "An Analysis of Convertible 
Debentures: Theory and Some Empirical Evidence," Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 21, No. 2 (March, 1966), p. 37.
through the use of a yield curve. This can be illustrated 
by assuming two convertible bonds, X and Y, each have 
coupon rates of 6%. Bond X has 3 years to maturity and Y 
has 20 years to maturity. The market yield curve for bonds
i
' 9 1
with similar ratings is also 6% for all maturities. Bonds 
X and Y will each have a straight debt value equal to par 
or $1,000, since their coupon rates equal the market's 
rate of interest. If we assume that one year later inter­
est rates have increased to 8% on bonds with 2 year matur­
ities and to 7% on 19 years bonds,.the decrease in straight 
debt values will be greater for the 19 year maturities than 
for the 2 year maturities. These yield curves are presented 
in Chart 5.
Chart 5 reveals a smaller yield change for the longer 
term maturity, but the 1% change must be spread over the 19 
years that remain to maturity. Present value tables indi­
cate the long-term bond to have lost approximately $104.20 
in straight debt value while the 2 year bond suffered only 
a $36.30 loss due to the 2% change in effective interest
A yield curve where all maturities have equal ef­
fective yields is said to be "flat". The flat yield curve 
is presented here due to its simplicity for explaining price 
changes.
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CHART 5
FLAT AND DOWN-SLOPING YIELD CURVES
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rates.22 Conversely, a decline in interest rates would have
2^The approximate decline in value for the long-term 
bond may be determined in the following manner.
Effective semi-annual yield 3.5%
Semi-annual coupon rate 3.0%
Interest deficiency .5%
P.V. of periodic $1 @ 3.5% for
38 periods X20.841
($1,000 par)(10.4205%)
10 .4205% 
$104.20
For the conventional approach in determining bond prices, see 
Jules J. Bogen, Financial Handbook (4th ed.; New York: The 
Ronald Press Company, 1968), pp. 27.48.
42
caused a greater price appreciation in the 19 year bond than 
in the 2 year bond. The direction of interest rates is then 
a very important aspect in the analysis of convertible bonds. 
Many financial experts have concluded that interest rate 
risks are more important than credit risks when analyzing
p 7
corporate bonds. J
The shape of the yield curve offers indication of 
the direction interest rates will take in the future. The 
flat yield curve usually occurs in initial stages of tight 
money periods and again near the end.of restrictive mone­
tary policies. Typically, the yield curve is upsloping
i '
with short-term maturities yielding less tlian longer term 
securities. This type of yield curve is consistent with 
ideas concerning liquidity preference, since short-term
m
instruments can be held with little risk of principal loss 
and a high degree of marketability. As a result, investors 
are willing to accept smaller yields on short-term invest­
ments and require higher yields on longer term commitments 
because interest rate risks are magnified. The upsloping 
(normal) yield curve offers a premium for assuming higher 
interest rate risks.
2^See Douglas H. Bellemore, Investments, Principles. 
and Analysis (Dallas: South-Western Publishing Company, 1966), 
p. 54 and Harry Sauvain, "Changing Interest Rates and Invest­
ment Portfolio," Journal of Finance, Vol. 14, No. 2 (May,
1959) , pp. 230-244.
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The yield curve where short-term maturities afford 
higher yields than longer term securities is referred to as 
a downsloping or hump-backed yield curve. It occurs during 
tight money periods and is a product of the struggle for 
reserves by the commercial banking industry and the desire 
to extend maturities during high interest rate periods. The 
Federal Reserve System absorbs much of the supply of short­
term money through selling government securities. Lenders, 
anticipating a decline in interest rates at the end of the 
tight money period, work toward increasing the average 
length of maturity of their portfolio during these high 
interest rates. Thus, short-term rates expand at a faster 
pace than long-term rates, and a hump-backed yield curve 
is created.
Historically, hump-backed yield curves have been 
followed by lower short and long-term interest rates as 
the yields settled back to a normal liquidity preference 
structure. From the standpoint of straight debt value, 
long-term convertible bonds are more attractive commitments 
when a hump-backed yield curve exists because of the ap­
preciation potential of their straight debt values.
Anti-Dilution Clauses for Warrants 
and Convertible Bonds
Stock purchase warrants and convertible bonds are 
closely related in that both provide contractual options for
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the purchase of common stock. Legal protection of these 
contractual rights necessitates similar draftmanship. There­
fore, the following discussion will be uniformly applicable 
to each security form.
The anti-dilution clause is an important element in 
each security package offering a call on the common stock. 
This clause contains the rights of the claimant on the common 
stock in respect to various developments. Provisions of 
anti-dilution clauses may be thought of as determining the 
relative positions of the option holders and the residual 
owners themselves, since a concession granted to the option 
holder dilutes the position of basic owners. Due to the 
important ramifications of these clauses, their explication 
is pertinent to this research project.
Stanley Kaplan2  ^ feels that the anti-dilution clause 
is often viewed by attorneys and investment bankers as 
boiler plate-a standard provision that is not worthy of 
negotiation. He contends that he has seen attorneys prepare 
convertible securities by cutting anti-dilution clauses from 
other prospectuses and glueing them to the data of a proposed 
security issue.
24Stanley Kaplan, "Piercing the Corporate Boiler­
plate: Anti-Dilution Clauses In Convertible Securities," The 
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 33 (1965-1966), p. 3.
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Current prospectuses of convertible bond offerings
tend to confirm Kaplan's contention. The following is a
statement taken from a preliminary prospectus dated December
31, 1969. It approximates some anti-dilution clauses, and
is identical to others.
The conversion price is subject to adjustment 
under a formula in certain events, including the 
issuance of Shares or rights or options to pur­
chase Shares or securities convertible into 
Shares at less than the current conversion price 
(with credit under the formula for the issuance 
or sale of Shares above the current conversion 
price). The conversion price is subject to auto­
matic proportionate adjustment-upon the subdivi­
sion or combination of Shares or the payment of 
Share dividends. No reduction under the formula 
will be required until cumulative adjustments 
amount to 1% of the conversion price then in ef­
fect. No adjustment under the formula or other­
wise will be made upon conversion of the Debentures 
or of the Trust's 5% Subordinated Convertible Notes, 
or upon the issuance of Shares in connection with 
the acquisition of assets, or upon the issuance 
of Shares pursuant to any present or future stock 
option plan.2^
The above statement was selected because it covered 
the typical developments requiring adjustment for dilution. 
Chronologically it covers (1) the sale of common stock below 
a specified price, (2) the proper handling of stock splits 
or stock dividends, (3) the problem concerning adjustment 
upon acquisition of assets, and (4) the adjustment due to 
the issuance of stock options. Possible developments that
25
Taken from the preliminary prospectus of Continental 
Mortgage Investors.
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may undermine the conversion or exercise value are infinite. 
Only the most frequently encountered developments are pre­
sented in typical anti-dilution clauses.
Similar provisions are presented when warrants are 
issued to the public. The prospectus will usually refer to 
a Warrant Agreement which is defined as an instrument execu­
ted by the corporation setting forth the rights of the 
warrant holders and the corporation.26 Warrant Agreements 
can be obtained from warrant agents, and they represent the 
formal contract between the issuing corporation, warrant 
agent, and the warrant holders.
Issue of Additional Common Stock
The first provision listed in the anti-dilution 
clause is perhaps the most difficult to reconcile. The 
proviso requires that an adjustment be made when common 
stock is sold for less than the exercise price. The use 
of exercise.price guarantees an adjustment to an option 
holder whenever common stock is issued, for consideration 
below the conversion price. Sales of common stock at 
prices higher than the exercise price are considered not 
to have diluting effects on the option holders.
26Clifford Charles Keith, "Convertible Securities 
and Stock Purchase Warrants," Rocky Mountain Law Review, Vol.
2, (1929-1930), p. 25.
Some anti-dilution clauses call for adjustments to 
the conversion price to be based on the market price of the 
common stock. Sales of common below the market price^? re­
quire adjustments in the conversion or exercise price.
The market price formula is fundamentally based upon the 
concept that the option holder is in the same position as 
the common stockholders. In other words, if common stock­
holders are given a benefit, it should be reflected in the 
conversion formula. This concept, in effect, implies that 
pre-emptive rights given to common stockholders should also 
be granted to the option holders. Adjustments in the exer­
cise price are based on the dilutive value of a pre­
emptive rights issue.
The market value approach may be compared with the 
conversion value approach by examining its impact on the 
following situation:
Company X
Initial shares outstanding ,
Warrants to purchase shares 
New Shares to be issued 
Average per share market price prior 
to issue (MP)
Subscription price of new shares (SP)
Exercise price of each warrant (EP)
^^Usually defined as average closing price for a 
period of timte prior to the actual issuance of the securities.
2®See the preliminary prospectus of Guardian Mort­
gage Investors dated November 21, 1969.
1,000,000
200,000
500,000
$30
20
10
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If the anti-dilution clause specified the exercise price in 
determining the degree of dilution, there would be no adjust­
ment. However, the use of the market price approach signifi­
cantly lowers the exercise price.
The adjustment required under the market price ap­
proach can be determined by calculating the intrinsic value 
of each warrant before and after the issue. The intrinsic
value prior to the issue is $20 ($30 market price— $10
29exercise price). The adjusted number of shares that each 
warrant is now entitled to can be determined by dividing 
the original intrinsic value of $20 by.the diluted value of 
$16.67 which yields 1.2 shares for each warrant. The ad­
justed exercise price per share then become $8.33 ($10 old 
exercise price-j-1.2 shares). By adjusting the exercise 
price when new stock is issued for less than the. market 
price, the option, holder has maintained his claims on the 
common stock to the same degree as common stockholders. On 
the other hand, the use of the exercise price approach would 
have diluted the holder's intrinsic value by $3.33 or 16,65%, 
since the market price for the newly issued shares exceeded
2^The new market price may be determined by the fol­
lowing formula:
New MP= (MP) (N) + (SP) = (30) (2) + (20) _ 2g
FF+T ' 2+1
Where: N=number of shares necessary to purchase one new 
share.
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the exercise price.
The exercise price approach has been described as 
adversely affecting the warrant holder when new issues of 
common are sold with SP>EP. The approach may also be shown 
to benefit the warrant holder when SP^EP. The following 
exemplifies those conditions.
Company Y
Initial shares outstanding 1,000,000
Warrants to purchase shares 200,000
New shares to be issued 500,000
Average per share market price'prior to
issue (MP) $8
Subscription price of new shares (SP) 6
Exercise price of each warrant (EP) 10
The adjusted exercise price can now be calculated 
with a specific formula, since the exercise and the market 
price are greater than the subscription price. Such a formu­
la i s : ^
Adjusted EP ^ PX4-NY
X+N
Where: P = exercise price (or average market price)
X - number of shares outstanding prior to the 
new price 
N =* number of shares to be issued 
Y, — consideration for newly issued shares.
Substituting into the formula to determine the adjusted 
exercise price under the two alternatives yields:
•^°Kaplan, o£. cit., p. 8.
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AVERAGE MARKET PRICE APPROACH EXERCISE PRICE APPROACH
(8) (1,000,000)4-(500,000) (6) 
500,000+1,000,000
10(1,000,000)+(500,000)(6) 
500,000+1,000,000
11,000,000
1,500,000
13,000,000
1,500,000
7.33 + (EP-MP) $8.67
7.33 + (10-8) = 7.33 + 2
= $9.33
The exercise price approach significantly benefits the
option holder, since he can now purchase 1.154 shares ($10 
initial exercise price +$8.67 adjusted exercise price per
share) when only 1.072 shares could be acquired under the
market value approach. The market value approach enables 
the warrant holder to obtain a benefit identical to that of 
the common stockholder, $.67 (i.e., $10 initial exercise 
price— $9.33 adjusted exercise price). This can be proven 
by examining the theoretical value of one right by using the 
formula:31
M - S
N + 1
Where: M = initial market price of stock
S = subscription price of the stock 
N = the number of rights necessary to purchase 
one new share.
Substituting:
$8 - 6
2 + 1
$.67
31Robert Johnson, Financial Management (Boston: Allyn 
& Bacon, Inc., 1966), p. 472.
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The adjustment to the exercise price is shown to equal the 
benefit received by each common stockholder through the pre­
emptive rights offering. The option holder has maintained 
his proportionate share in the firm through the market value 
approach.
Use of the exercise price approach provides the op­
tion holder with twice the benefit received by the common 
stockholders. ■ Such an approach actually undermines - the 
rights of common stockholders by increasing the claims on 
the common through a significant lowering of the exercise 
price on the warrants.
Potential option buyers should be cognizant of the 
fact that the exercise price approach will protect them 
from dilution via new stock sales only when the subscrip­
tion price of the new stock is less than the exercise price. 
On the other hand, the market price approach will afford 
protection anytime new shares are sold for less than the 
average price.
Stock Splits and stock Dividends
Modern anti-dilution clauses appear to offer ade­
quate protection for stock splits, although there is some 
variation in the handling of stock dividends. A few clauses 
enable payment of minor stock dividends without adjusting 
the exercise price. The clause of the Armour warrants failed
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to offer adequate protection for stock dividends. As a 
result these option holders lost approximately 30% of their 
value due to the declaration of two 10% stock dividends. ^ 2 
The courts have looked with disfavor on companies 
that have taken advantage of weak anti-dilution provisions.
A decision handed down- in 1950 required Merritt-Chapman and 
Scott to allow 1.4 shares of stock to perpetual warrant 
holders at $30, due to a 40% stock dividend, even though 
the company did not have an anti-dilution clause.33 Court 
action has not impinged on the right of firms to exempt 
small stock dividends from anti-dilution adjustments, and 
there appears to be a trend toward including specific pro­
visions to exempt stock dividends as cash substitutes from
anti-dilution provisions.^4
Mercer and Acquisition of Assets Though 
Issuance of Common Stock
Option holders are fundamentally without recourse 
when additional shares of common stock are issued in acquir­
ing specific assets. * Most anti-dilution clauses provide 
the right to acquire assets without requiring an adjustment
32Schwartz, 0£. cit., p. 14.
33Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, 
Security Analysis (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1962) , p. 621.
34
Kaplan, 0 £. cit., pp. 11-12.
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to the exercise price. Consequently, option holders must 
depend on the good faith of the directors in preserving the 
value of the company's common stock.
Mergers and consolidations present special problems 
in the proper drafting of anti-dilution clauses. Numerous 
authorities, including Dewing, have recognized the need to 
protect an option holder in the event of a merger by allow­
ing a substitute claim on an analogous security.35 Most 
option holders are adequately protected upon a simple mer­
ger where stock is directly exchanged— because an analogous 
security is created. The courts have also affirmed the 
claims of option holders on share-for-share merger exchanges. 
Berle cites a case where Justice Holmes enforced the con­
version privilege by requiring delivery of the new corpor- 
ation’s stock.
Simple exchanges of one share of common for another 
in a merger is rare today. Shares are now being exchanged 
for packages of bonds, warrants, and other convertible 
vehicles that result in dissimilar investment claims. Kaplan 
states.
In the more involved forms of corporate combina­
tion, such as the: sale of 40% of the assets of
35Arthur Stone Dewing, A Study of Corporation Securi­
ties (New York: The Ronald Press, 1934), p. 411.
AdoIf A. Berle, Jr., Studies In The Law Of Corpora­
tion Finance, (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1928), p. 138.
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Corporation A to Corporation B for common 
stock of B followed by the merger of Corporation 
A into Corporation C, the ordinary "boilerplate" 
merger provisions of an anti-dilution clause 
amount to little more than the convertible's 
prayer for fair play.3?
A pioneering article by Hills also recognized the
weakness of an option holder's claim upon the merger of the
obligor company. According to Hills:
Privilege holders have practically no rights 
upon a termination of the corporate existence 
of the company which granted the privilege, 
whether it terminates by reason of a consoli­
dation, merger, dissolution or otherwise.
Such rights as they do have are granted by 
statute or by an agreement of reorgainzation 
under which the successor company undertakes 
to protect the privilege.
Perhaps the only way to properly handle■complex com 
binations of firms with outstanding options is to specify 
some trustee to be responsible for deciding the rights of 
the option holders during the merger process. The'trustee 
should be a totally disinterested party. This provision 
could also be extended to other corporate developments.
Issuance of Additional Options
Quoted conversion clauses do not provide adjustments 
for options granted to employees, but they do offer adjust­
ments for additional issues of convertible bonds, warrants,
37Kaplan, oj>. cit., p. 16,
38
George S. Hills, "Convertible Securities— Legal As­
pects of Draftsmanship," California Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 
1, (Nov. , 1930) , p. 31.
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or other marketable claims on the common. These options can 
either be dilutive from an exercise price standpoint or from 
a market price standpoint. These two approaches have al­
ready been adequately treated.
The relevant question is whether adjustments are 
made upon actual conversion of the instruments or at the 
time of their issuance. The first approach may nullify any 
gains from such an issue because the first securities may 
be exercised ahead of the newly created securities. At the 
same time, forced conversion through a call of the issue 
may eliminate the benefits of conversion.
The second approach, adjusting the exercise price 
immediately, may benefit the convertible holders at the 
expense of the common holders. Newly issued securities may 
never be exercised— resulting in greater conversion benefits 
to those who convert early.
Other Methods of Dilution
Anti-dilution clauses can not provide for all pos­
sible developments that may affect the conversion privilege. 
However, known developments that may prostitute option value 
should be provided for. Two such occurrences are the crea­
tion of an intermediate class of stock and the payment of 
large cash or property dividends.
New issues of preferred stock may be offered to
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existing stockholders. The dividend rate could be designed 
to absorb normal earnings accruing to the common stockholders, 
and the options on the common would be rendered nugatory.
Berle was probably the first to repognize the danger of 
newly issued intermediate shares in undermining the value of 
the call on the common. His discussion of this danger in
39
1927 failed to generate preventive anti-dilution clauses.
Recognition of intermediate issues may not be satis­
factory for modern security forms. For example, LTV's 
accumulating convertible stock, issued June 28, 1968, may 
challenge the drafters of anti-dilution clauses. This hy­
brid security is exempt from cash dividends and offers a 3% 
annual stock dividend. It is convertible into common on an 
increasing basis, with each share convertible into .85 
common shares through December 30, 1969. This increases 
annually to a peak of 1.5 shares by 1979.^ LTV's new 
security offers tremendous potential dilution and option 
holders deserve protection.
Option holders may also find their position weakened 
through payment of unusually high cash or property dividends.
A. A. Berle, Jr., "Convertible Bonds and Stock Pur­
chase Warrants," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 36, No. 5 (March, 
1927), pp. 655-656.
^°Moody's Industrial Manual (New York: Moody's In-: 
vestors Service, 1969), p. 1973.
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Berle describes a corporation's right to pay dividends:
The corporation may, if it chooses, strip its sur­
plus account bare, distributing- it fully to the 
stockholders without considering the effect on 
the value of the shares in respect of which the 
privilege might operate. If the privilege hold­
er wishes to participate in the distribution he 
must elect to become a stockholder and convert 
his obligation, or pay for his stock. 41
There appear to be three ways in which anti-dilution 
clauses may be drafted to protect the option value where 
dividends are concerned. The clause may (1) require a 
notice prior to the record date to ensure that the options 
may be exchanged to common stock prior to distribution; (2) 
require an adjustment in the exercise price when dividends 
exceed a specific amount, or (3) contain restrictive cove­
nants that place a ceiling on annual dividend distributions.
The first method would not assist an option holder 
when the market price of the stock is less than the exercise 
price; the third approach may unduly restrict the firm's 
dividend policy. The preferred clause would enable adjust­
ments in exercise price when "in kind" or cash dividends 
exceeds a specific amount. Potential buyers of warrants 
or convertible bonds should review the specific protection 
afforded by anti-dilution clauses before making a commit­
ment.
41
Berle, o£. cit., pp. 140-141.
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Accounting For Warrants and Convertible Bonds
The Accounting Principles Board has experienced dif­
ficulty in deciding how stock purchase warrants and conver­
tible bonds should be reflected in financial statements.
42Prior to the issuance of APB Opinion No. 10, warrants and 
convertible bonds were relegated to footnotes in explaining 
their importance to a given business firm. The accounting 
profession's method of reporting for these securities 
traditionally has followed Internal Revenue Service Regula­
tions .
Straight Debt Value and Option Value
The Accounting Principles Board of the American In­
stitute of Certified Public Accountants rendered Opinion N o . 
10 in December, 1966. The advent of this opinion altered 
traditional methodology. It was recommended that the value 
of the call on the common be separated from the straight 
debt value by crediting paid in capital for its value. 
Correspondingly, an offsetting charge was suggested that 
would be made by debiting the debt discount (or reduction 
in premium).4"* The discount was then to be amortized over
^ Accounting Principles Board, Opinion N o . 10,
"Omnibus Opinion-1966,1 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants,December, 1966), pp. 141-151.
43Ibid., pp. 147-148.
the life of the bond issue. The net effect would be a 
reduction in reported income through an effective increase 
in the annual interest levy.
APB Opinion No. 10 generated a furor among corpora­
tions who had found these instruments helpful in acquiring 
huge amounts of capital. The airline industry, faced with 
rising costs, strongly protested. Investment bankers, 
fearful of losing lucrative convertible bond business, 
exerted their power in an attempt to have the ruling changed 
They argued that the conversion privilege in a bond was 
simply one of the provisions contained in an indenture, and 
that the low coupon rate was a function of numerous features 
of the security. The argument was further presented that 
convertible bonds were either equity or debt, but not both.
Prior to conversion they are debt; after conversion they are 
equity.4^
The Accounting Principles Board yielded to the pres­
sure of the business community and their fellow colleagues. 
Their Opinion No. \2, dated December, 19 67, requested that 
the section of Opinion N o . 10 concerning convertible bonds 
and bonds with warrants be suspended.46
44Arthur M. Louis, "The Accountants Are Changing the 
Rules," Fortune, Vol. 77, No. 7 (June 15, 1968), p. 179.
4^"Cloud Over Convertible Debentures," Business Week 
No. 1988 (Oct. 7, 1967), p. 148.
46Accountinq Principles Board. Opinion N o . 12,
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Straight. Debt or Stock
It was not until March 19 69 that the Accounting 
Principles Board took a definitive step on these securities. 
APB Opinion N o . 14 directed companies issuing detachable 
stock purchase warrants to credit paid-in capital for their 
fair value at date of issuance. The decision was based on 
the fact that these warrants become separable from the bond 
issue— thus commanding their own value.
Bonds issued with non-detachable warrants and con­
vertible bonds, however, were to be accounted for as if the 
entire issue were debt. The underlying reason for this 
decision was based on the inseparable nature of the debt and 
the conversion option. The Board evinced concern about the 
difficulty in properly assessing the value of the conversion 
option. To quote Opinion N o . 14, "In the absence of separate 
transferability, values are not established in the market­
place, and accordingly,'the value assigned to each feature 
is necessarily subjective.47
"Omnibus Opinion-1967," (New York: American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, December, 1967), p. 91
^ Accounting Principles Board, Opinion N o . 1 4 , 
"Accounting for Convertible Deb^E and Debt Issued VTith Stock 
Purchase Warrants;" (New York: American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants, (March, 1969), p. 205.
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Importance of Opinion No. 15
The Accounting Principles Board rendered its most 
significant opinion relative to warrants and convertible 
bonds in May, 1969, with the issuance of Opinion N o . 15. 
This opinion was primarily directed towards earnings-per- 
share calculations, although it included warrants and con 
vertible bonds by considering their dilutive effect on 
earnings-per-share data. In brief, Opinion No. 15 states 
that:
The Board believes that corporations with com­
plex capital structures should present two types 
of earnings per share data (dual presentation) with 
equal prominence on the face of the income state­
ment. The first presentation is based on the out­
standing common shares and those securities that are 
in substance equivalent to common shares and have a 
dilutive effect. The second is a pro-forma presen­
tation which reflects the dilution of earnings per 
share that would have occurred if all contingent 
issuances of common stock that would individually 
reduce earnings per share had taken place at the 
beginning of the period (or time of issuance of 
the convertible security).
The Board has concluded that determination of 
whether a convertible security is a common equiva­
lent should be made only at the time of issuance.
A convertible bond will be considered as a common 
equivalent at the time of issuance if, based on 
its market price, it has a cash yield of less than 
66-2/3% of the then current bank prime interest 
rate. Options, warrants and similar arrangements 
usually have no cash yield and derive their value 
from their right to obtain common stock at speci­
fied prices for an extended period. Therefore, 
these securities shall be regarded as common stock 
equivalents at all times.
The Board recommended that the amount of dilu­
tion to be reflected in earnings per share data 
should be computed by application of the "treasury 
stock" method. Under this method, earnings per
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share data are computed as if the options and 
warrants were exercised at the beginning of the 
period and as if the funds obtained thereby were 
used to purchase common stock at the average mar­
ket price during the period.4®
Opinion N o . 15 is relevant to the study of warrant 
and convertible bond valuations because these instruments 
can now affect the amount of primary earnings-per-share and/or 
fully diluted earnings-per-share. In addition, the price 
of the common stock relative to the option price has a 
direct relation on the reported per-share-earnings. The 
influence of the market price is demonstrated in Table IV.
TABLE IV
IMPACT OF COMMON STOCK PRICE ON EARNINGS PER SHARE
19X1 19X2
After tax earnings $2,000,000 $2,000,000
Average shares outstanding 1,000,000 1,000,000
Warrants 200,000 200,000
Exercise price per share 
Average market price of
$20 $20
common $20 $40
Adjusted common shares 1,000,000 1,100,000
Primary earnings per share $2.00 $1.82
An examination of Table IV illustrates the relation­
ship between the market price of the common and the option
4 8Accounting Principles Board,' Opinion N o . 15, 
"Earnings Per Share," (New York; American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants, May, 1969), selected pages.
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price. The decline in per-share-earnings for 19X2 is a 
result of the average market price appreciating to $40— it 
is unrelated to the earnings production of the firm. Thus, 
Opinion N o . 15 has delivered a new accounting concept; that 
the market capitalization rate should be reflected in 
earnings-per-share.
Earnings-per-share determination, under the present 
approach, has an important message for the market place. It 
conveys the image that options have no dilutive effect until 
the market price of the common approaches the exercise price. 
This suggests that options with exercise prices high 
relative to the conversion prices should be favored because 
dilutive effects are not recorded. In contradiction, op­
tions with exercise prices less than or equal to common 
stock prices should be avoided because each dollar the 
common appreciates will result in lower earnings per share.
It is conceivable that a rapidly growing company may report 
declining earnings per share due to a growth in the price 
of its common stock. The question that presents itself is: 
How meaningful are earnings per share data under these cir­
cumstances? One obvious answer is that the APB may have 
eliminated the traditional concept of earnings per share 
data with Opinion N o . 15.
The negative correlation between market prices of 
common stock and earnings per share (higher prices = lower
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reported earnings per share) should produce a leveling 
effect. Earnings per share should be cushioned during 
recessions by falling stock prices and curtailed during 
boom periods by higher prices. Such a development may be 
a desirable overall goal, but the impact on individual 
companies could be crippling.
Before concluding the discussion of accounting for 
these instruments, a brief address to the classification of 
these instruments as common equivalents is in order. The 
APB decided that the coupon rate relative to the prime 
lending rate should be used in classifying the convertible 
bond. It is interesting to note that stellar firms would 
come closer to having their securities classified as common 
equivalents due to their ability to float debt securities 
at lower rates. These firms would probably offer less 
dilution potential than highly leveraged firms. Under 
present conditions then, Opinion N o . 15 favors the highly 
leveraged firms. Whether primary earnings per share will 
be more significant than fully diluted earnings to the in­
vestors of capital is still to be tested.
It may be surmised that earnings per share data, as 
drafted in Opinion No. 15. no longer reflect operating per­
formance but are market oriented. Consequently, growth rates 
based on per share data must be adjusted for the impact of 
average market prices over a given period of time.
CHAPTER III
REVIEW OF SELECTED RESEARCH PROJECTS
Introduction To Stock Purchase 
Warrant Models 
This chapter entails a discussion of selected re­
search projects that have made significant contributions 
toward proper valuation procedures'for warrants and con­
vertibles. The projects are reviewed on a chronological 
basis, and the overview-approach does not permit exhaus­
tive treatment of any one project. The organization of 
this chapter is well served by following the natural 
dichotomy inherent in the subject matter. Warrant models 
will be reviewed first, followed by a consideration of 
the convertible models.
The first few warrant models are based on simple 
warrant-common stock relationships. The approaches utilized 
in the models may be described as pioneering efforts that 
are still useful today. These simple models are followed 
by two mathematical models, justified by comparing actual 
prices with predicted data. A massive research project, 
in which the warrant-stock price relationship is measured 
through an empirical study, is the fifth project to receive
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attention. Finally, a study which involves a multiple 
regression approach, where independent variables are used 
to predict the price of warrants, brings this section to an 
end.
Paul Hallingby1s Approach To Warrant 
Valuation
Literature pertaining to the nature of stock pur­
chase warrants were ubiguitous in the 1920's and 1930's. 
Valuation techniques or models were not described until 
empirical data on warrant performance became available. In 
a 1947 article, Hallingby, discussed a method of determining 
a "correct price" for a warrant.^ Hallingby concluded that 
historical price action of the warrant in relation to its 
corresponding common stock could provide a basis for deter­
mining a fair price for a warrant. An editor's annotation 
states, "If the stock is selling at one quarter of the dis­
tance between its high and low, the warrant should also sell 
at one quarter of the distance between the warrant's high 
and low— and so for any other price of the stock.UA
Ipaul Hallingby, Jr., "Speculative Opportunities In
Stock Purchase Warrants," The Analysts Journal, Vol. 3, No.
3 (Third Quarter, 1947), pp. 41-49.
2Ibid., p. 49.
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The "correct price", according to Hallingby's ap­
proach, is determined by comparing the current market price 
of the stock to its all-time high price. If the stock cur­
rently trades at one quarter of its high, the "correct price” 
for the warrant would be one quarter of its all-time high 
price. Warrants trading at less than the calculated price 
would be deemed attractive purchases. Hallingby also al­
luded to a desirable stock-warrant price relationship by 
stating, "The lower the price of a long-term warrant is in 
relation to that of its common, the greater the degree by 
which price movements of the warrant tend to surpass those 
of the common."3 The stock-warrant relationship could have 
provided a mathematical indication of leverage by dividing 
the price of the warrant into the price of the common stock.
Hallingby's article seemed to be directed toward 
the upside leverage of warrants during bull markets. There­
fore, his comments on proper valuation were not intended 
to be comprehensive. The major weaknesses in his approach 
are: (1) historical highs on the common stock do not serve
as true limits as they are frequently penetrated; (2) past 
stock-warrant relationships are not necessarily indicative 
of fair values; (3) the approach tended to overstate the 
correct price for warrants when the common was depressed; 
and (4) a linear relationship between common and warrant
»
^Ibid., p. 45.
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prices was assumed to exist when a curvilinear relationship 
appears more accurate. (The curvilinear relationship will 
be discussed in Chapter IV.)
Russe.l Morrison1 s Basic Formulas
Morrison contributed a succinct article on warrant 
price assessment in 1957.^ Morrison presented two ways for 
examining existing warrants. The first utilized the imputed 
return required on alternative investment. The second used 
the break-even price of a common when buying warrants.
Imputed return. The imputed return and the break­
even price are both determined by recognizing two possible 
costs when buying warrants versus common stock. The warrant 
usually sells at a premium over intrinsic value, and £his 
premium disappears at expiration. The disappearance of the 
premium on warrants with given expiration dates is one cost.
The other cost is the dividend, if any, that is lost by holding 
warrants instead of stock.
The formula for calculating the imputed return may 
be described by:
P + D 
(N)(Ps-Pw)
4Russel J. Morrison, "The Warrant Or The Stock," The 
Analysts Journal, Vol. 13, No. 5 (November, 1957), pp. 51-52.
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Where P = premium on the warrant
D = anticipated dividends per share for N years
N = number of years to expiration
Ps = market price of common stock
Pw = market price of warrant to buy one share
The formula relates the smaller commitment in the warrant over 
the holding period to the costs of buying the warrant, rather 
than the common stock. The resultant percentage can be 
conceptualized as the minimum rate of return necessary on 
other investments before a given warrant is preferred over 
the common stock.
The imputed return approach is best suited for war­
rants with relatively short maturity horizons. National 
General’s old warrant provides an example of such an instru­
ment. It is exercisable into common stock at $15.00 per 
share and expires May 14, 1974. On April 3, 1970, the 
common stock traded at $18.00 and the warrant closed at 
$9.25. National General also pays an annual cash dividend 
of $.20 per share. By substituting these data into Morrison's 
formula, one obtains an imputed return of 19.65%. The return 
is calculated as follows:
P + D _ 6.25 + .80 _ 7 -05
(N) (Ps-Pw ) (4.1) (18-9.25) 35.875
= .1965
Break-even price. Morrison1s second method in ap­
praising warrants deserves special attention, because it 
enables an investor to quantify the price appreciation- of the 
stock necessary for the warrant to be superior to the common 
as an investment. For example, if a stock trades at $6 
and the "break-even price'1 is calculated to be $12, the in­
vestor can assess the probability of the stock reaching $12
over a given period of time. High break-even prices in re­
lation to existing prices would expose specific warrants as 
being overpriced.
Morrison provided the following formula for calcu­
lating the "break-even price:"
A = "■ ■■ + Z
1 - X/Y
Where: A = "break-even price"
W = exercising price of warrant
X = current market price of warrant
Y = current market price of a share- -
Z = total dividends anticipated on a share during 
the future life of a warrant.
Morrison's formula can be applied to National General's 
warrant in the following manner.
A = _______~   + .80
1-(9.25/18)
The calculated price of $29.98 enables one to assess the merits 
of a commitment in the warrants. A high probability of 
National General's common stock attaining a price of more - 
than $29.9 8 in the next four years would indicate the warrants
i
to be more attractive than the common stock.
The primary weaknesses of his schema stem from its
inflexibility. Premiums do not evaporate in a step-wise
i t
fashion to a given expiration date. Given purchasers may 
take short-term positions in warrants and not be penalized 
by an eroding premium. The action of premiums is even more
i
j
unpredictable on perpetual or long-term warrants. It may
i
be surmised that Morrison's methodology applies only to 
warrants approaching expiration. Perhaps the major weak­
ness of the break-even formula is its failure to recognize 
downside risks. This can be illustrated with the following 
exmaple. Assume that a warrant trades at $21 and expires 
in 2 years. The exercise price is $10^ and the common trades 
at $30 and pays no cash dividend. The break-even price is 
calculated to be:
A " 10 = $33.33
1 - 21/30
The break-even price of $33.33 may look attractive, 
since it is only 11.1% above the price of the common. How­
ever, an investment in the warrant could expose a purchaser 
to unsuspected downside risks. For example, if the common 
declines by 1/3, the warrant should lose about 1/2 its value.
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I
Morrison's formula can be ruled ineffective when the warrant
.1
trades near its intrinsic value due to high prices of the 
common stock.
]
Guynemer Giguere1s Mathematical Modeh I;
Giguere's article^ contributed a new approach to 
warrant valuation. He suggested that the relationship be­
tween the value of a warrant and its corresponding stock is 
given by a parabola with its vertex at (0,0) and whose 
equation is:
4a
Where: W = Value of the warrant
P = Price of the stock <
a = Exercise price 
Giguere demonstrated the correlation between his 
formulated warrant values and the actual warrant prices by 
using price data for Tri-Continental and Atlas Corporation, 
both perpetual in nature. These data were taken from market 
quotes in the early and middle 19 50's. The observed relation 
ships led Giguere to conclude that his mathematical formula 
could prove helpful in locating attractively priced warrants.
5
Guynemer Giguere, "Warrants-A Mathematical Method of 
Evaluation," The Analysts Journal, Vol. 15, No. 5 (Novembert 
1958), pp. 17-25.'
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Giguere recognized that his model would not apply 
uniformly to all warrants. Warrant uniqueness in time to 
expiration, variable exercise price, marketability, and 
speculative nature of the corresponding common had to be 
considered before proper pricing could be determined. He 
made a specific adjustment to his formula by deducting 
(arl6) from the calculated warrant price, when it had from 
one to five years to expiration. The arl6 adjustment could 
be changed to a^8 or av20 depending on the experience of the 
historical relationship, but Giguere failed to elaborate on 
the specific method of making such a determination. His 
formula deemed warrants with expiration dates of more than 
5 years to be valued identically with perpetual instruments. 
He did not feel that warrants with less than one year could 
be properly evaluated with a formula.
Giguere failed to adjust his model for different 
ranges of marketability, exercise price adjustments, or ex­
pectations of the related common stock. He mentioned the 
incongruencies of these factors but failed to recommend 
solutions. Giguere also recognized the weakness of his 
basic formula when the P> 2a by requiring that W = P-a 
(warrant be priced at its intrinsic value) when P> 2a.
Thus, Giguere*s basic formula as modified reads:
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2
W - _P _ a (-a is utilized when expiration date is from 
4a 16 16 1 to 5 years hence.)
Subject to: W = P-a
When: P> 2a
Giguere's formula reveals a fair.value for National 
General's old warrant to be $4.46. The value is determined 
by:
W — (18) ^  __ 15 — 324   9 375
(4) (15) 16 60
= 5.40 - .94 
= $4.46
The actual price of National General's warrant is $9.25 or 
more than twice as high as Giguere's calculated fair value 
of $4.46 on April 3, 1970.
The formula presented by Giguere is helpful in des­
cribing how a warrant's value is a function of its related 
stock's price. The simplicity of his model is also commend­
able. However, some basic inconsistencies are present in his 
article. For example, his adjustment of minus aV-16 or aV20 
may create a negative value for individual warrants. He 
discussed the importance of expiration dates and suggested 
that warrants with long periods to expiration should be 
valued higher than near term warrants. Mathematically, how­
ever, he expressed warrants with expiration dates in excess 
of 5 years to be valued identically with perpetual warrants.
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Giguere also justified the appropriateness of his model 
based on empirical data existing in the 1950's. He further 
indicated that his predicted values for warrants were usually 
low or conservative. Actually, his approach is entirely too 
conservative to be useful in selecting warrants for purchase 
today. Chapter IV will explicate this conclusion in a more 
comprehensive fashion.
Kassouf * s Norm Value Model
Another mathematical model, focusing on the relation­
ship between the stock's price and the warrant's value, was 
developed by Kassouf. Kassouf's model is defined as the 
hyperbolic equation:^
Where: Y = warrant's value
a = exercise price 
x = price of common 
Kassouf refers to the resultant value of the warrant as the 
norm value.
wants to have a norm value of $8.34, The normal value is 
calculated by:
Kassouf s formula estimates National General's war-
^S. T. Kassouf, Evaluation of Convertible Securities 
(New York: Analytical Publishers Co., 1966), p. 26.
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Y « N|(i5> 2 + (18) 2 - 15
Y = ^549 - 15
Y = 23.43 - 15
Y = $8.43
The actual price of the warrant is close to Kassouf*s normal 
value.
Kassouf does not claim to .have a* sound set of as­
sumptions leading to development of the model, but he does 
claim that empirical evidence lends support to his model. 
Kassouf, like Giguere, demonstrated the accuracy of his 
formula by comparing norm {predicted) values to actual 
prices for individual warrants.
Kassouf also places constraints on the norm value by 
excluding warrants that do not meet the following normal 
conditions: (1) a life of 4 or more years; (2) potential 
dilution of less than 15%; and, (3) a dividend rate on the 
common of less than 4%.7 Kassouf's overall valuation of 
warrants introduces two new variables that influence warrant 
values. They are dividends on the associated common stock 
and potential dilution from convertible securities. He 
failed to discuss the rationale supporting the negative im­
pact of these variables on the common, but he obviously
7Ibid., p. 10.
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assumed high dividend payouts and high amounts of dilution 
have restrictive influences on the value of warrants.
Kassouf felt warrants that were priced at less than 
norm values and met the specified normal conditions offer 
attractively priced investment vehicles. His normal con­
ditions and norm value, however, appear too restrictive for 
the majority of warrants. It is illustrated in Table V 
that either the norm value or one of the normal conditions 
eliminates all of the following warrants from purchase 
commitments. These data are taken from Kassouf's Table I 
and represent closing prices for September 21, 1962.
Tri-Continental's warrant meets all the conditions 
except that of the dividend yield which is to be less than 
4%. Tri-Continental's yield was exactly 4%. Table V il­
lustrates the restrictiveness of Kassouf's approach to 
warrant valuation. In their original forms, Kassouf's and 
Giguere's models are conservative in selecting warrants to 
purchase. In Chart 6 the relationship of Kassouf's ap­
proach to the basic formula of Giguere is portrayed.
The hyperbolic formula of Kassouf provides warrant 
values almost double those of Giguere when the common price 
is less than 50% of the exercise price, as can be seen in 
Chart 6. For example, at .5X Kassouf provides a warrant 
value of $.118 whereas Giguere calculated the warrant at 
$.0625. Also illustrated is a major weakness of the Kassouf
TABLE V
KASSOUF'S NORM VALUE AND NORMAL CONDITIONS
- Company Terms Com.Price
War
Price
Norm
Value
%  Pot. 
Dilut.
% Div. 
Com.
Alleghany 1 sh. @ 3.75; perp. 8.00 4.88 5.00 26 0
Armour 1 sh. @ 20; to 12/64 36.00 22.50 21.10 12 3.9
Atlas 1 sh. @  6.25; perp. 2.50 .94 .63 33 0
First Nat. Realty 1 .05 sh. @ 6 . 0 0  to 12/66
6.75 to 12/71 3.25 1.25 .90 30 3.1
Gen. Acceptance 1 @  20 to 11/69 19.50 6.50 8.00 47 5.1
Hilton Hotels 1 @ 42 to 10/63; 46 to
10/67, etc. 24.00 6.50 6.25 11 6.3
Jeff. Lake Petro. 1 i 7 to 6/65; plus 1 ea.
yr. to 6/71 5.63 2.38 1.96 20 0
Mack Trucks 1 .4 @  45 to 9/63; 47.50 to
9/65; 50 to 9/66 35.13 15.63 21.60 21 5.1
Martin Marietta 2.73 @ 4 0  to 11/63; 45 to
11/68 22.63 28.50 33.80 2 4.4
McCrory Corp. 1 @ 20 to 3/76 22.25 7.13 10.10 42 4.0
Molybdenum 1 .05 @ 30 to 10/63 28.50 14.25 12.90 10 0
Pacific Petro 1 @  19 to 3/68 12.88 6.38 3.90 6 0
Realty Equities 1 @ 7.50 to 8/63; plus
.50 ea. 1.5 yr 7.13 1.75 2.82 44 2.8
Rio Algom .135 @  22.23 to 12/66 9.69 .44 .28 4 0
Sperry Rand 1 .08 @ 25 to 9/63; 28 to
9/67 12.75 7.12 5.20 7 0
Symington Wayne 1 @  10 5/63; 15 to 5/68 15.13 6.25 8.12 26 5.3
Teleregister 1 @ 15 to 5/63; 17 to 5/65 5.13 2.50 .85 4 0
Textron 1 @ 25 to 5/64; plus 5 ea.
5 yrs. 25.00 10.00 10.40 23 5.0
Trans World Air 1 @  20 to 6/65; 22 to 12/73 10.00 4.25 2.40 29 0
Tri-Continental 1 .27 @  22.60; perp. 36.88 27.63 29.30 11 4.0
Univ. American 1 @  13.75 to 3/67 7.88 2.63 2.15 22 0
Source: S. T. Kassouf, Evaluation of Convertible Securities (New York: Analytical Pub­
lishers Co., 1966), p. 26.
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CHART 6
GRAPHIC COMPARISON OF KASSOUF AND GIGUERE MODELS
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formula; the calculated norm for warrant values always 
lies above the intrinsic value. Giguere's formula, as previ­
ously described, shows the warrant equal its intrinsic value 
when the common price is 2 times its exercise price. These 
hueristic models have provided new insight into the dynamics 
of warrant pricing. Both Kassouf and Giguere, however, 
failed to test their model's efficiency in selecting war­
rants for purchase. Chapter IV includes a test of how well 
these models select warrants for purchase.
Investment Bankers Study of Warrants
Perhaps the most comprehensive study of warrant price 
behavior was undertaken by the Investment Bankers Association 
of America. The Association wanted to establish uniform 
principles of taxation for these securities when they were 
received as compensation by underwriters and other indepen­
dent contractors. Their study was concerned with establish­
ing valuation principles for these securities.
The original statistical format called for an analy­
sis of 10 6 individual warrants from July 1957 through June 
1963. However, 19 of these warrants failed to meet specific 
criteria and were eliminated from the study. The criteria
i
necessary for a warrant's inclusion in the study follow:
(1) the warrant had to have been issued by an
American company, defined as one incorporated 
in the U.S.;
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(2) the warrant had to be exercisable only with 
cash, as opposed to some warrants which 
provide for exercise through the tender of 
senior securities of the issuing company;
(3) the warrant had to be exercisable for common 
stock, which excludes some warrants entitling 
the holder to purchase other securities of the 
issuer; and
(4) the warrant had to be actively traded for three 
months. In this connection, the criterion em­
ployed was that quotations for the warrant and 
optioned stock be available in issues of the 
R.H.M. Survey for three consecutive months.**
The final results of the study were based on an analy­
sis of 87 warrants and included examination of over 3,200 
market price quotations. Each warrant was standardized by 
dividing its exercise price into the price of the common and 
the price of the warrant. Therefore, the statistical data 
were in terms of two ratios— one referred to as the relative 
value of the warrant and the other the relative value of the 
common stock. The relationship of these relative values was 
then measured by a regression equation which may be written 
as Rw = a(Rc)b . Rw and Rc represent the relative values of 
a warrant and of a common stock while a and b are constants 
determined by using a least-squares regression program.
The basic study was limited to warrants with lives
g
Federal Income Taxation of Compensatory Options 
(Including Warrants) Granted To Underwriters And Other Inde­
pendent Contractors (Washington, D.C.: Investment Bankers 
Association, 1963), p. 45.
in excess of two years, with steady exercise prices for at 
least 1 year. The findings revealed that average warrants 
sell at 41% of their exercise prices when market prices and 
exercise prices are at parity. The average value of the 
warrant, when the common trades at various levels relative 
to the exercise price, is revealed in Table VI.
TABLE VI 
NORMALIZED WARRANT VALUES
Ratio of Market Value 
of Optioned Stock 
To Exercise Price
Ratio of Market 
Value of Option 
To Exercise Price
80% 28%
90 34
100 41
110 48
120 55
Source: Federal Income Taxation of Compensatorv Options 
(Including Warrants) Granted To Underwriters And Other Inde­
pendent Contractors (Washington, D.C.: Investment Bankers
Association, 1963), p. 45.
The basic regression equation for the 87 warrants was 
not revealed in the study, but the empirical approach to 
warrant valuation seems to have merit. The study also recog­
nized that other factors may influence warrant values, and it 
discussed the influence of four possible developments, namely;
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(1) approaching expiration, (2) step-up in exercise price,
(3) deferred transferability, and (4) deferred exercis­
ability.^
The study tested the significance of approaching 
expiration by calculating a standard premium for all war­
rants. This was accomplished by determining the difference 
between the standard valuation and the intrinsic value. The 
ratio of actual premiums to standard premiums was then de­
termined for various intervals prior to expiration. Results 
indicated that approaching expiration is unimportant until 
a warrant has 2 years or less to maturity.10
An interesting finding was one that pertained to 
warrants containing step-up prices. Nearly 1,500 price 
quotations were collected for warrants with increasing 
exercise prices. The findings indicated that step-ups 
significantly affect warrant prices within a period of 9 
months or less before the step-up. The results also show 
that the warrants with step-ups 3 years or more in the future 
actually sell at higher premiums than those that exist on 
average warrants.11
9Ibid., p. 52.
-^Ibid., pp. 53-55.
^ T h i s  unusual phenomenon may be observed in their 
Chart 4. It is not discussed in the text of their paper, 
however.
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Also measured in this study was the influence of 
warrants with a period of time before they may be detached 
from another security and trade alone. An insignificant 
effect on warrant value with transferability restricted for 
one year or less was evidenced. A similar conclusion was 
rendered for warrants with deferred exercisability of 1 year 
of less."^
The IBA study must be regarded as a comprehensive 
compilation of statistical data concerning warrant values; 
its conclusions appear logical in most instances. However, 
one must question the conclusion that warrants with two years 
to maturity should be given identical values as warrants with 
perpetual lives— especially at all ranges of the common stock1s 
price. Other differences will be explored in Chapter IV.
John Shelton1s Multiple Regression 
Study
Shelton introduced numerous innovative approaches to 
warrant valuation in a 1967 article in the Financial Analysts
■^Federal income Taxation of Compensatory Options 
(Including Warrants) Granted To Underwriters And Other Inde­
pendent Contractors (Washington, D.C.: Investment Bankers 
Association, 1963), p. 45.
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Journal. He established a zone of plausible warrant prices 
by recognizing the minimum price of a warrant to be its in­
trinsic value. He deduced, from empirical results and 
theoretical concepts, that warrants will trade at their 
intrinsic value when the common stock is priced at four 
times its option price. For example, if a common stock 
trades at $40 and the warrant provides the right to buy 
one share at $10, the warrant will sell at $30. Shelton 
concludes that the speculative value of a warrant will dis­
appear when the common is priced 4'times the warrant's ex­
ercise price.
Shelton carried the logic of 4 times the exercise 
price to lower levels of stock-option price relationships.
He concluded that an appropriate upper limit on the warrant 
price is three-fourths of the common stock price. He found 
support to his zone of plausible prices by plotting 157 
observations of warrant-stock relationships. Only one ob­
servation exceeded the upper limit. Shelton's zone of 
plausible warrant prices can be described symbolically as:
■*-3John p. Shelton, The Relation of the Price of a 
Warrant to'the Price of Its Associated Stock," Part I," 
Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 23, No. 3 (May-June, 1967), 
pp. 143-151. For a similar approach, see Sheen Kassouf, "A 
Theory And An Econometric Model For Common Stock Purchase 
Warrants," (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Columbia 
University, 1965), pp. 1-88.
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(Ps-Po) < P w « 3 / 4 P s  if Ps < 4 (Po)
Pw =* (Ps-Po) if Ps 1  4(Po)
Where: Ps = Price of the stock
Pw - Price of the warrant 
Po = Option price 
The variation of warrant prices within the newly
defined zone concerned Shelton. He decided to analyze
specific variables that could lead to positioning of these 
prices and selected the following independent variables for 
trial:
(1) the longevity of the warrant (measured in 
months with an arbitrary truncation of 120 
months for perpetual warrants);
(2) the current yield on the common stock
(3) whether the warrant was listed on the
American Stock Exchange or traded over 
the counter;
(4) whether the warrant sold for more or less 
than $500;
(5) the past volatility of the common stock
(measured by averaging the ratios of annual
high dividend by annual low for each of the 
three preceding years); and
(6) the recent trend of the stock price (measured 
by the percentage change of the stock over the 
past year),14
John P. Shelton, "The Relation Of The Price Of A 
Warrant To The Price Of Its Associated stock. Part II," 
Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 23, Wo. 4 (July-August, 
1967), pp. 91-92.
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These variables were tested for colinearity by using
a simple correlation approach. They were all deemed ac­
ceptable for a multiple regression program, since none were 
highly correlated. These independent variables were then 
tested to see how well they predicted the variation of war­
rant prices in the aforementioned zone of plausible prices. 
The most highly affective variable in predicting warrant 
pricing was found to be the dividend yield of the stock— with 
the higher yield indicating a lower price for the warrant. 
Thus, the coefficient was negative. Next in importance 
was whether the warrant was listed on the American Stock 
Exchange or traded over-the-counter. Warrants listed on 
the A.S.E. had positive coefficients. The next important 
variable was the longevity of the warrant. The three other 
variables did not prove to be significant to Shelton in 
predicting warrant price behavior. Shelton's significant 
variables provided a multiple correlation value of .61 
indicating that unexplained variation remains high.
not a linear function, therefore, he substituted a "fourth- 
root" adjustment. He employed the findings of the previously 
mentioned Investment Bankers Study to justify use of the ad­
justment factor. The resultant equation for locating a 
warrant's price was:
Shelton reasoned that the longevity calculation was
Y = longQYitZ) [. 47-4 . 25 (yield)+ . 17 if listed] 
T 72
88
This formula can be applied to individual warrants in the 
following manner:
(1) Multiply the price of the stock by .75 to deter­
mine the upper limit.
(2) Deduct, the option price from the price of the 
stock to determine the lower limit or intrinsic 
value (if any).15
(3) Subtract the lower limit from the upper limit to 
determine the zone of plausible prices.
(4) Use the above formula to determine the positioning
of each warrant in the zone and then add the mini­
mum value if any. For example, data for National 
General's old warrant were as follows:
TABLE VII
SHELTON'S APPROACH IN DETERMINING WARRANT VALUES
Price of common stock 18.00
Exercise price 15.00
Dividend yield 1,1%
Longevity (months) 49
Where traded ASE
(1) 18.00 (3/4) - 13.50 (upper limit)
(2) 18.00 - 15.00= 3.00 (lower limit)
(3) 13.50 - 3.00= 10.50 (zone of P.P.)
= (^9) (.47-4.25(.011) + .17)
= ( V. 8248) (.423+.17)
= (.9082) (.593) = .539 
= (.539)(10.50) = $5.66 plus $3.00 
= $8.66
15If the option price of the stock is greater than the
89
Data for the National General.warrant were not compli­
cated by uneven number of shares or step-up exercise prices. 
The complexity of the calculation is grossly understated.
These prices are calculated for over 172 observations in 
Chapter IV to test the efficiency of the model.
Shelton should be complimented for presenting a new 
approach to warrant valuation as his zone of plausible prices 
is totally new. However, his relatively small sample in con­
junction with his low coefficient of determination leave the 
statistical inference suspect.
Introduction To Convertible Bond Models 
The development of convertible bond models has oc­
curred in a short period of time. Most of the research has 
taken place in the 19 60's with important projects contributed 
in the last 5 years.
Eugene Brigham1s Convertible Bond Model
Perhaps the most penetrating discussion of convertible 
bonds was presented in Brigham's 1966 article.^-® In it he 
constructed a graphic model and described its important
stock price, the lower limit will be zero. The warrant's 
price in this case is based solely on speculative value.
^Eugene F. Brigham, "An Analysis of Convertible De­
bentures: Theory And Some Empirical Evidence," The Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March, 1966), pp. 35-54.
C)0
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features. Interactions of the key variables were analyzed, 
as was the rationale behind convertible bond issuance.
Brigham's hypothetical convertible bond model, re­
produced as Chart 7, focuses on straight debt value and con­
version value. The conversion value (C) on the "y" axis 
was determined by multiplying the number of shares the bond 
may be exchanged for by the market price per share. The line 
(CCt ) illustrates the growth in market price over a period 
of years. The entire curve (CCt) may be expressed by the 
following equation:
Ct = Po(l+g)fcR 
Where: Ct = the conversion value at time t;
Po = the initial market price of the stock;
g = rate of growth of the stock's price;
R = the number of shares into which the 
bond may be converted
The straight debt value (B) may be described as a 
function of the bonds' coupon rate, compared with existing 
yields on similar rated bonds, over a definite time horizon.
B is shown to rise toward par (M) over its life; suggested 
that initial coupon rates on convertible bonds are typically 
less than the going rate of interest. The call price (V) is 
shown to decrease to par over the life of the security. The 
line (MM1) represents the price of the bond. The premium on 
the bond is designated by the slash marks and is shown to be
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confined by either BX or XCfc. BXCt is described by Brigham 
as a price floor. The spread between MM* and the floor 
represents the premium marginal investors are willing to 
pay for the conversion option. It is interesting to note 
that Brigham shows the greatest premium at point X, where 
C = B, which confirms the premiums described in Chart 3 in 
Chapter II. The amount of the premium grows as C approaches 
B, then diminishes steadily until M M 1 rests on CC^*
Possible reasons for the elimination of the premium 
are numerous. The domination of the straight debt value by 
the conversion value, at some point, is of primary importance. 
At this point, the market place considers the security to be 
identical with common stock. Obversely, straight debt value 
may dominate conversion value, at some point, and the market 
price will equal B. For example, what price would a $900 
straight debt value convertible bond command with a conver­
sion value of $10? The market place would probably ignore 
the conversion value in pricing the security as it ignores 
straight debt value, at some point, for the common stock.
Brigham's graphic model has provided a framework 
that has led to productive research on convertible bond 
financing. It indirectly influenced the creation of the 
valuation model introduced in Chapter V.
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Probability Distribution Model for 
Convertible Bonds
In 1966 a pertinent article on convertible bonds was 
presented by William Baumol, Burton Malkiel, and Richard 
Quandt.*^ They recognized that convertible bonds generally 
sell at a premium over the higher straight debt value or 
conversion value. They referred to the convertible feature 
and/or the straight debt value as providing an insurance 
value which cushions price declines. Prior to introducing 
their valuation model, they suggested that proper evalua­
tion required an assessment of the present value of interest 
receipts and an assessment of principal value along with the 
expected value of the convertible feature.
The valuation models developed by these writers 
assume that the determination of convertible bond premiums 
are revealed in two specific ways. First, one may deter­
mine the conversion value and then add the value of the in­
surance afforded by the straight debt value. Such an approach 
was described by the following model:
William J. Baumol, Burton G. Malkiel, and Richard 
E. Quandt, "The Valuation of Convertible Securities," Quar­
terly Journal of Economics, Vol. 80, No. 1 (Feb., 1966), pp. 
48-59.
94
C >  C„ = PS +C^/ps f(i,to) [B - i(t)PS]di(t)
s 0 o
Where: C = value of convertible
B = bond value
S — number of shares of stock into which 
the convertible may be exchanged
P(t) = the price, per common share at date t
PS = initial conversion value
i (t) — a price-relative of a share at date t
to = date on which the convertible is being 
evaluated
This equation shows the insurance value of the 
straight debt instrument to be positive only when the con­
version value is less than 5. This is shown by the limits 
of integration with i(t) = 0  and i(t) - B/PS. Therefore, a 
probability distribution for P(t) which assumes all values 
of P(t)S to be greater than B will not enable a premium to 
be based on the insurance value of debt. Rather, the entire 
value of the security will be based on PS in such a situation, 
Conversely, a probability distribution that contained. P(t)S 
values lower than B would add to the initial conversion value 
of the bond. This model approaches convertible bond valua­
tion by first examining conversion value and then adding an 
appropriate premium for the straight debt value cushion.
The cushion would' be nugatory if there were= a 100% probabil­
ity that the conversion value would never be lower than the
debt value.
The second1 approach to convertible bond valuation 
is to determine the debt value, then add the value of the 
convertible feature. Their model for such an approach is:
PS-b J di(t)
This equation assumes B to remain constant over the 
time horizon in which the probability distribution of the 
common stock is determined. The formula shows the premium 
over straight value to be governed by the probability of the 
conversion value exceeding the straight debt value, Baumol, 
Malkiel, and Quandt reverse their limits of integration some-
t
what for this formula. The lower limit should show PS/B be­
cause only at PS>"3 will a premium be contributed. The 
maximum value of i(t) isoo, since infinitely high values of 
the common contribute a premium over debt value.
The authors properly' show that the maximum value of 
the‘two equations should determine the value of the conver­
tible bond. This is noted by:
C = max {Cs ,Cb )
Their two models are consistent with the graphic description 
of the convertible bond as described by Brigham. For example, 
the first equation would provide a low or non-existent 
premium if the.initial price of the stock were high, since 
the probability of P(t)S being less than B would be small.
/\Q o
C i C b = B +J_ f (i, to) [i (t)
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The price of the convertible would then rest on its conver­
sion value. The second equation would also reveal a low or 
zero premium over B when the probability of the conversion 
value exceeding B over a definite time horizon was low.
The highest premiums would be calculated when B = P S .  This 
is consistent with Chart 3 in Chapter II.
The writers tested the efficiency of their model by 
assuming two time horizons— one of 2 4 months and the other 
of 36 months. They determined the subjective probability 
distributions of the common stock by extrapolating past 
distributions into the future. These magic forecasts were 
made for 7 convertible bonds, and their resultant values 
were compared to actual market prices. The spread between 
predicted values and actual values was extremely high, but 
the significance of the models was not undermined. The 
poor estimates arose from the improper assessment of the 
common stock's future performance.
A Regression Model for Convertible 
Bond Premiums
The determination of a fair price for a convertible 
bond leads directly to an assessment of the premium. Weil, 
Segall, and Green contributed an interesting approach to 
determining convertible bond premiums in a recently published
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article.1** They surveyed current literature and identified 
seven independent variables that have been ascribed as in­
fluential on premiums. These variables were: {1) trans­
actions costs, (2) income differences, (3) financing costs,
(4) anti-dilution clauses, (5) price floors, (6) volatility 
of price, and (7) duration.19 It was reasoned that some of 
these variables should not be tested because they were not 
quantifiable. For example, how could one properly quantify 
anti-dilution clauses? The authors recognized the divergence 
of different clauses but reasoned their significance to be 
of little importance.
The writers also recognized the potential importance 
of the price volatility of the common stock. However, they 
decided to test only bonds whose conversion values exceeded 
par value. They felt that bond prices would already reflect 
a risk measurement and therefore excluded price volatility 
as an independent variable.
The duration of the convertible privilege and the 
financing costs were also eliminated. Even though the im­
portance of the life of the convertible feature was discussed,
l®Roman L. Weil, Jr., Joel E. Segall, and David Green, 
Jr., "Premiums on Convertible Bonds," The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 23, No. 3 (June, 1968), pp. 445-463. For similar and 
more detailed study see Gary Stone, "An Analysis of The Invest 
ment Nature of Convertible Bonds," (unpublished Doctor's dis­
sertation, Stanford University, 1967), pp. 128-205.
^Ibid. , pp. 445-447.
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it was not included as an independent variable due to the 
lack of an operational measure* Financing costs were deemed 
to be quantitatively unimportant on the basis of substitute 
credit sources and small differences in cost.
Three independent variables then remained for use 
in-predicting premiums on convertibles.. They were, the 
price floor, income differences, and differences in trans­
action costs. The general form of the equation was:
|  - +lf|  + S 1
Where: P = calculated premium
B = bond price
F = floor variable; the difference between the 
bond price and the straight debt value of 
the bond as reported in Moody's Bond Survey.
Yd = difference in current income streams; bond
income (coupons) less stock income (dividends 
per share multiplied by number of shares 
into which the bond is convertible).
T = transaction cost difference; cost to buy
the stock into which the bond is convertible 
less cost to buy the bond including all 
transfer taxes.
The general equation was modified for the non-linear 
relationship of the premium to the straight debt value of 
the bond. The premium was claimed to be a monotonically 
decreasing function of the floor variable and therefore 
divided into ten ranges: (1-10), (10-20), (20-30), (30-40),
(40-50), (50-75), (75-100), (100-150), (150-200), and (above
99 ,
200).20
The authors utilized 452 observations of convertible 
bond values gathered for 18 different dates to evaluate 
their model. These observations were separated into two 
sets through the use of a random-number series. One half of 
the observations were used to calculate the coefficients of 
the specific equation, the other half of the observations 
were tested using the estimated coefficients.
The results of the regression on the first half of 
the data revealed an R2 of .57. When the estimated coef­
ficients were used to predict the premiums in the other 
half of the sample, the coefficients failed to perform as well 
as on the primary set. The quasi— R2 dropped to .36.^1 The 
t values all proved significantly different from zero for 
the floor variable— thus, the floor variable was omitted 
and a similar regression program was fitted. Again the re­
sults were not powerful.
The major finding of this research was claimed to 
be the negligible importance of the floor in explaining the 
premium. Historically, it was claimed, too much emphasis 
has been placed on the significance of the floor. The
2QIbid., p. 454.
A  | .
21Ibid.. p. 456. Quasi-R defined as 1- /a where a 
is variance of P/B and b is residual variance.
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studies previously reviewed in this paper were cited as ex­
amples. It was also claimed that either stop-loss orders 
to sell at a set price or the use of a put contract may 
establish a floor with greater significance. In effect, 
it was proposed that straight debt value has little or no 
influence on the premium of a convertible bond with the 
conversion value greater than par.
Weil, Segall, and Green seem to have overlooked the 
cost of their hypothetical floor. The use of stop-loss 
orders may cause a whipsawing effect which could result in 
excessive commissions of selling for protection and then 
buying back for appreciation. The cost of put contracts may 
consume the entire value of convertible bonds if they are 
used over a long time horizon. ,
Concluding Remarks 
All of the research projects reviewed herein provide 
insight into the proper evaluation of the securities under 
discussion. These research efforts, however, are circum­
scribed in the following ways:
(1) Static models have been designed for dynamic rela­
tionships. A mathematical model verified by empiri­
cal data over a limited time horizon can not be
extrapolated into the future. The models should 
offer adjustments in lieu of changing conditions.
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(2) Recent research projects have placed too much
emphasis on the power of a particular statistical 
technique and have failed to fully evaluate the 
parameters of the problem in question. For example, 
multiple regression approaches used in identifying 
significant independent variables have provided 
contradictory findings.22 Most researchers using
this technique have made allowances for the non­
linear relationships that exist for most of these 
variables, but they have still failed to fully treat 
the variety of influences of these variables. 
Longevity has been accorded varying degrees of im­
portance. Obviously, longevity may contribute 
nothing to value when the common exceeds the exer­
cise or conversion price by a sizeable amount, but 
it may prove highly significant at low prices of the 
common relative to these critical values.
22The Shelton regression model described the foregone 
dividend yield as second only to the stock price in predicting 
warrant value. Shelton also concluded that price volatility 
had an insignificant influence on warrant value. A recent 
article by James C. Van Horne yielded an entirely different 
set of relationships. Van Horne found a regression coeffici­
ent for volatility of .184 and a "t" value of 2.95 while 
dividend yields had a small regression coefficient of -.011 
and a "t" value of only 1.16. See James C. Van Horne, "War­
rant Valuation In Relation to Volatility and Opportunity 
Costs," The Industrial Management Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 
(Spring, 1969) , pp. 19-32.
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(3) Recent research projects have attempted to analyze 
too many variables in testing the predictability of 
independent variables. This has led to inconclusive 
and contradictory findings.
Chapter IV attempts to identify the warrant-stock 
relationship as it is influenced by the longevity of the 
option. Convertible bond values are evaluated in a similar 
fashion in Chapter V.
CHAPTER IV
AN EVALUATION MODEL FOR STOCK PURCHASE WARRANTS
Introduction
This chapter is comprised of two parts, the first 
of which deals with the development of a warrant model.
The model is created by normalizing the common stock price 
and the warrant price by dividing the exercise price into 
these values. Observations are separated into six time-to- 
expiration categories. A power function is utilized to 
convert these observations to predictive equations that 
are used in determining fair values for warrants.
The second part of this chapter, which focuses on 
testing the model, involves a study of all of the common 
stock warrants listed on the American Stock Exchange from 
1960 through 1969. Performance data are gathered for the 
four separate models used in the study. Through this pro­
cess conclusions concerning the utility of the empirical 
models are drawn.
Development of the Model 
Influence of Prior Research Projects
Numerous researchers have concluded that the most
10 3
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important variable influencing warrant pricing is the 
corresponding price of the common stock. As previously 
mentioned, other independent variables such as dividend 
yields on the common, volatility of the common, and longevity 
of the warrant have been accorded different levels of signifi­
cance in separate research projects.
At first glance the impact of dividends on the value 
of a warrant appears to be negative. Cash dividends are 
paid directly to common stockholders and warrant owners 
receive no direct benefits. Moreover, the warrant owner 
finds his potential equity in the firm reduced by the amount 
of the dividend on each payment date. Before concluding 
that warrants on dividend paying stocks should be valued 
lower than warrants on low or non-dividend stocks, it must 
be recognized that dividend rates may influence the value 
of the stock and consequently the value of the warrant. 
Empirical studies, have generally found regression coeffici­
ents for dividends to be greater and more significant than 
those for retained earnings.^* The higher positive coef­
ficients indicate that dividends influence the value of the 
common stock to a greater extent than do retained earnings.
1James C. Van Horne, Financial Management and Policy 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 188- 
189.
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Therefore, the higher price for the common stock would 
produce higher market values for warrants.
The past volatility of the common stock also seems 
to have a role in determining market value of warrants. 
Theoretically, the warrants of a company whose common stock 
has ranged in price from $10 to $30 would be more attractive 
to a potential warrant buyer than one with a range of $18 to 
$22. However, empirical studies using the past trading 
range of the common stock have failed to produce conclusive 
evidence as to its influence on warrant values. General 
Acceptance Corporation (Now GAC Corporation) offers a classic 
example of how a stock may trade in a narrow range over a 
long period of time and then realize a substantial apprecia­
tion. GAC's stock never rose above 26.75 nor fell below 17.00 
from 1960 through 1966. By the end of 1968 the common had 
risen to 64.125 and the warrant gained 864% to a price of 
43.375. Numerous examples may be used to confirm the inef­
ficiency of past trading ranges to predict future price
2
See James C. Van Horne, "Warrant Valuation in Rela­
tion to Volatility and Opportunity Costs," The Industrial 
Management Review. Vol. 10, No. 3 (Spring, 1969), pp. 24-26. 
See also John P. Shelton, "The Relation of the Price of a 
Warrant to the Price of Its Associated Stock," Financial 
Analysts Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4 (July-August, 1967), pp. 94- 
97. The researcher also experimented with a crude measure of 
past volatility of the common stock in predicting market moves 
in warrants. The findings revealed an insignificant and 
negative coefficient. It was concluded that past volatility 
fails to predict future price levels or trading ranges for 
individual warrants.
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movements of warrants.
The influence of longevity receives special treat­
ment in this paper. Prior researchers indicate this variable 
to be highly significant only for warrants approaching ex­
piration. The reviewed research seemed to have produced con­
clusive evidence that a time horizon beyond a specific number 
of years has little or no influence on warrant values. The 
Investment Banking Study used 2 years, Kassouf 4 years,
Giguere 5 years, and Shelton 10 years. The researchers all 
concluded that warrants beyond some specific number of years 
to maturity should be valued identically regardless of their 
actual longevity.
The arbitrary truncation of all warrants beyond some 
specific number or years arose from empirical investigations—  
because theory can not support such a decision. Warrants 
often expire with the price of the common at less than the 
exercise price and thus become worthless, whereas a longer 
maturity would have given rise to a tangible value with the 
common priced above the exercise price. Theoretically, the
■^Jefferson Lake Petroleum common ranged from 7.00 to 
10.00 in 1964. One year later the common closed at 22.50 and 
the warrant appreciated 339% to 15.375. The common of Nation­
al General also traded from a high of 12,50 in 1965 to a low 
of 7.50 in 19 66. National General's warrants appreciated from 
4.25 to 13.875 in 1967 for a 226.5% increase. These examples 
support the lack of correlation found between past volatility 
and future price performances.
10 7
time horizon of the warrant should become increasingly rele­
vant as the price of the common is lower in relation to the 
exercise price. Time to expiration would be. more important 
for a warrant with an exercise price of $50 and a common 
price of $10 than with an exercise price of $50 and a common 
price of $40. When the latter situation exists, investors 
may well reason that a 2 year warrant should be valued ap­
proximately equal to a 4 year warrant because an appreciation 
of only 25% or $10 would result in parity. The influence of 
time would be negligible if the probability were high that 
the stock would reach $50 in less than 2 years. On the 
other hand, the common must appreciate 400%, or 40 points, 
to reach parity in the first case. The probability of such 
a move may be low over the two year horizon and significantly 
higher over the four year horizon. Longevity can be theoreti­
cally viewed as becoming more significant as the ratio of 
the market price to the option price declines and less signi­
ficant as the ratio rises.
Prior researchers failed to recognize that time to 
expiration may well prove significant when common prices are 
low in relation to option prices and insignificant when 
common prices are well above option prices. Typical multiple 
regression studies have included time to expiration {in 
months) with such other variables as the price of the common 
stock, dividend yields, volatility of the common, and
10 8
potential dilution of the convertible securities. The 
dependent variable, price of the warrant, is then regressed 
on these independent variables.
Studies have generally shown the price of the 
common to be the most significant predictor of warrant 
values. Heretofore, time to maturity has not been shown 
to exert much influence on warrant value, except when two 
years or less remain to expiration. It is likely that 
these findings have been biased due to the failure to 
structure the time variable as a function of the ratio 
of the common stock price to the exercise price. In other 
words, empirical studies conducted when common prices were 
high, in relation to option prices, have found longevity 
to be mildly significant. Empirical observations analyzed 
when low ratios existed have found the time variable to be 
a better predictor of warrant value. This weakness may be 
overcome in three possible ways, namely: (1) adjusting the
time variable to include the ratio of the common to the 
exercise price, (2) separating the observations according 
to the ratio of the common to the exercise price, or (3) 
separating the observations according to their time to 
maturity. Prior researchers have failed to properly con­
sider these alternatives in their regression models, and 
the investment community still lacks a sophisticated 
technique for appraising these securities.
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Structuring the Time to Expiration
The supply of actively traded stock purchase warrants 
is definitely limited. Most of these are listed on the 
American Stock Exchange, as the New York Stock Exchange 
does not allow trading in these securities. Warrants are 
traded over-the-counter, but the inaccuracy of the price 
structure may negate the efficiency of an empirical model.
Accepting these limitations, it was decided to 
analyze the common stock— warrant price relationships by 
using a sample of the existing warrants on the American 
Stock Exchange over the 1960-1969 period. The warrants 
were structured according to their time to expiration and 
were segregated into the following classifications: Category
1 (6 months to 1 year); Category 2 (1 to 2 years); Category 
3 (2 to 4 years); Category 4 (4 to 7 years); Category 5 
(over 7 years); and Category 6 (perpetual warrants).
These classifications arose from the limited number of price 
quotes that would accomodate a greater number of time intervals.
Initially, all of the warrants that fitted these cate­
gories were selected for study. Immediate problems arose such 
as a accurate measurement of the life of a warrant with step- 
ups in the exercise price at predetermined intervals, and the 
need for a method of accounting for exercise prices that could 
be settled by either cash or the principal value of a fixed 
income instrument that may trade at less than par. These
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differences were important, and warrants with either step- 
ups in exercise price or the exercise price payable in 
principal value of some security were eliminated from the 
study. Some of the warrants that had been recognized as 
selling at excessively high or low premiums were also elim­
inated from the study. For example, Molybdenum was deemed 
to trade at an excessive premium and was not used in the 
s tudy.
Companies were selected for the 6 months to 1 year 
and 1 to 2 year classifications on the basis of available 
data for each of these categories. In other words, the 
same companies were used for both of these classifications 
in order that only time to expiration varied. The compan­
ies used in the first two categories were also used in 
subsequent categories where possible. Table VIII lists the 
warrants used in developing the model.
For comparative empirical trading patterns. Table 
VIII presents a less-than-perfect selection of warrants.
In Category 3 (2 to 4 year maturities) United Industrial is 
substituted for Armour, since the Armour warrants contained 
a step-up in exercise price 3 years before expiration. The 
other categories contain all of the warrants that met these 
time intervals during the 1960-1969 period. General Accep­
tance is the only warrant listed in all categories except 
Category 6 {perpetual maturities).
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TABLE VIII
LIST OF WARRANTS USED IN EACH CLASSIFICATION
Category 1 
(6 months to 1 year)
Category 4 
{4 to 7 years)
Armour
General Acceptance 
Martin Marietta 
Rio Algom 
Sperry Rand 
Universal American^
Category 2 
(1 to 2 years)
First National Realty 
General Acceptance 
Martin Marietta 
National General 
Rio Algom 
United Industrial 
Universal American 
Uris Building 
Category 5 
(Over 7 years)
Armour
General Acceptance 
Martin Marietta 
Rio Algom 
Sperry Rand 
Universal American*^
Category 3 
(2 to 4 years)
General Acceptance 
Gulf & Western 
Lerner Stores 
McCrory Corp. 
National General 
National Industries 
Uris Building 
Category 6 
(Perpetual)
General Acceptance 
Martin Marietta 
Rio Algom 
Sperry Rand 
United Industrial 
Universal American
Alleghany 
Atlas Corp. 
Tri-Continental
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Price data for these securities were gathered on 
an interval basis. For the first three categories, monthly 
data were used. For example, 24 price quotations were ex­
tracted for each warrant listed in Category 3. The quota­
tions were taken from Standard & Poors ISL Daily Stock 
Price Indexes starting when each warrant had four years to 
maturity and taking monthly closing prices until only two 
years remained to maturity. The total number of observations 
for Category 3 was 144 (24 months X 6 warrants). Quarterly 
data were usually extracted for the remaining classifications, 
except where a warrant had a expiration of less than 7 years 
in Category 4 (4 to 7 year maturities). The only warrant to 
perfectly fit the category was General Acceptance. Therefore, 
improvisations had to be made to insure a sizeable sample. 
Monthly price data were acquired for warrants with 5 year 
expirations and bimonthly data were acquired for 6 year war­
rants. It was felt that each warrant should contribute an 
equal number of observations, necessitating a different 
time interval (i.e., monthly, bimonthly, or quarterly) for 
individual warrants.
The number of observations for each classification 
varied due to the number of warrants available for analysis 
and the time span in each grouping. Category 1 (6 months to 
1 year maturities) consisted of only 42 observations (7 for 
each warrant ranging from 12 to 6 months to expiration). The
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highest number of observations was 144; these were gathered 
for Category 3. The number of observations totaled 5 40 
for the six maturity categories.
The validity of these data may be questioned because 
different companies are compared in the individual categories. 
The limited population of warrants dictated this comparative 
technique--a deficiency future researchers may circumvent 
since the supply of actively traded warrants has grown 
sharply in 1969 and 1970.
Normalization of the.Dependent and 
Independent Variables
Comparisons of the actual prices of the warrants to 
the prices'of the common stock would not provide meaningful 
data since the warrant prices are influenced by the exercise 
price on each security. For exmaple. National General's old 
warrants have an exercise price of $15 while Gulf & Western's 
warrants carry a $55 exercise price. On March 6 , 1970, 
National General's common closed at 17.125 while Gulf & 
Western's common ended up at 17.625, The corresponding 
prices for the warrants were 9.50 and 5.625 on the same date. 
These data are not meaningful without some common denominator. 
The method selected for comparing these values for this study 
is a normalization of the warrant and the common by dividing 
the exercise price into each value.
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Normalized values can be thought of as ratios of the 
market price to the current exercise price of the warrant. 
This normalization procedure involved two steps. First, the 
relationship between the ratio of the market price and exer­
cise price is measured for each warrant. Then, the ratio of 
the market price of the common stock to the exercise price is 
calculated. These normalized values become the two basic 
variables of the study. The normalized common stock ratio 
is the independent variable and is used to predict the de­
pendent variable, or the warrant ratio.
The normalized values for the National General and 
Gulf & Western warrants may be determined as follows:
National General Gulf 6 Western
Common stock ratio: Common stock ratio:
Market price 17.125 =1.142 Market price _ 17.625 =
Exercise price 15 Exercise price 55
Warrant ratio: Warrant ratio:
Market price = 9#50 - .533 Market price ror. ln„
Exercise price — 55-  Exercise price"- ^  ~
These data show the normalized values to be substantially 
different even though the market prices of the two common
stocks differs by only $.50. 'Thes.p, normalized ratios are
7 ‘ . * ; ' - J' :
■ r > 1 ' t
extracted.for numerous'trading dates and are used in deter-
»
mining the empirical relationship between the two ratios. 
These empirical data are then used to predict the normalized
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or expected value of a warrant when a common stock has a 
given relationship to its exercise price.
Selecting the Proper Statistical Approach
The normalized ratios are plotted on a graph by 
letting the X axis represent the common stock ratio and the 
Y axis represent the warrant ratio. The empirical points re­
veal a curvilinear relationship as a given change in the 
common stock ratio fails to generate an equal magnitude of 
change on the Y axis. A free-hand curve through these ob­
served points indicates a simple parabola. Free-hand curves 
are drawn for data in the aforementioned classifications, 
and the time horizon appears to prove important in influ­
encing the values of the warrants. Each curve appears higher 
as the time to expiration is increased.
Free-hand curves are too inaccurate for decision 
making purposes; therefore, mathematical relationships of 
these curves are evaluated. The first equation used to cal­
culate a line of best fit through the observed points is a 
second-degree polynomial expressed by:
Yc= a + bX + cX2 
The second-degree polynomial produces the following predictive 
equations:
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Category 1 
(6 months to 1 year maturities)
Yc = -.08742 + .2148(X) + .1666(X)
Category 2
(1 to 2 year maturities) ^
Y = -.1146 + .3625(X) + .1234(X) c
Category 3
(2 to 4 year maturities)_____
Yc = .0084 + .2086(X) + .1546(Xj
Category 4
(4 to 7 year maturities)
Y— = '" -.0836  +":"4U6’3(X) *” ."()ff91 (X) 2 c
Category 5 
(over 7 year maturities) „
Yc = .1316 + .0251(X) + .2501(X)
Category 6
(Perpetual maturities) „
Y_ = -.05834 + . 569 3 (X) ,0484 (X)<ic
These data generally support the contention that the 
time horizon of each warrant provides a positive influence 
on warrant value. The second degree polynomial, however, 
produces some incongruous results. Category 3 equations pro­
vide higher values than those for Category 4 at common 
stock ratios of less than .6 . Category 3 equations also 
provide lower values for warrants than those for Category 2 
at common stock ratios greater than 1.2. These empirical 
results do not fit the prior theory developed for these in­
struments. j
i
The equations reveal four of the intercepts to be
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negative and only two positive. The negative intercepts are 
ruled theoretically impossible, since the price of a warrant 
can not be less than zero even when the common stock is zero. 
The calculated intercept for Category 3 of .0084 is insignifi­
cantly different from zero. Therefore, the high positive 
intercept for the Category 5 is viewed as a chance occur­
rence.
Various mathematical equations are applied to the 
observed data in an attempt to obtain a superior fit. A 
third degree polynomial is tried, a second degree polynomial 
with a zero intercept is attempted, and transformations of 
the independent and dependent variables are utilized. These 
predictive equations are graphed with the observed data in 
arriving at the best fit. The coefficient of determination, 
f is also used to assist in selecting the superior approach. 
Most of the statistical procedures applied to these 
data have some strong points. The cubic parabola provides 
a better fit for all classifications, but the problem of 
having Category 3 overstated at low common stock ratios 
exists as with the second-degree polynomial. Exponential 
trends and the Gompertz curve are found to fit Category 1, 
but they fail to uniformly apply to each series of data.
i
The superior method of fitting these data is found by con­
verting both the common stock ratio and the warrant ratio 
to natural logarithms and fitting a linear equation for
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log X and log Y. Predicted regression lines are drawn 
through observed points, and the closeness of fit is remark­
ably high. The calculated R2 is in excess of .94 for 4 of 
the classifications.
The Final Model for Warrants
The use of logarithms in transforming both the de­
pendent and independent variables is referred to as a power 
function.^ it may be represented by:
Y = a (X)b 
c
The exponent, b, provides a measure of elasticity which is 
an important element in a warrant's price, since leverage 
plays an important role in warrant pricing. The simple 
conversion of these data to logarithms provides a good 
curvilinear approximation of a warrant's price relative to 
its corresponding common stock.
Final equations using the power function are as
follows:
^John E. Freund and Frank J. Williams, Modern Busi­
ness Statistics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1969), p. 419.
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Category 1
y = .2753 (X)1* 8585 
c
R2 = .9622
Category 2 
(1 to 2 year maturities)
Y = .3547(X)1 *6124 
c
R2 = .9421
Category 3 
(2 to 4 year maturities)
Yc = .3703(X)1 *4317 R 2 = .8039
Category 4 
{4 to 7 vear maturities)
Y = .4062(X)1 -3095 
c
R2 = .9582
Category 5 
(Over 7 year maturities)
Y = . 4263(X) 1,iy/J 
c R2 = .8141
Category 6 
(Perpetual maturities)
Y = .5509(X)1 *2155 
c
R2 = .9926
These equations convey the importance of time in warrant 
pricing. The calculated constant for "a" is shown to increase 
as time to expiration is lengthened. When the price of the 
common is equal to the exercise price, the speculative value 
of the warrant increases from .2753 of exercise price for 
6 months to 1 year maturities to .3547 for 1 to 2 year maturi­
ties. These speculative values increase gradually as longevity 
is stretched out. The large speculative value of .2753 for 
warrants with average lives of nine months indicates the criti­
cal nature of time when the expiration horizon is short, as
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warrant premiums will trend toward zero when maturity ap­
proaches. This phenomenon is incorporated into trading 
tactics in Chapter VI.
The calculated exponents also support previous theory 
concerning warrant pricing. Exponents decline as a function 
of time except for perpetual warrants, and the importance of 
time is minimized as the common stock ratio increases above 
1.0. In other words, warrant prices appreciate and depreciate 
faster with the higher exponents. Time is less important at 
higher common stock ratios and more important at lower 
ratios. Chart 8 provides a graphic representation of the 
empirical price of the warrant, compared to the common stock, 
by utilizing these ratios.
As can be seen in Chart 8 the warrant is valued 
relatively higher as the common stock ratio and time to ex­
piration increase. At the common stock ratio of approximate­
ly 1.2, the categories show a tendency to change relative 
positions— especially for Category 2. These interchanges can 
primarily be explained by the relevant ranges of the empirical 
data. Observations for Category 4 consist of common stock 
ratios ranging from .30 to 1.20. Therefore, data beyond this 
relevant range are not comparable. Their sole function is 
to facilitate an understanding of the mathematical model.
The empirical model is designed to provide a method 
of evaluating fair prices for warrants based on past
CHART 8
GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF WARRANT MODEL
Maximum
Value
^Minimum
Value
.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.4
Common Stock Ratio (X)
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relationships. The model is employed in the following manner:
(1) Determine the proper category for an existing war­
rant according to its time to expiration.
(2) Divide the exercise price of the warrant into the 
price of the common stock to determine the value of
|
(3) Calculate the normalized value of the warrant by 
taking the logarithm of X and multiplying it times
I
the exponent. Take the anti log of the product and 
multiply it by the constant "a" value.
(4) Multiply the normalized value by the exercise price 
per share to determine the fair value of the warrant.
(5) Compare the calculated value with the existing mar­
ket price to determine if an attractive buying op-
4portumty exists.
The complete model for warrant valuation has poten­
tial uses other than determining fair values for purchase 
opportunities. It can be used in determining the taxable 
benefit when warrants are received as compensation (i.e.,
A potential investor should analyze factors other 
than the empirical price compared to the actual price. The 
expectations of the individual company should be integrated 
with the overall economic outlook. The calculated price 
should be used only in judging relative prices and not as 
the only factor in deciding what to pay.
12 3
when inactively traded warrants are paid to underwriters as 
compensation for distributing a security issue). The model 
may also be applied to potential new issues of warrants in 
determining the terms, especially longevity, of the Warrant 
Agreement. The terms of the warrants can be fitted to manage­
ment's utility preferences that will interact in the tradeoff 
of a higher price for the longer life of the warrant. This 
model enables the elements of this tradeoff to be quantified 
on an empirical basis.
Testing the Empirical Warrant Model
Purpose of the Test
Historically, warrant models have been tested by
comparing predicted prices to actual warrant prices. Kassouf,
5
Giguere, and Shelton utilized such an approach in confirming 
the validity of their models. These three models were aimed 
at determining fair or normalized values for warrants. Each 
researcher provided an approach designed to assist investors 
in the selection of warrants for purchase.
The empirical model discussed in the first part of 
this chapter has already been described as providing a close 
approximation of warrant prices. A further test accomplished 
by comparing predicted prices with actual prices would not 
support the utility of the model in selecting warrants for
50p. cit.
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purchase. The logical test for a predictive model is to de­
termine if normalized or fair values assist investors in 
selecting securities for purchase. Theoretically; models 
aimed at determining fair values for warrants should provide 
superior performance than average warrants, since capital 
will not be committed to overpriced warrants.
Structure of the Test
A basic tenet of the empirical model is that its 
coefficients will change as long-term market conditions 1 
change. Empirical data gathered for its construction are 
taken from the most recent ten year period to enhance its 
applicability in today's markets. Extrapolation of this 
model into the distant future or past would probably rule 
it as ineffective in determining appropriate values.
The period from the beginning of 19 60 to the end of 
1969 is chosen to test the efficiency of the model. First- 
of-the-year price data are gathered for each warrant on the 
American Stock Exchange. Closing prices at the end of the 
year are used in determining the performance of individual 
warrants. Performance is measured in terms of percentage 
gained or lost for each year. These net percentage changes 
are then averaged to determine the overall performance of the 
listed warrants for each year.
Average percentage changes provide a method of simu­
lating purchase commitments in these warrants by assuming equal
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dollar investments in each warrant at the beginning of the 
year and closed out at the year's end. The average percentage 
change of all warrants determines the net effect on the 
initial investment. The original investment at the beginning 
of 1960 is assumed to be $100, and it fluctuates according 
to the annual cumulative percentage changes of the assumed 
investments.
Valuation models of Giguere, Kassouf, and Shelton 
are also included in this study. These models are added to 
the empirical test to provide further comparisons. The 
Giguere model provides conservative normalized values while 
the other two models offer higher predicted prices.
Decision Rules for the Models
All of the models included in the test provide nor­
malized values for the warrants, but the prior researchers
failed to specify rules for determining when a warrant should
be purchased. A uniform decision rule is therefore deemed 
appropriate and is applied to each normalized value.
There are various approaches to establishing an auto­
matic decision making process. One may reason that a 50% 
confidence limit placed on the model value would include at­
tractively priced securities. Those in the upper quartile 
would be deemed overvalued; those in the lower quartile would 
be ruled unattractive due to the market's extremely cautious 
appraisal of them. Confidence limits could be increased or
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narrowed and multiple purchase decisions could be simulated.
Purchase decisions could also be based on the per­
centage differences in the normalized values and actual prices. 
For example, normalized values that exceed actual prices by 
more than 3% might be deemed as desirable commitments.
The decision to use a 3% filter for purchase decisions 
does not have greater theoretical support than a 2%, 1%, or 
5% filter. One could logically argue that any price of a 
warrant less than a model's appraisal value would offer an 
attractive buying opportunity. The selected decision rule—  
to simulate a purchase when the normalized value is 3% 
greater than the price of the warrant is based on objectivity 
and selectivity. It is objective in that technical buy or 
sell signals are usually based on a 3% penetration of a 
resistance or support level. It is selective in that fewer 
than 50% of the warrants will be selected for purchase with 
the least squares technique used in the model development.
The 3% buy signal is used for each of the four models. 
Each time the model value exceeds the initial price of the 
warrant by more than 3% a buy signal is given. Each model's 
performance is measured by averaging the percentage gains 
and/or losses of the simulated purchases.
Unique Characteristics of Each Model
The empirical model is limited by a relevant range 
of sample calculations used in its construction. Category 2
127
provides higher normalized values than Category 3 when the 
common stock ratio is greater than 1.2; therefore, normalized 
values are not determined for common stock ratios greater 
than 1.2. The exclusion of warrants with common stock ratios 
in excess of 1.2 also eliminates low leverage warrants. The 
potential leverage of any particular warrant is an inverse 
function of the price of its corresponding common stock.
Higher prices of the common stock mean less leverage in the 
warrant and vice versa.
The empirical model is also limited in accurately 
determining warrant values at low common stock ratios, since 
sample data were unavailable for these low values. Normalized 
values are not calculated for warrants with common stock 
ratios of .5 or less. The exclusion of these low common 
stock ratio warrants tends to lower the potential leverage 
of the empirical model selections.
Kassouf's normal conditions are deemed too restrictive 
to be useful in studying the benefit of his model. Calcu­
lations of normalized values for his model are based solely 
on his formula except for warrants with step-ups in exercise 
price. In these instances the exercise price is raised to 
the higher level when less than one year to the step-up exists. 
Step-ups for the Shelton model are treated according to his 
format with adjustments of 2.5 times the percentage increase 
in step-up price used to lower the time to expiration.
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Step*-ups for the empirical model and Giguere*s model are 
treated by calculating a normalized value for each possible 
exercise price. The immediate exercise price is applied to 
the appropriate equation according to time to step-up.
Higher exercise prices are applied to longer time to expir­
ation categories, and the highest normalized value is compared 
with the actual price of the warrant for decision purposes.
Return on Investment
Stock purchase warrants do not provide a cash income. 
Capital appreciation is the only source of income from these 
instruments. The cumulative impact of the annual commitments 
is compared with the initial investment in determining the 
overall performance of each model and the overall performance 
of average warrants.
The individual models call for purchasing different 
numbers of warrants in each year. The initial investment is 
assumed to be equally divided among'all warrants purchased. 
Where the model does not select any of the given warrants 
for purchase, the money is assumed to be invested in 91 day 
Treasury bills— at the annual rate in existence during that 
year.
The cumulative amount of the investment at the end of 
10 years is compared for each category. The final balance 
is converted to an annual compounded rate of return through
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use of present value tables. Present value rates of return 
are used to rank the individual classifications in terms of 
overall performance
Results of the Test
The chosen time horizon provides an interesting frame­
work for warrant analysis. Different degrees of bullish and 
bearish sentiment are portrayed in specific years. Price 
fluctuation of individual warrants is also shown to be ex­
tremely high. Appendix A shows First National Realty warrants 
to have appreciated 1114.3% in 1968 while Ling-Tempco-Vought 
warrants declined 80.1% in 1969. Of the 177 warrant ob­
servations listed in Appendix A, 80 appreciated, 94 declined, 
and 3 were unchanged. The contrasting performances provide 
a good challenge for the valuation models.
Table IX depicts the overall gains and losses for each 
year, and Appendix A contains individual observations. Exam­
ination of Table IX reveals that average warrants appreciated 
sharply over the 10 years. They actually appreciated more
than the warrants selected for purchase by either of the valu­
ation models. This suggests that valuation models should be
^The cumulative funds are based on market changes 
without consideration of brokerage fees and capital gain 
taxes. These items are ignored due to the assumption of 
equal investment in each security. Odd-lot fees on low 
priced warrants would complicate the procedure and may even 
bias the findings. The exclusion of these normal costs tends 
to inflate the present value rate of return.
TABLE XX
SUMMARY OF TEST RESULTS FOR WARRANTS
Total
Warrants Giguere Kassouf Shelton
Empirical
Model
1960 Data
No. Purchased 11 None 3 4 1
No. Increasing 2 0 1 1 0
No. Decreasing 9 0 2 3 1
Average Change (%) -18.850 +4.100* -14.460 -23.920 -52.300
Initial Investment 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
Ending Balance 81.150 104.100 85.540 76.080 47.700
1961 Data
No. Purchased 14 None 9 8 3
No. Increasing 12 0 9 7 3
No. Decreasing 2 0 0 1 0
Average change (96) +39.290 +2.200* +50.530 +40.030 +79.270
Ending Balance 113.034 106.390 128.763 106.535 85.512
1962 Data
No. Purchased 16 None 5 8 None
No. Increasing 1 0 0 1 0
No. Decreasing 15 0 5 7 0
Average Change (96) -25.070 +2.700* -21.420 -21.200 +2.700*
Ending Balance 84.696 109.263 101.182 83.950 87.821
1963 Data
N o . Purchased 19 1 8 12 4
No. Increasing 8 0 2 3 0
No. Decreasing 11 1 6 9 4
Average Change (96) +5.840 -21.400 -14.550 +3.020 -29.620
Endinq Balance 89.642 85.881 86.460 86.485 61.804
*Indicates estimated treasury bill rate for the year.
TABLE XX (CONTINUED)
Total
Warrants Giguere Kassouf Shelton
Empirical
Model
1964 Data
No. Purchased 18 1 11 14 7
No. Increasing 9 0 6 7 3
No. Decreasing 7 0 4 6 3
Average Change (%) +5.570 0.000 +15.240 +8.540 +5.260
Ending Balance 94.635 85.881 99.637 93.871 65.055
1965 Data 
No. Purchased 19 None 11 14 6
No. Increasing 15 0 9 11 5
No. Decreasing 3 0 1 2 0
Average Change (96) +82.710 +3.800* +88.720 +96.190 +130.080
Ending Balance 172.908 89.144 188.035 184.166 150.980
1966 Data
No. Purchased 18 1 7 11 2
No. Increasing 5 0 1 5 0
No. Decreasing 13 1 6 6 2
Average Change (96) -18.070 -46.800 -19.230 -9.580 -32.500
Ending Balance 141.664 47.425 151.876 166.523 101.912
1967 Data
No. Purchased 16 1 8 9 3
No. Increasing 14 1 6 8 3
No. Decreasing 2 0 2 1 0
Average Change (96) +135.240 +240.000 +134.250 +157.890 +257.370
Ending Balance 333.250 161.245 355.770 429.446 364.203
*Indicates estimated treasury bill rate for the year.
TABLE IX (CONTINUED)
Total
Warrants Giguere Kassouf Shelton
Empirical
Model
1968 Data 
No. Purchased 18 None 7 9 1
No. Increasing 13 0 7 7 1
No. Decreasing 5 0 0 2 0
Average Change (%) +127.450 +4.900* +75.930 +69.250 +114.500
Ending Balance 757.977 169.146 657.321 705.660 781.215
1969 Data 
No. Purchased 28 None 9 10 3
No. Increasing 1 0 0 1 0
No. Decreasing 27 0 9 9 3
Average Change (%) -53.260 +6.300* -52.940 -53.410 -68.800
Ending Balance 362.863 179.802 309.335 328.770 243.739
Total Data 
No. Purchased 177 4 77 99 30
No. Increasing 80 1 41 51 15
No. Decreasing 94 2 35 46 13
Annual P.V. ROI 13.8% 6.0% 12.0% 12.7% 9.4%
♦Indicates estimated treasury bill rate for the year.
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ignored in warrant selection because average warrants per­
form'better than any of the sophisticated models. This 
conclusion is decidedly premature as the performance of 
average warrants is biased upward by one observation, namely, 
First National Realty's 1114.3% increase in 1969 * At the 
end of 1967, three of the models held a slight advantage 
over the average warrant category. If this observation were 
deleted, average warrants would show a cumulative value of 
564.525 instead of 757.977 at the end of 1968 and would ex­
ceed only Giguere's cumulative value.
Arbitrary selection of beginning and ending years 
could also change the results of this study. If the initial 
year were 1961 and the ending year 1968, $100 invested via 
the empirical model would have grown to $1637.74 for a 
present value rate of return in excess of 40% annually. A 
selection of those years could have shown the empirical model 
to be totally superior, but the purpose of this research pro­
ject would not be satisfied.
The decision to restrict warrant selection to war­
rants with common stock prices less than 20% above the exer­
cise price (common stock ratio of less than 1.2) naturally 
provides more leverage for the warrants selected by the em­
pirical model. The danger of this downside leverage is pro­
perly shown by having a bear market exist in the first and
X34
last years of the study. Such a test forces the empirical 
model to demonstrate superior percentage gains in bull 
market periods in order to surpass the other models. Table 
IX shows the empirical model's selections to have gained 
85.51%, 130.08%, 257.37%, and 114.50% in the bull markets of 
1961, 1965, 1967, and 1968 respectively. These remarkable 
gains place its performance above all of the other classifi­
cations by the end of 1968. The downside leverage of the 
model results in huge percentage losses during the 1969 
bear market to erase its overall advantage.
The most interesting fact about the empirical model 
is its tendency to recognize generally inflated markets.
Table IX shows average warrants declined sharply in four of 
the ten years. Specifically, average warrants declined 
18.85% in 1960, 25.07% in 1962, 18.07% in 1966, and 53.26% 
in 1969. Table IX also shows the empirical model to have 
given only 6 buy signals in these four years, even though 
it provided 30 buy signals over the ten year period. If 
potentially dangerous markets can be identified by few buy 
signals and/or by generally inflated warrants, the empirical 
model could be utilized to generate tremendous gains.
A modification in the decision rule to buy warrants 
only when they are favorably priced in general would signifi­
cantly change the results. The decision rule could dictate 
buying only when 30% or more of relevant warrants are
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favorably priced by the empirical model. This‘decision rule 
would avoid all of the major bear markets and eliminate only 
1 bull market. The initial investment in warrants would grow 
from $100 to $1,102 by the end of 1967, and warrants would 
not be purchased in 1968 and 1969. The timing device is not 
sophisticated, but it illustrates the importance of avoiding 
overpriced markets. These data can be verified in Appendix 
A.
Giguere's model m^kes only four purchases over the
ten year period. The conservatism of the model basically
1
keeps it out of the market— when average warrants experience 
sizeable gains. Giguere's model is not applicable to warrant 
prices in the 1960's, but it is not ruled ineffective for 
warrant markets in1 the future-.
The performances of the Kassouf and Shelton models 
are viewed as applicable in today's markets. Shelton's 
model suggests that more than half of the available warrants 
should be purchased, as it specifies 99 buy signals from the 
177 observations. Shelton's model appears consistent in 
selecting warrants, but it seems to place excessive negative 
influence on dividends per share. Kassouf's model would - 
probably prove more efficient if some upper limit were 
placed on the ratio of the common stock price to the exercise 
price. The overall results for the models show Shelton's
1
f
model to be superior with a 12.7% compound rat^ ;ofi retuirn.
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Kassouf*s model provides a 12.0% return while the empirical 
model and Giguere's model produce returns of 9.4% and 6% 
respectively.
Conclusion
It is probably desirable that average warrants per­
formed better than warrants selected by either of the models. 
These models are not designed to answer all questions per­
taining to warrant behavior. Futurv warrant performance will 
depend on the performance of corresponding common shares, and 
these models do not evaluate fundamental and technical 
strengths of each common stock. The empirical model provides 
only an approximation of average prices based on historical 
relationships.
The empirically designed model can be best described 
as a guide to thinking and not an end in itself. Prospec­
tive purchasers of warrants may find the empirical relation­
ships helpful in arriving at fair prices. Users should be 
especially careful in selecting warrants on the basis of the 
model values alone. A warrant may be priced at lower than 
model values due to the market's knowledge of the weaknesses 
of the common stock. Users of these models should engage in 
a thorough analysis of the common stock before making a 
commitment in the warrant.
The normalizing procedure tends to understate the
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price for warrants with low exercise prices and overstate 
warrant values with high exercise prices. For example, an 
exercise price sf $1 for one warrant and $100 for another 
will result in identical relative prices for the warrants 
when their common stock price equals their respective exer­
cise prices. The market price will probably favor the lower 
exercise price, however, as investors would prefer to pay 
$.30 for the low priced warrant rather than $30 for the 
higher priced security. Users of the empirical model should 
recognize this limitation in the normalizing procedure. 
Prospective issuers of warrants may also utilize this ob­
servation by enabling warrants to be exercisable into frac­
tions of shares, rather than whole shares, in order to ef­
fectively increase the initial price of the warrant's 
speculative value.
Those who employ the empirical model should also 
recognize the extreme leverage they are subjected to when 
using the approach presented in this chapter. Warrants with 
low common stock ratios possess more leverage, upside as well 
as downside, than do average warrants. Purchasers of war­
rants with low common stock ratios should invest a smaller 
fraction of their overall portfolio in these securities, since 
leverage will be magnified.
I
CHAPTER V
AN EVALUATION MODEL FOR CONVERTIBLE BONDS
Introduction
The empirical warrant model shows the price of war­
rants to be a function of time to expiration and the common 
stock ratio. Warrant prices are based solely on their claim 
to common stock which is similar to the claim offered by a 
conversion feature on convertible bonds. A proper method 
of valuing the conversion feature provides a method of analy­
zing convertible bonds in a similar format to that used for 
warrants in Chapter IV.
This chapter consists of two distinct sections.
First, an evaluation model for convertible bonds is developed. 
The second section concentrates on the testing of that mode|l.
The model is developed by normalizing the conversion 
value and the convertible feature in terms of straight debt 
value. Observations are gathered for these securities and are 
used in determining final equations for the model.
A sample of 100 convertible bonds is selected to ac­
complish the testing of the model. Tabular data are provided
to illustrate how well the model selects convertible bonds for
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purchase. The performance of the convertible bond'model is 
measured in'terms of average convertibles used in the study 
with conclusions based on those comparisons.
Development of the Model 
Value of the Conversion Feature
Convertible bonds offer fixed coupon payments and set 
maturity values similar to straight debt instruments. When 
convertible bonds offer a greater than zero probability of 
conversion value (common stock price multiplied by the number 
of shares the bond may be converted into) exceeding straight 
debt value during the life of the feature, the right to 
convert is reflected in their price. Market participants 
evaluate the worth of straight debt value concomitant with  ^
the conversion feature in determining the price they will / 
pay for the convertible bond. In order to develop a conver­
tible bond model similar to the warrant model, the price of 
the convertible bond must be segregated into a value for the 
conversion feature.
Charts 3 and 4 in Chapter II illustrate a convertible 
bond's price to always be equal to or greater than its straight 
debt value. Therefore, the difference in the bond's price 
and its straight debt value is identical with the premium' on 
a convertible bond when straight debt value is greater than 
conversion value, and it is always equal to the premium over 
straight debt value. The conversion feature's value is,
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however, improperly determined by deducting conversion value 
from the price of the bond, since a measurement of straight 
debt value's influence is provided with such an approach.
Normalization of the Variables
The empirical model for warrants, illustrated in 
Chapter IV, uses the exercise price as the common denominator 
in determining common stock and warrant ratios. The exer­
cise price component for a convertible bond is the bond 
itself, since it is given in exchange for common stock.
Bonds exchanged for common stock usually consist of redemp­
tion value, par value, and straight debt value. These are 
three distinct values, and it is conceivable that any one of 
them could represent the most important factor in a bond's 
price at different times.
Redemption value governs the price of a convertible 
bond when it is being called by the issuing company. It also 
restricts the upward movement of a bond as interest rates 
drop due to the possibility of a call. Par value is dominant 
when maturity is near. Straight debt value, or the present 
value of future coupon payments and principal discounted at 
existing interest rates, is a pervasive element that seems to 
always have a role in a bond's price. These coupon payments
i
are usually considered when bonds are called for redemption!. 
As bonds near maturity, straight debt value approaches par
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value. Thus, straight debt*value is the proper foundation
for-developing a convertible'bond model; ....
A division of straight debt value into conversion value 
normalizes the common stock contribution to a bond's total 
value. A low ratio suggests a small contribution to the 
bond's overall price, since the stock must appreciate signifi­
cantly before conversion value exceeds straight debt value. 
Ratios of greater than 1.0 contribute tangible values above 
the coupon and principal values.
The normalization of straight debt values and con­
version values is hereafter referred to as the conversion 
value ratio. It becomes 1 t he■independent■variable-that is used 
to-predict-the dependent-variable, or the value of the con­
version feature. An empirical determination of how conver­
sion value ratios influence the value of the conversion 
feature enables proper valuation of convertible bonds.
Dividing the straight debt value into the difference 
between the actual price of the bond less the straight debt 
value normalizes the conversion feature and becomes the de­
pendent variable referred to as the conversion feature ratio.
Selection of the Observations
Data for the warrant model are based on the most 
recent ten years (1960-69), and consistency with the warrant 
model dictates a similar time horizon for the convertible bond
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model. The supply of convertible bonds is, however, much 
greater than the supply of warrants. This circumstance 
permits a more objective method of gathering data than was 
possible for the warrant model.
Test cases are determined from issues of Barron1s
i
and The Commercial and Financial Chronicle for the end of each
year, 19 60-1969, and data are obtained for industrial conver­
tible bonds with ratings of Baa or higher. Each convertible 
issue is required to be listed at least two years prior to 
the respective cutoff dates. Each- individual issue is limited 
to five observations.
Moody1s Industrial Manual provides ratings no lower 
than Baa due to the erratic nature of lower rated bonds,
In addition, many institutional investors are limited to buy­
ing the top four grades. Therefore, only high quality bonds 
are included in the observations. The universe is limited 
to industrial bonds in an attempt to obtain consistent inter­
action between conversion value ratios and conversion feature 
ratios. Single observations of one company are eliminated due
i
1
In a personal correspondence Miles II. Riggs of 
Moody's Investors Service, Inc. explained that bonds rated 
below Baa are too unpredictable for average yields on these 
categories to be meaningful. Mr. Riggs' letter of November 
11, 1969 stated that bonds with Ba ratings yield from 7.40 
to 11.00%, B bonds, about 8.00 to 12.60%, and Caa issues, 
anywhere from 9.00 to 15.00% in the current market.
I
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to some underwritings that are nothing more than disguised 
equity issues. These securities are deemed to misrepresent 
the nature of average convertible bonds. At the same time,
I
convertible bonds that have remained outstanding over a long 
period of years are ruled atypical, and their observations 
are limited to five years.
Inactively traded convertible bonds are excluded 
from consideration because of the possibility of a lengthy 
time lapse between recorded closing prices for the common 
stock and convertible bond— a situation that could result 
in sizeable error if the normalizing process were to be at­
tempted. The closing price of each convertible bond selected 
is extracted concurrently with the closing price of the stock. 
The terms of each convertible feature are determined from 
Moody1s Industrial Manuals and adjustments are made for stock 
splits, dividends, and other capitalization modifications.
Conversion values are determined by dividing the con­
version price into the price of the common stock and multi­
plying the product by the par value of the bond. Straight 
debt values are determined by deducting the present value 
of the coupon deficiency from par. Redemption value pro­
vides the upper limit on straight debt values when- coupon 
rates exceed existing interest rates. In such situations, 
the present value of the coupon advantage is added to par.
Structure of the Model
Few convertible bond observations provided short 
periods to expiration of the convertible feature. Most of 
the observed issues contained significantly longer maturities 
than did the warrants. Time categories for convertible bonds 
differed significantly than those for warrants.
A total of 181 observations are taken from the end 
of 1959 to the end of 1969.2 These observations are sub­
divided into six categories. Two categories are created for 
convertibles with step-ups in exercise price. Convertibles 
with step-ups of less than five years hence comprise one 
category. Actual observations for this category amounted to 
thirty-seven, and the predictive equation was determined to 
be:
Yc = .1593(X)2,6820
a second category consisting of twenty-six observations with 
step-ups of five to ten years hence provided the following 
equation:
Yc = •1574(X)3*1948
These results are in contrast with theory, since the longer 
period to step-up provides lower values for the conversion
2These observations are shown in Appendix B. These 
data reveal the supply of highly rated convertibles to have 
declined sharply in the middle 1960's and then increased in
1968 and 19 69.
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feature at conversion value ratios less than 1.0. These 
data are deemed inappropriate in valuing convertibles with 
step-ups, and they are eliminated from the study.
The remaining observations (all free of step-ups in 
exercise price) are separated into four categories. Twenty- 
one observations with conversion features less than ten years 
to expiration are included in Category A. Category B is com­
prised of thirty-two observations with convertible features 
expiring from ten to twenty years. Category C consists of' 
thirty-seven observations with over twenty years to expira­
tion and straight debt values in excess of $700. Category D 
contains twenty-eight observations with over twenty years to 
expiration and straight debt values less than $700.
The separation of long-term convertible feature in­
struments into two distinct categories is based on the con­
version value ratios' relationship to a convertible bond>'s 
call price. For example, a convertible bond with a straight 
debt value of $500 provides a conversion value ratio of 2.0 
when-conversion value is $1,000. At a ratio of 2.0, the 
convertible still provides upside potential, since the re­
demption price is yet to be reached. On the other hand, 
a straight debt value of $1,000 produces a conversion value 
ratio of 1.0 when conversion value is $1,000, and upside 
potential is similar to a $500 straight debt value with a > 
conversion value ratio of 2.0. The convertibles are
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segregated into these categories on the contention that 'low 
straight debt values should produce higher values for con­
version features at given conversion price ratios.,
The Final Model for Convertible Bonds
These data are regressed in a fashion similar to those 
for warrants. The independent and dependent variables are 
converted to natural logarithms and linear least squares fit 
is mathematically calculated. The final model is given by 
the following equations.
Category A 
fless than 10 years to expiration)
Yc = .1871(X) 2.9190 R2 = .6812
Category B 
(10 to 20 years to expiration)____
Y = .2679(X)1*9112 r2 _ #8852
c
Category C 
(Over 20 years to expiration— SDV>$700)
Y = .2772(X) 1 * 7521 R2 = >8827
c
Category D 
(Over 20 years to expiration— SDV<$700)
Y « ,3173<X)1,6809 R2 - .9135
c
These mathematical equations provide a simple method for 
determining a fair price for a convertible bond when straight 
debt values and conversion values are available. The proce­
dure follows:
147
(1) Divide straight debt value into conversion value to 
determine X, or the conversion value ratio.
(2) Select the proper equation by determining the years 
to expiration.*^
(3) Take the log of X and multiply it by the exponent.
Take the antilog of the product and multiply it by 
the constant "a".
(4) Multiply the resulting decimal by the straight 
debt value to determine a proper value for the con­
version feature.
(5) Add the calculated conversion feature to the 
straight debt value in determining a fair price 
for the convertible bond.
The final model reveals that time plays a significant 
role in convertible bond pricing. The constant "a" value in­
creases as a function of time. The "a" value also rises for 
convertibles with low straight debt values for the observations 
in Category D. The exponents decline in an expected fashion 
to show time less important at conversion value ratios above 
1.0. In other words, the convertible feature increases 2.919
^Convertible bonds with step-ups are treated in an 
identical fashion as warrants. The initial conversion price 
is applied to the appropriate category. Higher conversion 
prices are then applied to longer term categories as they 
exist. The higher of the calculated values is deemed to be 
the fair price. The use of a Wang calculator enables these 
calculations to be made with great speed.
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times as fast as conversion value when the conversion value 
is equal to 1.0 in Category A. This upside leverage rules 
the equation worthless at conversion value ratios of greater 
than 1.2 as can be seen in Chart 9. The descending exponents 
reveal the model to be consistent with traditional conver­
tible bond theory which suggests that all convertible bond 
prices should rest on conversion value at some percentage 
above par.
This graphic presentation shows the critical nature 
of time to expiration. Category A-consists of observations 
with an average of five years to expiration. The observed 
points do not fit the regression line too closely as some of 
these convertibles have zero values for the conversion fea­
ture. Regression lines for the three other categories fit 
their observed points well, with the lowest R^ - .8827 for 
Category C.
Chart 9 can be used to approximate fair values for 
individual convertibles by calculating the conversion value 
ratio and reading off the value of the conversion feature.
The conversion feature is multiplied by the straight debt 
value to determine the actual dollar worth of this contrac­
tual right. The conversion feature plus the straight debt 
value yields the total value of the convertible bond.
The observations could conceivably be carried to 
infinitely high conversion value ratios. For example, if
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CHART 9
GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE CONVERTIBLE
BOND MODEL
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the conversion value is $5,000 and straight debt value is 
$500, the conversion value ratio is 10. The conversion 
feature should have ratio of 9 due to arbitrage conditions, 
described in Chapter II, and the resultant value of the con­
vertible bond is $5,000 [(9 x $500) + 500],
The empirical model for convertible bonds enables
these instruments to be appraised regardless of whether con­
version value is higher or lower than straight debt value.
The empirical model is, however, bound by the relevant range 
of the observations. A conversion value ratio of . 3 is deemed 
the appropriate lower boundry and 1.2 is the upper limit.
Testing the Empirical Model 
Selecting the Proper Test
The logical method of determining the appropriateness
of the empirical convertible model is to determine how well
it selects convertible bonds for investment since its con­
struction is aimed at this goal. The model's selection of
attractively priced combinations-of straight debt value and
conversion value should produce results superior to those
I
achieved by investments in average convertibles. Theoretical­
ly, overpriced convertibles are avoided with such a model.
The test procedure for the warrant model includes too
many observations outside the model's relevant range. The 
test procedure for the convertible model attempts to over­
come these prior deficiencies, as the abundant supply of
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convertibles enables a superior test for the convertibles 
model.
The relevant range for the convertible model is a 
conversion value ratio of .3 to 1.2. Actually, model values 
appear close to empirical observations at extremely low con­
version value ratios. Therefore, convertible issues with con­
version value ratios of less than .3 are deemed acceptable for 
this test. However, selection of only low conversion value 
convertibles would severely restrict the upward mobility of 
the sample, since the common stock must appreciate significant­
ly before parity would be attained.
The procedure necessary to objective selection of con­
vertibles with comparable conversion and straight debt values 
is accomplished by selecting those convertible bonds selling 
near par. These bonds should have some of their value oc­
curring from conversion value, since coupon rates on conver­
tibles are typically lower than existing interest rates on
similarily rated companies.
The first issues of The Commercial and Financial
Chronical and Barron1s of each year from 19 60 to 19 69 are 
used to locate convertible bonds selling near par. The num­
ber of convertibles trading within 6 to 8 points of par are 
listed. Closing prices are used to locate the ten convertibles 
nearest to par and these securities are included in the final 
sample of securities. The sample is structured to exclude 
the following convertibles: (1) those rated below B by Moody's
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Corporation, (2) those not listed in Moody1s Industrial 
Manual, (3) those convertible into instruments other than 
common stock, and (4) those requiring additional monetary 
payments upon conversion.
A minor improvisation is required in order to ob­
tain sample convertibles trading near par. Bonds rated Ba 
and B are included in the test observations even though the 
model is based on Baa or higher instruments. It is reasoned 
that the lower rating only influences straight debt values 
and does not change conversion feature values. As long as 
straight debt values are properly estimated, the model 
should properly extend to all classes of convertibles.
The inclusion of Ba and B rated bonds requires their 
yields to be estimated, since Moody's does not list these 
yields. The estimation procedure includes an estimation of 
the percentage difference in coupon rates on newly issued Ba 
and B bonds when compared with yields on Baa bonds. The 
method of comparison shows Ba bonds to usually carry an in­
terest rate of 5 to 6 per cent higher than Baa bonds. 
Therefore, the yield on Baa provides the basis for the ad-» 
justment. B rated bonds are found to have from 6 to 7 per 
cent higher yields than Ba bonds.4
4Estimated yields for all of these securities appear 
in Appendix C.
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Fair values are determined for the 100 observations. 
Buy decisions are simulated using the 3 per cent filter in a 
fashion identical to that used in testing the warrant model.
Results of the Test
A simulated test produces findings that must be 
treated with caution. Failure to include the entire uni­
verse of convertibles limits reliability of cumulative changes 
as measured in this test. Thus, the test results obviously 
contain bias.
Table X shows average convertible bonds used in the 
study to have slightly declined in market value during the 
ten year period. Coupon payments are not included in the 
cumulative balances since capital appreciation appears to 
best test a model's efficiency. These data also reveal the 
average convertible to have appreciated in five of the years 
and declined in the other five years. Large percentage gains 
were registered in 1965 while severe capital losses were suf­
fered in 1969. The market performance of the convertible 
bonds was similar in direction to the performance of the 
warrants. The major capital losses for each of these 
securities occurred in 1962, 1966, and 1969.
The performance of the convertible bond model is 
outstanding. Table X shows it to have performed better 
than average convertibles in each year excepting 1966— a
TABLE X
SUMMARY OF TEST RESULTS FOR CONVERTIBLE BONDS
Total
Conv.
Bonds
Empirical
Bond
Model
Total
Conv.
Bonds
Empirical
Bond
Model
1960 
No. Purchased 10 7
1965 
No. Purchased 10 6
No. Increasing 4 3 No. Increasing 9 6
No. Decreasing 6 4 No. Decreasing 1 0
Aver. Chg. {%) -1.600 +0.200 Aver. Chg. (%) +31.250 +39.700
Init. Invest. 100.000 100.000 ENDING BAL. 150.847 205.258
ENDING BAL.
1961 
N o . Purchased
98.400
10
100.200
7
1966 
N o . Purchased 10 1 '
No. Increasinq 10 7 No. Increasing 0 0
Nc. Decreasing 0 0 No. Decreasing 10 1
Aver. Chg. (%) +17.610 +18.100 Aver. Chg. {%) -17.420 -23.200
ENDING BAL. 115.718 118.336 ENDING BAL. 124.600 157.638
1962 
No. Purchased 10 1
1967 
No. Purchased 10 4
No. Increasing 0 0 No. Increasing 6 4
No. Decreasing 10 1 No, Decreasing 3 0
Aver. Chg. (%) -9.210 -2.200 Aver. Chg. (%) +9.440 +24.200
ENDING BAL. 105.072 115.733 ENDING BAL. 136.362 195.786
1963 
No. Purchased 10 3
1968 
No. Purchased 10 2
No. Increasing 6 3 No. Increasing 6 2
No. Decreasing 4 0 No. Decreasing 4 0
Aver. Chg. (%) -0.200 +2.300 Aver. Chg. (%) +5.560 +7.750
ENDING BAL. 104.862 118.395 ENDING BAL. 143.944 210.959
1964 
No. Purchased 10 3
1969 
No. Purchased 10 0
No. Increasing 8 3 No. Increasing 0 0
No. Decreasing 2 0 No. Decreasing 10 0
Aver. Chg. (%) +9.560 +24.100 Aver. Chg. (%) -32.500 0.000
ENDING BAL. 114.887 146.928 ENDING BAL. 97.162 210.959
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in which the model selected only one of the ten declining 
convertibles. In other words, it reveals nine of the 
convertibles to be overvalued and only one favorably priced. 
An astute investor could have used these data as indicative 
of convertibles in general being overpriced and would have 
failed to commit any capital in convertibles in 1966.
The convertible bond model shows a remarkable ability 
to anticipate overpriced markets, as'indicated by its se­
lection of one purchase1in 1962, one in 1966, and none in 
19 69. Further testing of the model is needed, however, 
before it proves itself effective in determining the direc­
tion of the stock market.
The convertible bond model is found to be highly 
accurate in its selection of individual securities. The 
following summary data from Table X confirm its accuracy:
Total Conv.
Conv. Bond
Bonds Model
Total No. Purchased 100 34
No. Increasing 49 28
No. Decreasing 50 6
Compound Capital Appre. Neg. 7.8%
Few people in the investment community would be dissatisfied 
with*a model providing profits on more than 80 per cent of 
its selections, especially when1. 50 per cent of the observa­
tions in the universe declined.
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Appendix C reveals that fopr of the six declining 
convertibles selected by the empirical model experienced only 
marginal declines. For example, in 1960 W. R. Grace lost 
2.3%, J. R. McDermott 2.2%, and SCM 1.2%. Royal McBee also 
had a 2.2% loss in 1962. When these minor losses are con­
sidered, the convertible bond models' selection record is 
marred only by Seiberling Rubber's 12.0% decline in 1960 and
t
by Crescent Corporations1s 23.2% decline in 1966. It must, 
however; be recognized that many of the model's selections ex­
perience minor capital appreciations.
The compound rate of return of 7.8% considers only 
the capital appreciation of these instruments. Coupon rates 
on the purchased convertibles average approximately 5% and 
the Treasury bill rate for 1969 would be in excess of 6%.
One can estimate the overall benefit from investing in these 
securities at approximately 12.8% per year.
The calculated rate of return may well be downward 
biased for two reasons. First, the sample included only 
securities initially priced close to par. These securities 
probably provide less upside potential than higher priced 
convertibles since conversion values tend to be more operative 
in higher priced convertibles. Second, the ten year period 
contains bear markets at the beginning and end of the period.
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Conclusion
The convertible bond model developed in this chapter 
can be described as innovative. It yields objective prices 
for existing convertible bonds and can be tested by astute 
market students. It is simple, and it removes the mystique 
surrounding the convertible bond premium since straight debt 
value is the fulcrum on which convertible bond analysis should 
be based.
The convertible bond model is limited in that it fails 
to include an analysis of the common stock. A fair valued 
combination of straight debt value and conversion value will 
never substitute for a sound fundamental analysis of a common 
stock because common stock performance will determine eventual 
performance of convertible bonds;-
The convertible bond model is not a proven device 
for timing critical market junctures; It must be adequately 
tested before being used for such purposes. However, there 
appears to be theoretical support behind speculative activity 
preceeding bear markets. Investors may well shift to con­
vertible bonds as stocks become inflated, and the convertible 
bond model may be useful in predicting these turning points.
The convertible bond model is not intended to be a 
permanent tool in appraising convertible bond prices. It 
should be up-dated periodically with new bond data. For
example, statistics for 1960 should be replaced with 19 70 
data'when they become available. The number of observations 
should also be increased in order that more categories may 
be included. Data for convertibles with short-term ex­
piration dates are especially needed for a more complete 
set of equations.
CHAPTER VI
SPECIAL TRADING TACTICS FOR WARRANTS AND 
CONVERTIBLE BONDS
Introduction
This chapter begins with a discussion of terminology 
used in the literature, followed by a brief description of 
short selling. Potential trading tactics are discussed and 
are then applied to the warrant and convertible bond models. 
Simulated commitments are employed to demonstrate the pro­
fitability of the recommended specialized tactics. The 
chapter is brought to a close with a presentation of the 
conclusions drawn from the analysis of the data.
Arbitrage Verses Hedging
Chapter II identifies the minimum price of a warrant 
to be its intrinsic value due to available arbitrage profits 
at lower prices. Arbitrage, in this instance, involves 
selling the common stock short and buying warrants exercis­
able into the number of shares sold short. The warrants 
are exercised and the acquired common is used to cover the 
short position in the stock. Arbitrage profits are the
difference in the selling price less the buying price (price
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of the warrants and exercise costs), minus commissions and
i
(
other trading expenses.
'1
A strict definition, of arbitrage is "the simultane­
ous purchase and sale of the same or equivalent things to take 
advantage of a price d i s c r e p a n c y ^  This definition fits the 
purchase of warrants and the short sale of the corresponding 
common, but it fails to uniformly apply to numerous security 
transactions. For example, the warrant may be sold short and 
common purchased. The common is then used to protect against 
declines in the warrant and to rise faster than the warrant
i
in bull markets. In other words, possible profit exists on 
the upside while the downside is semi-protected with the 
common stock. The position has elements of both an arbitrage 
and a hedge, since a hedge is defined as "a sale or purchase 
of a contract for future delivery against a previous purchase 
or sale of an equal quantity of the same commodity or an 
equivalent quantity of another commodity." Hedge positions 
have generally been associated witti commodity trading where 
a hedger creates a neutral position. However, numerous 
financial writers refer to transactions in convertible bonds
Jules I. Bogen, Financial Handbook (4th ed.; New 
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1968), p. 10.58.
2Ibid., p. 23.23.
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and warrants as hedge positions.
Arbitraging and hedging can involve a simultaneous 
purchase and sale of securities, but the former seems to 
convey a concept of profit whereas the latter creates a 
neutral position to avoid losses. The trading tactics des­
cribed in this chapter seem to convey profit opportunities 
with limited risk exposure. This dual nature calls for new 
terminology which is designated as arbitrage-hedge,
positions are arbitraged in that profits exist in one direc­
tion and hedged to the extent that losses are minimized in 
the other direction. •
Importance of Short Selling
The arbitrage-hedge position requires an investor 
to be long and short in securities at the same time. The 
short position is often misunderstood. Therefore, it is 
discussed prior to presenting complicated trading tactics.
Short selling simply involves a sale of securities 
where the seller delivers the stock by borrowing it from a 
third party. The act of borrowing creates short interest 
in that the seller must later repay his short position by 
buying stock (hopefully at a lower price than he sold it
Financial writers often refer to identical trans­
actions as either arbitrages or hedges. See, Wilford J. 
Eiteman, Charles A. Dice, and David K. Eiteman, The Stock 
Market (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 359; William 
Schwartz and Julius Spellman, Guide To Convertible Securi­
ties (New York: Convertible Securities Press, 1968), p. 55; 
and Reynolds Griffith, "Arbitrage for the Amateur," North 
Texas State University Business Studies, (Fall, 1967), pp. 
6-7.
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for) and returning it to the lender.**
A short seller's account executive is responsible 
for obtaining the stock to be delivered in a short sale.
He may have it in inventory, obtain it from customers who 
frequently lend stock, or obtain it from other brokerage 
firms. Typical borrowing arrangements call for the pro­
ceeds of the short sale to be turned over to the lender.
The usefulness of the cash proceeds is ample compensation 
to the lender, and most loans are made on a "flat" basis 
with no further compensation passing from either party.
Mutual benefits are accorded each. The lender has a de­
posit of cash and the borrower has the shares to deliver.
The short seller must, however, pay dividends paid on the 
borrowed stock if any are declared.
Short sales are unique in that each is made on 
margin. The short seller is required to pay current margin 
requirements when selling short and is required to maintain
**Some short sales are made by individuals who own 
the security being sold short but elect not to deliver their 
shares. Such a transaction is referred to as an "against the 
box" short sale. It is primarily used to lock in a profit 
to be carried to a different tax year or as a hedging de­
vice in a bear market.
5
George L. Leffler and Loring C. Farwell, The Sto.ck . 
Market (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1963), p. 223.
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a minimum of 30 per cent margin in his account.® However, 
Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board specifies that the 
margin on short sales is ignored when securities- exchange­
able into the securities sold short are in'the seller's 
account. Regulation T enables a small investment in most 
arbitrage-hedges, since the price of the exchangeable 
security is often less than the one sold short.
One major problem in executing favorable arbitrage- 
hedges is that short sales can be executed only after an 
up-tick. The rule requires that the direction of the last 
change in price of the security must be up before a short 
sale* can be executed; For this reason, most arbitrage- 
hedges should be engineered by establishing the short posi­
tion and then executing the long purchase. ■ Instantaneous 
purchases and short sales are usually superior when possible.
Various Types of Arbitrage-Iiedges
Convertible bonds and warrants offer avenues for 
profits other than their appreciation potential. Charts 9 
and 10 showed the price of the common stock to have signifi­
cantly higher amounts of change than either warrants or 
convertible bonds at less than parity. These charts are
®For a discussion of margin requirements and margin 
maintenance, see, Donald E. Vaughn, Survey of Investments 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), pp. 140- 
142.
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based on empirical data and represent fair approximations of 
reality. If all convertibles and/or warrants performed 
identically to the models, arbitrage-hedges would be imprac­
tical. Attractive arbitrage-hedges exist1 when relatively 
small amounts must be paid for the call on the common, or 
when the call is grossly inflated.
A frequently used investment combination is that of 
buying a convertible bond and shorting the corresponding 
common stock. Convertible bonds are sought where conver­
sion price, straight debt value, and the bond's price are 
all close together. Small premiums over straight debt value 
and conversion value enable the stock to be sold short. Con­
version value hedges against price appreciation in the common; 
straight debt1value enables an arbitrage profit when the 
common stock declines. In other words, straight debt value 
provides a floor price for the bond even though the common 
stock declines sharply:
Tactics where the number of shares on the long con­
vertible are equal to the shares of the common sold short 
and referred to as full arbitrage-hedges. Profits accrue 
when the stock declines and the position is hedged at higher 
common stock prices. A partial hedge, on the other hand,
7
Graham, Dodd, and Cottle consider these commitments 
to properly be classified as investment operations. 0£. cit., 
p. 49.
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permits one to earn profits from the transaction regardless 
of the direction of the common stock. If less than the full 
number of shares is sold short against the convertible bond 
( i.e., 100 shares of common are sold short against a bond 
convertible into 200 shares), conversion value rises faster 
than the common on the upside and straight debt value minimiz­
es the loss on the downside. Profits are dependent on the
Q
common stock fluctuation and the direction is not important.
Warrants permit various tactics aimed at creating 
limited risk profits through arbitrage-hedge arrangements.
A normal tactic is to locate a warrant with a minimum specu­
lative price and trading near parity. The warrant is then 
purchased and the corresponding-common is sold short. The 
position is hedged on the upside through the exercise fea­
ture on the warrant, and the downside produces profits as 
the common stock declines faster than the warrant.®
Warrants containing excessive speculative prices can 
be sold short against a long position in the common stock.
The theory behind such a tactic is that the common will
O
°If the common stock price remains stable, the bond 
price will be unaffected, and profits are non-existent.
9 ' • • .• .. . •
The common,'ideclipes’ f^s^e*f ^Ln/absolute dollar amounts.
The warrant oftejrl .declines1 froip ter ,$j'50 while the common
declines a full $1.00 per share* The■percentage decline is
usually higher for the warrant, since it declines from a
smaller base. See the discussion of warrant leverage in
Chapter II.
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appreciate faster than the warrant on the upside— as the 
warrant premium or speculative value declines'. The-position 
is'somewhat hedged on the downside as the warrant declines 
in- a fashion similar to the common stock. Such a trans­
action fails to provide a perfect hedge, since the common 
may decline much faster than the warrant.- This is especial­
ly true if a sharp market set-back is experienced.
An alternative approach is to short the inflated 
warrant and buy a call10 on the common stock. An increase 
in the price of the common results in a profit as the call 
appreciates faster than the warrant. A decline in the price 
of the common forces the warrant to decline, and a profit 
is realized on the short sale of the inflated warrant. The 
only weakness with this tactic is the time limitation and 
the cost on the call. A profit is realized only if a size­
able price fluctuation occurs in the common during the con­
tract period.
A special tactic, aimed at reaping the benefits from 
an inflated warrant, is to short a soon-to-expire warrant 
and hedge the position with a call. Such a transaction is 
a near "foolproof" arbitrage. The price of the call is
A call is defined as a contract which gives the 
holder the right to purchase a specified security within a 
certain time period at a specified price. For a further 
discussion of these instruments see, Herbert E. Dougall, 
Investments (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1968), pp. 303-304.
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compared with the premium on the warrant to determine if a 
profitable transaction can be designed. The tactic resembles 
an arbitrage in that the speculative premium will gradually 
decline as expiration of the warrant nears. The empirical 
warrant model reveals a speculative parity premium of .2753 
is expected for warrants with an average of nine months to 
expiration. Such a huge premium can often result in signifi­
cant profits by selling the warrant short and using a call 
for upside protection.
Warrants also offer different combinations of shares 
to be sold short or acquired long in relation to'the number 
of warrants long or short. A logical trading tactic would 
be to locate warrants selling well below the empirical war­
rant model's value, buy two warrants, and sell one share of 
common short. The upside results in profits as the two war­
rants rise faster than the common; the downside is cushioned 
by the warrants being fairly priced. This trading-tactic is 
referred to hereafter as a double arbitrage-hedge in warrants.
Warrants found to be significantly inflated according 
to the empirical model's value could be handled in*the re­
verse fashion.- Two inflated warrants could be sold short 
and -one- common-share purchased long. 'The-downside offers 
profit potential as the two inflated warrants should depreci­
ate faster than one common share. The common should cushion
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the gain of the two inflated warrants on the upside. This 
tactic is referred to hereafter as a reverse double arbitrage- 
hedge in warrants.
Use of the Empirical Warrant Model in 
Locating &rbitrage-Hedges
Empirical model values can be compared to actual 
warrant prices in locating actual values that are significant­
ly higher or lower than predicted values. For example, model 
values that are fifty per cent higher than actual prices may 
be deemed attractive for a double arbitrage-hedge; • On the 
other hand, actual prices fifty per cent above model values 
may be used in establishing reverse double arbitrage-hedge 
positions.
The warrants of McCrory Corporation, General Acceptance, 
and Realty Equity generally fit the requirement of being 
priced fifty per cent above model values.”'*' Price data for 
the beginning of 1967 indicate both McCrory and General 
Acceptance have model values more than fifty per-cent above 
their actual prices. A simulated double arbitrage-hedge is 
depicted in Table XI.
Table XI illustrates the high profit opportunities 
from double arbitrage-hedge positions when the common stock
^These model value— warrant price relationships 
may be analyzed in Appendix A.
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TABLE XI
SIMULATED DOUBLE ARBITRAGE-HEDGE
Cost
Selling
Price
Profit 
(Loss)
General Acceptance
Long:
200 warrants $900
Short:
100 shares of common 3500 
Gross Profit
$3650
1962
$2750
(1538)
$1212
McCrory
Long:
200 warrants 625
Short:
100 shares of common 2650 
Gross Profit
2125
1750
1500
( 900) 
$ 600
Price Data
General Acceptance:
12-30-66
12-29-67
Common stock
$19.62
35.00
Warrant
$ 4.50 
18.25
McCrory:
12-30-66
12-29-67
17.50
26.50
3.12
10.62
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appreciates. The initial investment is not as high as typi­
cal long positions, since the warrants serve to offset poten­
tial losses from the short position. Margin requirements 
on the short sale are considered to be covered by the war­
rants in the account, and only the cost of thewarrants is 
committed. The gross profit is lowered by commissions and 
dividends paid on the short interest. •
Data for 1966 illustrate how the double arbitrage- 
hedge and the reverse double arbitrage-hedge protect an in­
vestor in a bear market. Appendix. A shows McCrory and Pacific 
Petroleum to fit the fifty per cent requirements. McCrory 
is favorably priced and Pacific Petroleum is overpriced. The 
decision calls for purchasing McCrory warrants and shorting 
Pacific Petroleum warrants. Each Pacific Petroleum warrant 
is exercisable into 1.1 shares at $19 per share. The increased 
number of shares obtainable with each warrant requires a pur­
chase of 110 shares of common stock. Table XXX illustrates 
the unique elements of these simulated commitments.
Table XII illustrates the importance of favorably 
priced and overpriced warrants. McCrory warrants declined 
much less than Pacific Petroleum warrants when the common 
stock of each company dropped. The weakness of Pacific 
Petroleum's warrants created a significant gain from the 
short position while the McCrory warrants held up well in 
lieu of the common's decline. Dividends on McCrory's common
TABLE XII 
SIMULATED DOUBLE AND REVERSE DOUBLE 
ARBITRAGE-HEDGE
Selling Profit
Cost Price (Loss)
McCrory
Long:
200 warrants $1075 $ 625 $(450)
Short:
100 shares of common 1750 2275 525
Gross Profit $75
Pacific Petroleum
Long:
110 shares of common 1169 1100 (69)
Short:
200 warrants 650 1125 475
Gross Profit $406
Price Data Common Stock Warrant
McCrory:
12-31-65 22.75 5.87
12-30-66 17.50 3.12
Pacific Petroleum: 
12-31-65 10.62 5.62
12-30-66 10.00 3.25
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stock and commissions completely eliminate the $75 gain. 
Superior price combinations can probably be obtained, 
since the chosen price data are arbitrarily taken from clos­
ing prices at the year's end.
The warrant model also assists in locating inflated 
warrants prior to maturity. Molybdenum warrants are a case 
in point. These warrants had an expiration date of October 
18, 1963. On January 4, 1963 they closed at $10,875 and 
were exercisable into 1.0 41 shares of common at $30. On 
the same date the common stock closed at $25 per share. The 
calculated model value was $6.34 and this compared with an 
actual price of $10,875. An arbitrage-hedge was in order.
The warrant did not provide an intrinsic value, and the full 
$10,875 premium would be eliminated by expiration— only nine 
months and fourteen days away. The reverse double arbitrage- 
hedge called for 200 warrants to be sold short at $10,875 and 
104 shares (each warrant is exercisable into 1.041 shares) 
of common acquired long at $25 per share. This transaction 
would have resulted in profits from each side as seen in 
Table XIII.
The price of the common appreciated to $29,875 on 
October 11, 1963, and the warrant closed at $1,125 on the 
same date. The cost of covering the warrants and the selling 
price of the common is shown-in Table XIII. Profits in both 
directions resulted due to a totally overpriced warrant only
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nine months prior to exercise.
t 1 ^
TABLE XIII •i
ILLUSTRATION OF ARBITRACE“HEDGE ON SOON 
TO EXPIRE WARRANTS
Cost
Selling
Price
Profit
(Loss)
Molybdenum
Long:
10 4 shares of common $2600 $3107 $ 507
Short:
200 warrants 225 2175 1950
Gross Profit $2457
The overpriced warrant could also have provided pro­
fits via purchasing a call on the common to protect a short 
position in the warrant. A nine month call on Molybdenum 
may have been priced at approximately $600 per 100 shares.
The cost of the call would have resulted in a lower overall 
profit, since the. price of the common appreciated during the 
period. On the other hand, if Molybdenum had closed signifi­
cantly below its purchase price, a call would, have provided 
larger profits since downside exposure is limited to the price 
of the call.
The use of a "call" in protecting against a short 
position in warrants can be illustrated by examining Sperry
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Rand's warrants that expired September 15, 1967. These war­
rants were exercisable into 1.0 8 shares of common stock at 
$28. Table XIV illustrates the net profits received by 
simulating an arbitrage-hedge through the usejOf a call.
Table XIV illustrates the upside as well as downside
t
protection offered by using call to reap the benefits on an 
inflated warrant. The profit of this combination appears 
low, but it is realized in only nine months. The use of a 
call lowers the initial investment base when compared to a 
short sale of the common stock. Moreover, the downside risk 
is protected by the call. A short sale on Sperry Rand's 
common would have resulted in a significant loss if the 
common declined to $10 during the nine month period.
Use of the Convertible Bond Model in 
Locating Arbitrage-Hedge Candidates
An arbitrage-hedge in convertible bonds requires small 
premiums over straight debt value and conversion value. 
Candidates for arbitrage-hedges can therefore be chosen by 
examining straight debt and conversion'values in an attempt 
to locate minimum overall premium bonds. Once these securi­
ties have been located, the direction of the common stock can 
be estimated through a fundamental and technical analysis.
A full or partial arbitrage-hedge can be established, based 
on the estimated direction of the common. Full hedges would
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TABLE XIV
SIMULATED ARBITRAGE-HEDGE IN SPERRY RAND WARRANTS
Common
Stock Warrant
Sperrv Rand
11-7-66 (closing 
8-7-67 (closing
price) 
price)
24.62
39.25
7 .12 
14. 25
-
Actual Data Cost Selling
Price
Profit 
(Los s}
Long:*
Purchase 9-month 
on 108 shares
call
$ 540 1579 1039
Short:
100 warrants 
Gross Profit 
Less commissions
1425 712 (713)
326
118
Net Profit 208
Assumed Data (Common Stock $10 per share, 8-7 -67)
Long:
Purchase 9-month 
on 108 shares
call
$ 540 0 (540)
Short:
100 warrants** $ 50 712 662
Gross Profit $ 122
Less Commissions 17
Net Profit 105
Required Investment 
Call price
Margin on short sale
$ 540 
509
Total Investment 1049
*The price of a call was determined by a' price quotation 
from John Womack, Account Executive with Merrill Lynch in
November of 1966. At that time a nine-month call on Sperry 
Rand common was $500 per 100 shares. The price was con­
firmed in a telephone conversation.
**Cost to cover warrant position was assumed to be a nominal 
$50 per 100 warrants. The warrants were to expire in one 
month, and the exercise price was well above the price of 
the common stock.
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be established under bearish expectations,- partial hedges 
if uncertainty were forecasted.
The convertible bond model can be used in locating 
arbitrage-hedge candidates. Predicted values can be com­
pared with actual values in a first screening of the con­
vertible bonds allowing straight debt value and-conversion 
value relationships to be analyzed. A review of Appendix C 
shows only 3 of the 100 convertibles to simultaneously offer 
downside protection and upside potential. These are Rohr 
Aircraft and Scott Paper in 19 60, and NAFI Corporation in 
1961.
The model values for these convertibles are well above 
the market price. The premiums over each value are also low 
when compared with average convertibles on the list. The 
convertibles are subject to increases in interest rates 
which lower straight debt values.
Table XV illustrates the gross profits received from 
a half arbitrage-hedge in these three convertibles. The 
trading tactic employed is to buy one-convertible bond and 
to sell short one-half the shares into which it is conver­
tible. These positions are assumed to be taken simultaneous­
ly and closed out one year later.
The gross profit amounts of $11, $41, and $113 indicate 
that arbitrage-hedges in convertibles were not too attractive
177
TABLE XV
ARBITRAGE HEDGE IN SELECTED CONVERTIBLE BONDS
Cost
Selling
Price
Profit
(Loss)
Rohr Aircraft (1-4-60 to 1-2-61)
Long:
1 convertible bond $1025 $1090 $65
Short:
27 shares of common 496 442 (54)
Gross Profit $11
Scott Paper (1-4-60 to 1-2-61)
Long:
1 convertible bond 1025 1111 $86
Short:
6 shares of common 516 471 (45)
Gross Profit $41
NAFI (1-2-61 to 1-1-62)
Long:
1 convertible bond 1029 1180 $151
Short:
14 shares of common 472 434 (38)
Gross Profit $113
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in the I9 60's. ^  Numerous convertible bonds not on the list 
were evaluated in order to locate a desirable candidate for 
the designed trading tactic. All were found to have premiums 
too high to enable profitable short sales against long 
positions.
It is interesting to note that convertible bonds in 
recent years offer poorer opportunities for these special 
tactics than convertible bonds in the early 1960*s. The low 
straight debt values rule arbitrage-hedge techniques less 
effective, and straight debt values' have declined sharply 
due to higher interest rates.
Future markets may again enable convertible bonds to 
become instruments for special trading tactics, but today 
these tactics are more theoretical than practical. If sound 
dual positions exist, they are certainly obscure.
Conclusion
Warrants are shown to be highly appropriate for various 
types of arbitrage-hedge positions. The warrant model is 
also-shown to be capable of locating profitable candidates 
for simultaneous short and long positions.
The most interesting commitment involves warrants just
l^An inclusion of commissions and dividends on the 
common stock sold short would consume most of these profits.
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prior to maturity. These securities can often be sold short 
to obtain the benefits of the high speculative values. 
Corresponding shares of common can be purchased to protect 
the upside, or call options can be utilized. The higher cost 
of the call option tends to lower profit potential, but it 
provides protection on each side.
Convertible bonds are found to generally offer arbitrage- 
hedge positions inferior to those of warrants. Low straight 
debt values tend to reduce the possibility of desirable 
arbitrage-hedges, and straight'debt1 values of convertible 
bonds tend to be less than conversion values in current 
markets.
The examples used in this chapter were generally taken 
from year end closing prices to correspond with previous data. 
Profitable arbitrage-hedges require close scrutiny of prices 
in order to locate opportune commitments. Daily fluctuations 
should be watched closely in executing these transactions 
since ultimate profits are based on initial price combinations 
with the arbitrage-hedge technique.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
A statement by an alleged financial expert on Johnny 
Carson's Tonight Show provided the initial impetus for this 
research work. He conveyed to millions of viewers that con­
vertible bonds offer little downside risk with ample upside 
potential. One of his recommended convertible bonds subse­
quently declined more than fifty per cent, and his limited 
downside risk contention was proven incorrect.
At the same time financial services were touting 
warrants as offering tremendous upside potential with a mini­
mum investment. The exuberance concerning these instruments 
appeared exaggerated; therefore, a decision was made to 
analyze these securities from theoretical and empirical van­
tage points.
A natural starting point was a review of the litera­
ture concerning the investment nature of these securities. 
Theoretically, warrants were found to have potential trading 
ranges bordered by the price of the common stock as a
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maximum value and intrinsic value as a minimum.'*' Convertible 
bonds were described as having a floor based on the higher 
of straight debt or conversion values. Prior researchers 
failed to fully consider the upper limit of a convertible 
bond's price, but they seemed to acknowledge that premiums 
gradually dissipate as the bond's price increases,■
Existing literature on stock purchase warrants con­
tains numerous valuation models for these securities. Two 
mathematical models, one by Giguere and another by Kassouf, 
offered objective methods in determining a normal or fair 
price for these instruments. Giguere's model provided con­
servative values while Kassoufs model offered values almost 
double those of Giguere, especially when the price of the 
common was low relative to the exercise price. Shelton 
presented a modified regression model for valuing warrants.
All of these models provided insight into the behavior of 
warrants and influenced the creation of the warrant model 
described in Chapter IV.
Prior research on model building for convertible bonds 
failed to contribute one approach providing objective prices 
for these securities. Convertible bond models were found to
■^See Chapter II, p. 18.
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be theoretical exercises requiring subjective judgments.to 
arrive at a proper price for these instruments. These 
theoretical models, however, influenced the creation of the 
empirical convertible bond model.
Time to expiration on warrants was given different 
emphasis by individual theorists. Samuelson viewed time to 
expiration as a relevant variable in warrant pricing. War­
rants with longer expiration dates were described as having 
generally higher values. Other researchers that had empiri­
cally analyzed warrants generally concluded that expirations 
in excess of some specific number of years (i.e., Giguere 5 
years and Shelton 10 years) should be valued on an identical 
basis. These inconsistencies in addressing the time horizon 
led to a special structuring of time to expiration dates.
The six time categories also required six different equations 
for determining attractively priced warrants.
The warrant model's predictive efficiency was tested 
by applying it to all warrants listed on the American Stock 
Exchange from 1960 to 1969. Warrants were regarded as 
favorably priced when model values exceeded warrant prices 
by more than three per cent. Investment commitments were 
simulated by comparing the performance of average warrants 
with the performances of warrants selected for various valu­
ation models.
The warrant model was created by normalizing warrant
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and common stock prices in terms of exercise prices for in­
dividual instruments. The normalization procedure created 
two ratios: the common stock ratio (defined as the common 
stock price relative to the exercise price) and the warrant 
ratio (defined as the warrant price relative to the exercise 
price). The common stock ratio became the independent variable 
and was employed to predict the dependent variable, or the 
warrant ratio. Warrant ratios were converted to actual prices 
by multiplying the ratios by exercise prices for individual 
warrants.
The convertible bond model was developed in a fashion 
similar to that utilized in the development of the warrant 
model. Straight debt value was substituted for the exercise 
price component in the warrant model, and it was utilized in 
normalizing key elements of convertible bonds. Straight 
debt value was then divided into conversion-value and into 
the- conversion feature value. These—manipulations produced 
the~conversion value ratio and the conversion feature ratio, 
respectively. The conversion value ratio became the inde­
pendent variable and was used to predict the dependent 
variable, or the conversion feature ratio. The latter ratio 
was converted to an actual amount by multiplying it by 
straight debt value, since straight debt value provided the 
foundation on which normalization was based. The value of the 
conversion feature was then added to the straight debt value
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of each bond to predict an approximate price to pay for each 
convertible bond.
Four categories were created for these securities. 
Three of these were based on different time horizons; the 
fourth division was based on different straight debt values. 
These categories required four separate equations.
The convertible bond model was tested by simulating 
purchases on one-hundred investment opportunities. Ten ob­
servations were chosen for each year from 19 60 through 1969. 
The model recommended thirty-four purchases. The three per 
cent decision rule used for the warrant model was again in­
voked for the convertible bond model.
The versatility of the empirically determined models 
was tested in a special chapter (Chapter VI) on trading tac­
tics. The warrant model was found-to profitably select 
underpriced and overpriced instruments that qualified for 
special trading tactics: Overpriced warrants were sold
short against one-half as many common shares purcahsed long. 
Conversely, underpriced warrants were purchased against one- 
half as many shares of common sold'short.
Warrants containing sizeable speculative values 
prior to expiration were also found to offer exceptional 
profit opportunities; they were sold short against a long 
position in the common. An alternative arbitrage-hedge 
using a "call" to protect the short position in the warrant
was-also illustrated.
Simulated arbitrage-hedges in convertible bonds were 
illustrated. The convertible bond model was used to locate 
candidates for these special tactics, but the positions 
proved generally unprofitable.
Conclusions
Prior researchers have failed to properly evaluate 
the influence of time to expiration on warrants and convertible 
bonds. The equations for the warrant model revealed that 
time positively affected warrant prices when exercise prices 
exceeded prices of the corresponding common stock. However, 
time became less important as common stock ratios increased. 
Students of warrant behavior would uncover such a finding 
only by structuring time in relation to the common stock 
ratio. The fact that researchers have arrived- at different 
expiration date cut-offs"has likely arisen due to stock 
market levels in existence during their study. Studies con­
ducted during bear markets (low common stock ratios) would 
probably find time to be a significant variable whereas 
studies conducted during bull markets would lead to opposite 
conclusions.
It is felt that equations for the warrant and con­
vertible bond models provide new insight as to how expiration 
dates influence warrant prices. Expiration dates critically
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affeet warrant p.v : c r s  when common stock prices are low in 
rel'cion to exer^j -c prices. As these common stock ratios 
increase, time to expiration becomes less and less signifi­
cant.
The use of the equations in the determination of the 
normal values for warrants provided a close approximation of 
reality. Predicted graphical points closely approximated ob­
served points, and coefficients of determination were above 
.80 for all categories. The structure and testing of the 
warrant model led to these basic conclusions:
(1) Model values approximated average prices of warrants 
with similar time horizons, but these normal prices 
did not provide a sound basis for predicting price 
performance; This conclusion is based on-the in­
ferior performance of warrants selected by the 
model versus the performance of average warrants.
(2) Warrants selected by the empirical model tended to 
have greater leverage than average warrants. The 
model's relevant range of a common stock ratio (.5: 
1 .2) restricted its selections to more volatile 
warrants.
(3) Some type of timing device should be found to mini­
mize the downside leverage of warrants during bear 
markets. The warrant model was shown to select 
fewer warrants prior to bear markets. In subsequent
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research it may be used to indicate generally in­
flated markets for warrants.
(4) The warrant model was found to locate warrants suit­
able for arbitrage-hedge tactics. Warrants deemed 
overpriced by the warrant model appeared well suited 
as candidates for short sales. Long positions were 
recommended for those obviously underpriced.
(5) The warrant model showed only modest premium in­
creases for warrants with expirations in excess of 
five years. Prospective issues of warrants may 
utilize these data in arriving at optimum expiration 
dates for these instruments.
The convertible bond model provided an innovative 
approach to valuing these securities. Heretofore; objective 
prices had not been-provided by convertible bond models. 
Therefore, empirical testing of these models was impractical. 
Conclusions pertaining to the structure and testing of the 
empirical convertible bond model are:
(1) Straight debt value is the proper foundation for ap­
praising the worth of convertible bonds. It is 
similar to the exercise price on warrants since it 
represents the value given up at conversion. More­
over, it provides a consistent approach to valuing 
the premium on convertible bonds.
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(2) The convertible bond model was shown to efficiently 
select investment commitments. It selected individu­
al bonds poised for appreciation ■ and also seemed
to be useful as a device in timing overall market 
purchases and sales. Use of the convertible bond 
model would likely produce increased returns to in­
vestors in these securities.
(3) The equations for the convertible bond model re­
vealed time to expiration of the call privilege to 
have a positive impact on the value of the conversion 
feature. Companies planning to issue convertible 
bonds should therefore lengthen the expiration of 
the call privilege to twenty or more years, since a 
higher premium can be expected for the longer ex­
piration.
(4) Convertible bonds are not suited for arbitrage- 
hedge techniques in today's markets. The convertible 
bond model revealed excessive premiums for these 
securities.
Equations for the warrant and convertible bond model 
revealed warrants to command premiums higher than those for 
convertible bonds. The warrant model estimated warrants in 
Category 4 (4 to 7 years from expiration) to carry premiums 
of 40.62 per cent at parity. The convertible bond model 
estimated a parity premium of only 26.79 per cent for
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convertible bonds in Category B (10 to 20 years‘from expira­
tion).- -Warrants in Category 1 (6 months to 1 year prior to 
expiration) were estimated to have higher parity premiums 
than those for convertible bonds with ten to twenty year 
conversion expirations.
These two models appear we LI suited for analyzing the 
proper benefit of these security forms when new issues of 
bonds are being considered. For example, management may 
plan to issue a bond worth $800 on its straight debt value 
alone and be undecided as to whether to include a conversion 
feature or warrants with the bonds. If each bond is to pro­
vide a claim on eight shares of common stock with a market 
price of $100 per share, the total price of the bond may be 
estimated by applying the two models. Assuming a fifteen 
year expiration on each privilege, the convertible bond would 
have an estimated market price of $1,014 [(.2679) (800) +
800]. The bond containing warrants to purchase eight shares 
of common for $800 provides an estimated price of $1,141 
[ (. 4263) (800) + (800)] ,3
2
See Chapter V, p. 147.
3See Chapter IV, p. 122.
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The models enable management to evaluate the trade­
off between a higher price for the warrants versus the flex­
ibility of the call provision with the convertible bonds.
They also provide a technique with which management can es­
tablish optimum terms of new issues that will lower overall 
capital costs and assist in maximizing the value of the firm.
Recommendations
Stock purchase warrants and convertible bonds remain 
a fruitful area for additional research. The present study 
will be construed to,have rendered a meaningful service if new 
and better techniques of analysis are developed by others who 
review these pages.
The models designed in this work are not intended to 
be everlasting. Constant updating and revision*are inherent 
in these equations. It is also recommended that the time 
categories be enlarged by including more varieties of obser­
vations . Additional tests should also be administered for 
each model.
The usefulness of these models in explaining the dy­
namics of new issues is untried. It is therefore recommended 
that equations be designed for newly issued securities in 
order that management can properly quantify meaningful com­
ponents of new issues.
Inferences concerning the models' ability to time
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security market turning points are based on crude decision 
rules. These models should be tested at disparate market 
junctures to measure their predictive efficiency. Perhaps 
both models should be compared in selecting turning points 
for common stock in general. It is conceivable that the con­
vertible bond model could be used in signaling purchase 
opportunities in common stocks or other securities.
It is finally recommended that the newly created 
warrant and convertible bond models should be viewed as 
"guides to thinking"— not as automatic tools enabling instant 
profits in these securities. It should be remembered that 
a -successful long position in warrants and convertible bonds 
usually requires the common stock to rise. Therefore, common 
stocks should always be analyzed before committing money to 
these securities.
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF OBSERVATIONS USED IN TESTING 
THE WARRANT MODELS
1960 DATA
Listed
Warrants
Initial
Price
Closing
Price
Percent
Change Giguere Kassouf Shelton
Empiri
Model
Alleghany 9.50 7.12 -25.1 8.75 9.30 9.20 ( )
Armour 19.50 22.75 +16.7 16.03 B21.29 B21.15 ( )
Atlas 2.87 1.37 -52.3 1.56 2.59 B 3.41 b 3.44
Mack Trucks 33.62 15.75 -53.2 24.68 B 37.97 B37.89 ( )
Martin Co. 23.75 31.50 +32.6 10.38 20.52 14.36 19.39
Molybdenum 37.25 23.62 -36.6 22.80 32.13 32.97 ( )
Pacific Pet. 9.62 6.00 -37.6 1.97 3.60 6.29 4.79
Sperry Rand 11.25 8.62 -23.4 6.16 11.26 8.62 11.06
Symington Wayne 6.00 5.25 -12.5 2.75 5.33 3.61 4.71
Tri-Continental 27.25 25.37 - 6.9 27.30 b32.14 B32.77 ( )
Van Norman 5.50 5.00 - 9.1 1.24 4.05 5.39 ( )
Net Total -207.40 None -43.40 -95.70 -52.30
Average Percent
Change - 18.85 +4.10 -14.46 -23.92 -52.30
Initial Value 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
Ending Value 81.150 104.100 85.540 76.080 47.700
B
Value is not determined as the common stock ratio is outside the model's relevant range.
Indicates a buy signal. These signals are based on the model value being more than 3 
per cent higher than the initial price of the warrant.
Lis ted 
Warrants
Initial
Price
Closing
Price
1961 DATA 
Percent 
Change Giguere
Alleghany 7.12 7.87 +10.5 6.75
Armour 22.75 32.00 +40.7 20.64
Atlas 1.37 1.12 -18.2 .39
General Acceptance 4.75 10.50 +121.1 4.16
Guerdon .81 .94 +15.4 neg.
Mack Trucks 15.75 24.00 +52.4 10.67
Martin Co. 31.50 38.50 +22.2 25.09
Molybdenum 23.62 16.25 -31.2 10.00
Pacific Pet. 6.00 9.37 +56.2 1.28
Rio Algom .37 .50 +33.3 neg.
Sperry Rand 8.62 13.37 +55.1 4.51
Symington Wayne 5.25 8.12 +54.8 3.36
Textron 1.75 2.87 +64.3 .96
Tri-Continental 25.37 44.00 +73.4 25.08
Net Total +550.00 none
Average Percent Change + 39.29 +2.20
Cumulative Balance 81.150 104.100
Ending Value 113.034 106.390
Kassouf Shelton
Empirical
Model
a 7.40 B 7.57 ( )
B25.25 B24.91 ( )
.74 B 1.70 B ( )
B 7.07 B 5.96 B 7. 64
B 1.28 B 1.99 ( )
B19.50 n15*15 B18. 31
B38.20 36.50 ( )
18.21 17.44 ( )
2.41 4.79 3. 70
.16 .30 ( )
8.62 B10.10 8..54
B 6.10 5.04 ( )
B 1.99 1.48 b2 15
B30.15 B 30.76 < )
+454.80 
+ 50.53
+320.20 
+ 40.03
+237.80 
+ 79.27
85.540
128.763
76.080
106,535
47.700
85.512
Indicates a buy signal. These signals are based on the model value being more than 3 
per cent higher than the initial price of the warrant.
Initial
Price
1962 DATA
Lis ted 
Warrants
Closing
Price
Percent
Change Giguere Kassouf Shelton
Empirical
Model
Alleghany 7.87 7.75 - 1.6 7.25 7.87n 7.98 ( )
Armour 32.00 27.25 -14.8 32.00 35.71 “ 35.38 ( )
Atlas 1.12 .94 -16.7 .28 .53 B 1.43 ( )
First National Realty 1.87 1.25 -33.3 .84 1.50 2.01 1.77
General Acceptance 10.50 7.00 -33.3 8.94 B13.40 b 13.59 ( )
Mack Trucks 24.00 19.87 -17.2 18.03 31.01 28.86 ( )
Martin Mar. 38.50 29.62 -23.1 31.14 B43.57 B42.55 ( )
McCrory 10.50 4.87 -53.6 5.98 9.64 9.90 9.49
Molybdenum 16.25 10.87 -33.1 5.00 11.53 10.20 9.92
Pacific Pet. 9.37 6.00 -36.0 2.77 4.90 7.03 5.42
Rio Algon .50 .37 -25.0 neg. .24 .39 < )
Sperry Rand 13.37 7.75 -42.1 5.72 10.58 11.43 9.96
Teleregister 8.12 2.75 -66.2 3.40 6.05 6.07 4.29
Textron 2.87 3.62 +26.1 1.46 2.86 n 2.27 2.76
TWA 5.00 4.37 -12.5 2.64 4.86 B 6.44 4.54
Tri-Continental 44.00 35.75 -18.7 42.53 b 46.33 B 46.22 ( )
Net Total -401.10 none -107.10 -169.60 none
Average Percent Change - 25.07 +2.70 - 21.42 - 21.20 +2.70
Cumulative Balance 113.034 106.390 128.763 106.535 85.512
Ending Value 84.696 109.263 101.182 83.950 87.821
Indicates a buy signal. These signals are based on the model value being more than 3
per cent higher than the initial price of the warrant.
1963 DATA
Listed
Warrants
rnitial
Price
Closing
Price
Percent
Change Giguere Kassouf ' Shelton
Empirical
Model
Alleghany 7.75 7 \ 25 - 6.5 7.87 r 8,46 
28.10
B 8.45 ( )
Armour 27.25 25.00 - 8.3 23.75 27.31 { )
Atlas
First National
.94 1.37 +46.7 .20 .39 B 1.23 ( )
Realty 1.25 1.00 -20.0 .37 .78 1.24 .88
General Acceptance 7.00 4.50 -35.7 5.32 B 8.73 B 7.28 B 3.46
Jeff. Lake Pet. 2.25 3.12 +38.9 .55 1.42 1.94 1,56
Mack Trucks 19.87 17.87 -10.1 13.22 B24.21 B 20.52 
B30.64 
B 6.37
20. 98
Martin Mar. 29.62 21.00 -29.1 20.28 r30.33 
a 6.25
B ( )
B 7.02McCrory 4.87 2.37 -51.3 3.61
Pacific Pet. 6.00 6.12 + 2.1 1.63 3.02 5.14 3.83
Rio Algom .37 .25 -33.3 neg. « *32 R *47 ( )Realty Equity 1.75 1.37 -21.4 B 2.02 B 3.90 B 3.64 B 3.38
Sperry Rand 7.75 9.37 +21.0 .30 3.89 5.93 5.13
Teleregister 2.75 3.50 +27.3 .09 1,35 1.87 ( )
Textron 3.62 4.12 +13.8 2.09 B 3.80 R 3 *35 < )TWA 4.37 16.37 +274.3 2.04 R 3*95 R 5 -87 4.26
Tri-Continental 35.75 36.87 + 3.1 33.97 38.30 38.72 ( )
Univ. Amer. 55 2.50 1.12 -55.0 neg; 1.89 B 3.05 ( )
Univ. Amer. 62 
Net Total
2.75 1.50 -45.5
+111.00
.34
-21.40
2.22
-116.40
B 3.58 
+36.20
2.80
-118.50
Average Percent Change 
Cumulative Balance 
Ending Value
+ 5.84 
84.696 
89.642
-21.40
109.263
85.881
- 14.55 
101.182 
86.460
+ 3.02 
83.950 
86.485
- 29.62 
87.821 
61.804
BIndicates a buy signal. These signals are based on the model-value-being more than 3
per cent higher than the initial price of the warrant.
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1964 DATA
Warrants
Initial.
Price
Closing
Price
Percent
Change Giguere Kassouf Shelton
Empirical
Model
Alleghany 7.25 7.25 0.0 6.62 7.28 7.36 J  )
Atlas 1.37 1.00 -27.3 .42 .79 B 1.77 B 1.56
First National 
Realty 1.00 .62 -37.5 .43
B *9° B 7.50 B 1>39 B 5.51
B 1.35ft
General Acceptance 4.50 5.50 +22.2 4.45 B 7.53
Jeff. Lake Pet. 3.12 3.50 +12.0 1.37 2.99 2.03 n 2*55
Mack Trucks 17.87 17.25 - 3.5 13.75 B26,20 B22.25 21.97
Martin Mar. 21.00 18.00 -14.3 13.76 B25.76 B22.30 ( )
McCrory 2.37 3.75 +57.9 1.41 B 2.65 B 2.90 B 4.00
Pacific Pet. 6.12 6.25 + 2.0 1.63 3.02 4.87 3.83
Realty Equity 1.37 1.37 0.0 B 1.50 B 3.21 B 2.57 B 2.74
Rio Algom .25 ,.31 +25.0 .05 B .36 B .48 B .42
Sperry Rand 9.37 6.25 -33.3 2.43 7.70 9.42 7.41
Textron 4.12 7.25 +75.3 3.42 B 5.10 B 5.25 ( )
TWA 16.37 29.37 +79.4 12.10 B18.27 B20.72 ( )
Tri-Continental 36.87 39.62 + 7.5 31.19 B40.37 B40.56 ( )
Univ. Amer. 55 1.12 .37 -66.7 neg. B 1.23 B 2.11 ( )
Univ. Amer. 62 1.50 1.75 +16.7 neg. 1.46 B 2.68 ( )
Uris Bldg. 8.75 7.37 -15.7 7.19 B10.21 B10.23 ( )
Net Total
Average Percent Change
+100.20 
+ 5.57
0.00
0.00
+167.60 
+ 15.24
+119.50 
+ 8.54
+36.80 
+ 5.26
Cumulative Balance 
Ending Value
89.642
94.635
85.881
85.881
86.460
99,637
86.485
93.871
61.804
65.055
Blndicates a buy signal. These signals are based on the model value being more than 3
per cent higher than the initial price of the warrant.
2
03
1965 DATA
Listed
Warrants
Initial Closing 
Price Price
Percent
Change Giguere Kassouf Shelton
Empirical
Model
Alleghany 7.25 10.12 +39.7 6.25 6.93 7.04 ( )
Atlas 1.00 1.37 +37.5 .23 .44 B 1.30 < )
First National
Realty .62 .44 -30.0 .18 B .65 B 1.35 J  >
General Acceptance 5.50 5.50 0.0 4.39 B 9.18 B 7.09 J 8.80
Jeff. Lake Pet. 3.50 15.37 +339.3 2.07 B 4.09 B 3.97 3.47
Mack Trucks 17.25 23.50 +36.2 10.29 B22.00 19.02 B 18.78
Martin Mar. 18.00 28.25 +56.9 10.59 B21.64 15.95 B 18.90
McCrory 3.37 5.87 +74.1 2.32 B 4.20 3.08 B 5.38
National General 4.75 4.12 -13.2 2.16 3.83 B 5.53 4.59
Pacific Pet. 6.25 5.62 -10.0 .65 3.38 4.87 3.57
Realty Equity 1.37 6.00 +336.4 1.21 B 2.96 B 2.23 B 2.56
Rio Algcan .31 .50 +60.0 neg. .30 B .37 ( )
Sperry Rand 6.25 10.25 +64.0 .25 3.76 5.90 4.24
Textron 7.25 13.75 +89.7 5.49 B 7.83 B 8.11 ( )
TWA 29.37 44.25 +50.6 25.75 B30.57 B32.86 ( )
Tri-Continental 39.62 45.25 +14.2 39.36 b 43.34 B43.25 { )
Unit. Ind. Corp. 1.12 4.37 +288.9 .06 1.12 B 2.05 B 1.50
Univ. Amer. 62 1.75 4.00 +128.6 neg. 1.57 B 2.54 ( )
Uris Bldg. 7.37 8.00 + 8.5 5.85 B 8.69 B 9.11 ( )
Net Total +1571.40 None +975.90 +1346.70 +792.50
Average Percent Change + 82.71 +3.80 + 88.72 + 96.19 +132.08
Cumulative Balance 94.635 85.881 99.637 93.871 65.055
Ending Value 172.908 89.144 188.035 184.166 150.9 80
g
Indicates a buy signal. These signals are based on the model value being more than 3
per cent higher than the initial price of the warrant.
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1966 DATA
Listed
Warrants
Initial Closing 
Price Price
Percent
Change Giguere Kassouf Shelton
Empirical 
Model
Alleghany 10.12 5.37 -46.9 9.75 10.26 10.00 ( )
Atlas 1.37 1.62 +18.2 .30 .58 B 1.91 ( )
First National 
Realty .44 .31 -28.6 .08 .21 B .70
B< 1 B 7.67General Acceptance 5.50 4.50 -18.2 4.00 B 8.64 B 5.71
Indian Head 9.37 8.00 -14.7 4.20 8.64 8.71 8.39
Jeff. Lake Pet. 15.37 16.75 + 8.9 14.40 15.45 B16.40 ( )
Martin Mar. 28.25 25.50 - 9.7 17.00 b29.78 25.83 « ( }
McCrory 5.87 3.12 -46.8 B 6.47 B 10.29 B 9.51 B 9.95
National General 4.12 4.25 + 3.0 1.67 3.02 B 5.15 3.94
Pacific Pet. 5.62 3.25 -42.3 .61 3.31 4.39 3.51
Realty Equity 6.00 3.37 -43.7 4.62 B 7.35 B 9.62 ( )
Sperry Rand 10.25 9.62 - 6.1 3.29 8.72 8.-33 7.62
Textron, Inc. 13.75 18.00 +30.9 13.62 B14.92 B14.85 ( )
TWA 44.25 52.50 +18.0 41.50 45.20 B45.70
47.70
( )
Tri-Continental 45.25 35.25 -22 ;1 44.44 B48.14 ( >
Unit. Ind. Corp. 4.37 3.00 -31.4 1.63 3.57 3.71 3.18
Univ. Amer. 62 4.00 1.25 -68.7 1.29 3.78
B 10il0
3.53 3.34
Uris Bldg. 8.00 6.00 -25.0 6.68 B10.65 ( )
Net Total
Average Percent Change
-325.20 
- 18.07
-46.80
-46.80
-134.60 
- 19.23
-105.40 
- 9.58
-65.00
-32.50
Cumulative Balance 172.908 89.144 188.035 184.166 150.98!
Ending Value 141.664 47.425 151.876 166.523 101.91;
BIndicates a buy signal. These signals are based on the model value being more than 3
per cent higher than the initial price of the warrant.
2
05
1967 DATA
Listed
Warrants
Initial
Price
Closing
Price
Percent
Change Giguere Kassouf Shelton
Empirical
Model
Alleghany 5.37 10.12 +88.4 4.12 4.97 5.20 ( )
Atlas 1.62 3.87 +138.5 .28 .53 1.43 ( )
First National
Realty .31 .87 +178.6 .03 .05 B .47 ( )
General Acceptance 4.50 18.25 +305.6 3.56 B 8.02 B 4.64 B 7.21
Indian Head 8.00 26.50 +231.3 4.34 7.33 7.11 7.49
Jeff. Lake Pet. 16.75 48.00 +186;6 13.68 15.93 16.00 ( )
Martin Mar. 25.50 21.50 —15; 7 18.48, B28.16 22.65 ( )
McCrory 3.12 10.62 +240.0 B 3.83 B 6.58 B 5.20 B 7.27
National General 4.25 13.87 +226.5 2.35 4.13 B 5.33 ^ 4.83
Pacific Pet. 3.25 3.50 + 7.7 .40 2.95 B 3.57 2,79
Realty Equity 3.37 6.12 +81.5 .29 B 3.91 3.11 ( )
Textron 18.00 44.25 +147.2 18.37 B19.44 B18.93 ( )
TWA 52.50 36.00 -31.4 51.62 B54.84 B53.79 ( )
Tri-Continental 35.25 57^62 +63.5 35.87 B40.07 B40.13 < )
United Ind. Corp. 3.00 4.00 +33.3 .94 2.55 2.13 2.41
Uris Gldg. 6.00 23.00 +283.3 5.94 B 8.79 B 9.02 , ( )
Net Total +2163.90 +240.00 +1074.00 +1421.00 +772.10
Average Percent Change 135.24 +240^00 + 134.25 + 157.89 +257.37
Cumulative Balance 141.664 47.425 151.876 166.523 101.912
Ending Value 333.250 161.245 355.770 429.446 364.203
“indicates a buy signal. These signals are based on the model value being more than 3
per cent higher than the initial price of the warrant.
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1968 DATA
Listed Initial Closing Percent Empiric;
Warrants Price Price Change Giquere Kassouf Shelton Model
Alleghany Air 9.87 16.12 +63.3 4,04 6.47T) 7.00 6.09
Alleghany Corp. 10.12 21.62 +113.6 10.00 10.50 10.13 ( )
Atlas 3.87 5.25 +35.5 1.50 2.50 3.34 3.36
Braniff Air 20.37 27.00 +32.5 7.40 13.55 B22.00 18.14
First National
Realty .87 10.62 +1114.3 neg. .26 .87 ( )
Frontier Air 9.87 7.87 -20.3 6.89 10.09 B12.19 ( )
General Acceptance 18.25 43.37 +137.7 14.06 B20.31 B18.91 ( )
Indian Head 26.50 24.75 - 6.6 20.02 25.84 B27.45
B 1.05Lerner Stores 7.75 16.62 +114.5 5.40 B 8.43 B 9.51
McCrory 10.37 16.00 +54.2 8.78 B13.20 B 12.97 ( )
McCrory (new) 10.62 15.62 +47.1 8.78 B13.20. B 13.30 
15.06
( )
National General 13.87 30.50 +119.8 10.11 13.83 ( )
Realty Equity 6.12 30.50 +398.0 3.56 6.25 5.96 ( )
Textron 44.25 36.50 -18.0 44.37 44.91 44.37 ( )
TWA 36.00 30.75 -14.6 28.62 33.20 33.80 ( )
Tri-Continental 57.62 72.75 +26.2 57.78 60,88 59.23 ( )
United Ind. 4.00 3.87 - 3.1 1.85 3.88 3.23 3.31
Uris Bldg. 23.00 46.00 +100.0 23.04 25.18 B25.18 ( )
Net Total +2294.10 none +593.30 +578.90 +114.50
Average Percent Change 127.45 4.90 84.76 64.32 +114.50
Cumulative Balance 333.25 161.245 355.770 429.446 364.203
Ending Value 757.977 169.146 657.321 705.666 781.215
Indicates a buy signal. These signals are based on the model value being more than 3
per cent higher than the initial price of the warrant.
2
0
7
1969
Listed Initial Closing Percent
Warrants_____________ Price Price Change
Alleghany Air 16.12 7.87 -51.2
Alleghany Corp. 21.62 10.25 -52.6
Atlas 5.25 2.62 -50.0
Braniff Air 27.00 10.12 -62.5
First National
Realty 10.62 3.25 -69.4
Frontier Air 7.87 4.00 -49.2
Gulf 6 Western 17.87 6.37 -64; 3
Indian Head : 24.75 -11.00 -55; 6
Leasco Data 26.37 14.87 -43.6
L e m e r  Stores 16.62 17.62 + 6.0
LTV 40.50 7.75 -80.1
Loews Theaters 34.12 16.50 -51.6
LTV Aero 24.37 7.25 -70.3
LTV Ling 7.75 2.50 -67.7
McCrory 16.00 7.12 -55.5
McCrory (new) . 15.62 7.62 -51.2
National General 30.50 12.12 -60.2
Nat'l Gen. (new) 18.37 6.37 -65.3
Nat'l Industrial 14.50 3.75 -72.5
Okonite 13.62 3.62 -73.4
Pac, Southwest Air 16.37 15.00 - 8.4
Realty Equity 30.50 9.62 -68.4
Textron 36.50 17.50 -52.1
TWA 30.75 13.87 -54.9
Tri-Continental 72.75 68.75 -  5.5
Ur is- Bldg. 46.00 29.00 -37.0
Wilson Co. 13.50 5,12 -62.0
Empirical 
Giguere Kassouf Shelton Model
9.95 13.20 13.77 ( )
21.62 21.90 21.62 C )
2.48
15.09
3.80
25.67
4.74 
B3Q.77
( ) 
27.77
8.44 9.78 9.95 ( )
2.92 4.87 6.48 
°25.83 
^26.50
5.05
11;G8 b 18.91 B 20.61
20; 54 b 26.29 < )
18v05 26,22 ^31.24 
18.26 
B 51.29
( )
13.07
24.55.
16.76
B 41.58 B ( > " 44.60
20.25 28.72 32.97 ( )
14; 75 21.43 23.91 ( )
3.15 5.43 7.13 6.05
15.75
15.75.
920.75 
B20.75
B21.28 
21.77
( ) 
( )
28.37 30.89 30.88 ( )
11.76 B 19.00 B23.80 18.79
6.73 10.76 13.75 10.46
7.90 12.85 13.22 12.84
8.30 12.99 15.47 12.30
29.86 31.09 29.87 ( )
35.37 36.23 3,5.37 ( )
21.75 26.97 •27.47 < )
73.53 B76.17 73.53 ( )
46.37 B47.69 
16.31
46.37 
16.52
( >
10.15 B15.98
8
0
S
1969 DATA (CONTINUED)
Listed Initial 
Warrants Price
Closing
Price
Percent
Change Giguere KfcSSfcuf Shelton
Empirical
Model
Wilson Sporting 11.12 4.12 -62.9 5.64 9.19 9.90 9.21
Net Total -1491.40 none -476.50 -534.10 -206.40
Average Percent Change - 53.26 +6.30 52.94 - 53.41 - 68.80
Cumulative Balance 757.977 169.146 657.321 705.666 781.215
Ending Value 362.863 179.802 309.335 328.770 243.739
Ann. Compound Ret. on Investment 13.8% 6.0% 12.0% 13.0% 9.4%
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IAPPENDIX B
LIST OF OBSERVATIONS USED IN CONSTRUCTING 
THE CONVERTIBLE BOND MODEL
December 31, 1959
Rating
Common
Price Company
Bond
Price
Conv.
Value
Debt
Value
Baa 54.50 Allegheny Ludlum Steel 4s81 1087.50 990.91 855.00
A 40.37 Atlantic Refining 4 l/2s87 1C45.00 761.79 970.00
Baa 33.87 Burroughs Corp. 4 l/2s81 1145.00 869.48 920.00
Baa 41.37 Champion Paper 4 l/2s84 1108.75 897.90 914.00
Baa 28.87 Dresser Industries 4 l/8s77 915.00 525.00 886.00
Baa 65.25 Fansteel Metalurigical 4 3/4s76 1500.00 1468.60 959.00
Baa 50.37 Gardner-Denver 4 l/4s76 1310.00 1356.90 904.00
Baa 63.50 Gen. American Transport 4s81 1685.00 1693.33 855.00
Baa 39.75 Hooker Chemical 5s84 1190.00 883.33 983.00
Baa 30.25 International Min, & Chem. 3.65s77 870.00 560.19 831.00
Baa 42.50 I-T-E Circuit Breaker 4 l/4s82 1150.00 1083.63 885.00
Baa 11.00 Libby McNeil & Libby 5s76 1025.00 743.24 987,00
Baa 40.00 Macy (RH) & Co. 5s77 1250.00 1250.00 986.00
A 46.50 Phillips Petroleum 4 l/4s87 1100.00 930.00 9 32.00
Baa 66.37 Radio Corp. of Amer. 3 l/2s80 1400.00 1353.49 796.00
Baa 77.37 Richfield Oil Corp. 4 3/8s83 1215.00 1105.36 899.00
Baa 18.50 Royal McBee 6 l/4s77 1155.00 711.54 1045.00
A 78.50 Scott Paper 3s71 1025.00 1019.48 851.00
A 53.25 Sinclair Oil Corp. 4 3/8s86 1022.50 819.23 952.00
Aa 43.87 Standard Oil (Indiana) 3 l/8s82 1070.00 953.80 801.00
Baa A Aa
Estimated December 31/ 1959 Bond Yields 5.12 4.69 4.54
December 30f 1960
Ratinq
Common
Price Company
Bond
Price
Conv.
Value
Debt
Value
Baa 34.50 Allegheny Ludlum Steel 4s81 975.00 627.27 860.00
Baa 60.00 American Optical Co. 4.40s80 1170.00 976.74 913.00
A 43.00 Atlantic Refining 4 l/2s87 1110.00 811.32 994.00
Baa 27.37 Burroughs 4 l/2s81 1097.50 702.64 929.00
Baa 27.00 Champion Paper & Fibre 4 l/2s84 1060.00 585.93 917.00
Baa 24.25 Combustion Engineering Inc. 3 3/8s81 947.50 808.33 781.00
Baa 22.87 Dresser Industries, Inc. 4 l/ss77 930.00 415.91 892.00
Baa 47.62 Fansteel Metallurgical 4 3/4s76 1220.00 1071.91 962.00
Baa 48.75 Gardner-Denver 4 l/4s76 1293.75 1313.13 909 .00
Baa 79.75 Gen. American Transport 4s81 2040.00 2126.67 860.00
Baa 34.62 Hooker Chemical Corp. 5s84 1145.00 769.44 985.00
Baa 34.75 International Min. & Chem 3.65s77 925.00 643.52 839.00
Baa 21.62 I-T-E Circuit Breaker 4 l/4s82 950.00 551.38 889.00
Baa 10~. 50 Libby McNeil & Libby 5s76 1070.00 709.46 988.00
Baa 47.00 Macy (RH) & Co. 5s77 1440.00 1468.75 988.00
A 53.87 Phillips Petroleum 4 l/4s87 1155.00 1077.50 955.00
Baa 88.25 Richfield Oil Corp. 4 3/8s83 1285.00 1260.71 903.00
Baa 13.62 Royal McBee 6 l/4s77 1090.00 524.04 1045.00
A 86.00 Scott Paper 3s71 1111.25 1116.88 872.00
A 38.75 Sinclair Oil 4 3/8s86 1002.50 596.15 975.00
Aa 47.12 Standard Oil (Indiana) 3 l/8s82 1085.00 1024.46 833.00
Baa A Aa
Estimated December 30, 1960 Bond Yields 5.11 4.54 4.33
to
N>
December 29, 1961
Ratinq
Common
Price Company
Bond
Price
Conv.
Value
Debt
Value
Baa 75.00 American Optical 4.40s80 1338.75 1209.68 917.00
A 54,50 Atlantic Refining 4 l/2s87 1160.00 1028.30 995.00
Baa 42.50 Burroughs Corp. 4 l/2s81 1300.00 1090.86 927.00
Baa 37.37 Champion Paper 4 l/2s84 1150.00 811.09 920.00
Baa 28.50 Combustion Engineering 3 3/8s81 1131.25 950.00 789 .00
Baa 50.75 Continental Baking 4 3/8s83 1080.00 845.83 906.00
Baa 28.50 Dresser Industries Inc. 4s77 988.75 518.18 874.00
Baa 27.75 Fansteel Metallurgical 4 3/4s76 1235.00 964.88 965.00
A 24.12 Flintkote 4 l/2s80 1040.00 536.11 996.00
Baa 164.12 Xerox 4 l/2s81 1690.00 1563.10 927.00
Baa 39.75 Hooker Chemical 5s84 1270.00 883.33 987.00
Baa 18.75 I-T-E Circuit Breaker 4 l/4s82 950.00 478.07 893.00
Baa 13.62 Libby McNeil & Libby 5s76 1160.00 920.61 990.00
Baa 72.50 Macy (RH) & Co. 5s77 2270.00 2265.63 989.00
A 58.62 Phillips Petroleum 4 l/4s87 1230.00 1172.50 958.00
Baa 44.50 Richfield Oil Corp. 4 3/8s83 1310.00 1271.43 906.00
Baa 12.75 Royal McBee 6 l/4s77 1053.75 490.38 1045.00
A 42.62 Scott Paper 3s71 1620.00 1660.50 883.00
A 37.62 Sinclair 4 3/8s86 1025.00 537.50 977.00
Aa 55.00 Standard Oil (Indiana) 3 l/8s83 1200.00 1195.65 829.00
Baa A Aa
Estimated December 29, 1961 Bond Yields 5.10 4.53 4.40
December 28, 1962
Common Bond Conv. Debt
Rating Price Company Price Value Value
Baa 54.62 Air Reduction 3 7/8s87 1070.00 874.00 859.00
Baa 33.25 Allegheny Ludlum Steel 4s81 1000.00 604.55 891.00
Baa 61.25 American Optical 4.40s80 1220.00 987.90 942.00
A 48.25 Atlantic Refining 4 l/2s87 1121.25 831.90 1022.00
Baa 24.50 Baxter Laboratories, Inc. 4s82 1085.00 644.74 888.00
Baa 28.37 Burroughs Corp. 4 l/2s81 1092.50 728.31 952.00
Baa 25.62 Champion Paper 4 l/2s84 1085.00 556.10 947.00
Baa 25.00 Combustion Engineering 3 3/8s81 1015.00 833.33 816.00
A 56.75 Dow Chemical 3s82 1250.00 1213.90 824.00
Baa 22.50 Dresser Industries 4s77 972.50 409.09 907.00
Baa 17.75 Pansteel Metallurgical 4 3/4s76 1062.50 617.18 985.00
A 17.75 Flintkote 4 l/2s80 1032.50 394.44 1018,00
Baa 157.25 Xerox 4 l/2s81 1650.00 1487.62 952.00
Baa 35.75 Hooker Chemical 5s84 1175.00 794.44 1013.00
Baa 13.75 I-T-E Circuit Breaker 4 l/2s82 950.00 350.99 919.00
Baa 12.52 Libby McNeil & Libby 5s76 1132.50 853.04 1010.00
Baa 23.75 Mac Andrews & Forbes 5s87 1030.00 608.97 1014.00
Baa 39.25 Richfield Oil 4 3/8s83 1230.00 1121.43 932.00
Baa 9.00 Royal McBee 6 l/4s77 1020.00 346.15 1020 .00
A 32. C-0 Scott Paper 3s71 1272.50 1246.59 905.00
Baa 36.12 Sinclair 4 3/8s86 1007.50 516.07 927.00
Baa 63.00 Union Oil Cal. 4 l/4s91 1177.50 988.55 900.00
Baa A Aa
Estimated December 28, 1962 Bond Yields 4.90 4?35 4.25
December 27, .1963
Rating
Common
Price Company
Bond
Price
Conv.
Value
Debt
Value
Baa 55.37 . Air "Reduction 3 7/8s87 1087.50 886.00 858.00
Baa 37.37 Allegheny Ludlum Steel 4s81 961.25 679.55 895.00
Baa 68.50 American Optical 4.40s80 1250.00 1104.84 944.00
Baa 29.50 Ashland Oil & Ref. 3 7/8s93 1085.00 951.61 841.00
A 56.75 Atlantic Refining 4 l/2s87 1125.00 978.45 1022.00
Baa 26.50 Baxter Lab. 4s82 1125.00 697.37 891.00
Baa 23.62 Burroughs 4 l/2s81 1040.00 606.39 953.00
Baa 32.37 Champion Paper 4 l/2s84 1087.50 702.58 949.00
Baa 49.25 Continental Baking 4 3/8s83 1035.00 820.83 934.00
A 68.62 Dow Chemical 3s82 1471.25 1467.91 830.00
Baa 26.25 Dresser Industries 4s77 955.00 477.27 912.00
Baa 17.50 I-T-E Circuit Breaker 4 l/4s82 935.00 446.20 921.00
Baa 14.00 Libby McNeil & Libby 5s76 1133.75 945.95 1009.00
Baa 26.00 Mac Andrews & Forbes 5s87 1020.00 666.67 1014.00
Baa 75.50 Macy (RH) & Co. 5s77 2340.00 2359.38 1010 .00
A 48.00 Phillips Petroleum 4 l/4s87 1115.00 960.00 985.00
Baa 44.00 Richfield Oil 4 3/8s83 1270.00 1257.14 934.00
Baa 44.12 Sinclair Oil 4 3/8s86 1010.00 630.36 929 .00
Baa 81.00 Union Oil of Cal. 4 l/4s91 1305.00 1270.99 902.00
Baa A Aa
Estimated December 27, 1963 Bond Yields 4.90 4.41 4.36
to
H
Ul
December 31, 1964
Ratinq
Common
Price Company
Bond
Price
Conv.
Value
Debt
Value
Baa 53.87 Air Reduction 3 7/8s87 1080.00 862.00 868.00
Baa 38.50 American Optical 4.40s80 1390.00 1383.40 951.00
Baa 39.25 Ashland Oil 3 7/8s93 1271.25 1266.13 851.00
Baa 30.37 Baxter Lab 4s82 1140.00 799.34 901.00
Baa 35.37 Combustion Engineering 3 3/8s81 1262.50 1179.17 834.00
Baa 55.50 Continental Baking 3 4/8s83 1110.00 925.00 943.00
A 76.50 Dow Chemical 3s82 1635.00 1636.36 821.00
Baa 10.62 Fansteel Metallurgical 4 3/4s76 930.00 369.44 930.00
A 22.87 Flintkote 4 l/2s80 1030.00 508.33 1001.00
Baa 37.50 Hooker Chemical 5s84 1190.00. 833.33 834.00
Baa 29.25 Mac Andrews & Forbes 5s87 1035.00 750.00 1020.00
Baa 35.87 Union Oil of Cal. 4 l/4s91 1755.00 1756.86 911.00
Baa 986.25 Xerox 4s84 1341.25 986.25 894.00
Baa A Aa
Estimated December 31, 1964 Bond Yields 4.85 4.49 4.44
to
h-*
December 31f 1965
Rating
Common
Price Company
Bond
Price
Conv.
Value
Debt
Value
Baa 74.50 Air Reduction 3 7/8s87 1270.00 1192.00 846.00
Baa 56.12 Ashland Oil & Refin. 3 7/8s93 1770.00 1810.48 825.00
Baa 48.12 Baxter Lab. 4s82 1382.50 1266.45 883.00
Baa 48.00 Continental Baking 4 3/8s83 1040.00 800.00 922.00
A 77.12 Dow Chemical 3s82 1680.00 16 49.73 804.00
A 20.75 Flintkote 4 l/2s80 1073.75 461.11 976.00
Baa 31.12 Grant {WT) Co. 4s90 1220.00 1111.61 853.00
Baa 29.87 Mac Andrews & Forbes 5s87 1050.00 766.03 993.00
Baa 54.00 Macy (RH) & Co. 4 l/4s90 1175.00 900.00 888.00
Baa 51.00 Union Oil 4 l/4s91 2461.25 2497.55 885.00
Baa 202.00 Xerox 4s84 2140.00 2020.00 874.00
Baa A Aa
Estimated December 31, 1965 Bond Yields 5.05 4.73 4.69
  December 30 , 1966
Common Bond Conv. Debt
Rating_______  Price_____ ____________________________________________ Price Value Value
Baa 65.25 Air Reduction 3 7/8s87 1078.75 1044.00 736.00
Baa 32.62 Ashland Oil 3 7/8s93 2100.00 2104.84 703.00
Baa 46.00 Continental Baking 4 3/8s83 865.00 707.69 816.00
Baa 20.75 Grant(WT) Co. 4s90 908.75 741.07 733.00
Baa 38.12 Stauffer Chemical 4 l/2s91 950.00 712.61 791.00
Baa 51.25 Union Oil of Cal. 4 l/4s91 2407.50 2330.60 760.00
Baa 197.50 Xerox 44s84 2030.00 1975.00 770.00
Baa 47.37 Combustion Engineering 3 3/8s81 1630.00 1579.17 735.00
A 61.62 Dow Chemical 3s82 1380.00 1318.18 734.00
Baa A Aa
Estimated December 30, 1966 Bond Yields 6.18 5.57 5.39
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December 29, 1967
Ratinq
Common
Price Company
Bond
Price
Conv.
Value
Debt
Value
Baa 80.50 Aluminum Co, of Amer. 5 l/4s91 1125.00 947.06 817.00
Baa 33.25 Amerace Corp. 5s92 1005.00 898.65 784.00
Baa 54.00 Black & Decker 4s92 1285.00 1157.06 666.00
Baa 36.25 FMC Corp. 4 l/4s92 1012.50 873.49 695.00
Baa 34.37 Grant (WT) Co. 4 3/4s87 1245.00 1227.68 777.00
Baa 88.00 Kresge (SS) Co. 4 l/8s92 1320.00 1222.22 681.00
A 47.00 McGraw-Hill 3 7/8s92 1022.50 752.50 694.00
Baa 53.37 Radio Corp of America 4 l/2s92 1102.50 904.66 725.00
Baa 44.87 Stauffer Chemical 4 l/2s91 1040.00 838.79 730.00
A 67.00 Phillips Petroleum 4 l/4s87 1195.00 1218.18 765.00
Baa A Aa
Estimated December 29, 1967 Bond Yields 6.82 6.37 6.24
December 27, 1968
Rating
Common
Price Company
Bond
Price
Conv.
Value
Debt
Value
Baa 74,62 Aluminum Co. of America 5 l/4s91 1092.50 877.94 780.00
Baa 34.75 Amerace 5s92 1035.00 939,19 748.00
Baa 41.75 Ashland Oil 4 3/4s93 10 72.50 835.00 715.00
Baa 66.75 Becton Dickinson 4 1/8S88 1080.00 890.00 676.00
Baa 61.37 Black & Decker 4s92 1310,00 1315.08 636.00
Baa 39.12 FMC 4 l/4s92 1090.00 942.77 664.00
Baa 43.37 Grant (WT) Co. 4s90 1520.00 1549.11 649.00
Baa 40.25 Kresge Co. 4 l/8s92 16 82.50 1677.08 650.00
Baa 26.00 Lone Star Cement 5 l/8s93 1090.00 1000.00 758.00
A 38.25 McGraw-Hill, Inc. 3 7/8s92 906.25 612.00 668.00
Baa 71.50 Owens-Illinois, Inc. 4 l/2s92 1225.00 1211.86 692.00
A 46.25 Penney (JC) Co. 4 l/4s93 1110.00 925.00 707.00
Baa 46.00 RCA 4 l/2s92 1040.00 779.66 692.00
Baa 26.00 Ralston Purina 4 7/8s92 1150.00 981.13 734.00
Baa 47.87 Stauffer 4 l/2s91 1060.00 894.86 697.00
Baa 53.62 Trane 4s92 900.00. 744.79 636.00
Baa 26.62 Sprague Electric 4 l/4s92 827.50 585.16 664.00
Baa 46.25 White Motor 5 l/4s93 1066.25 848.62 772.00
Baa A Aa
Estimated December 27, 1968 Bond Yields 7.25 6.71 6.52
N)
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December 31, 1969
Ratinq
Common
Price Company
Bond
Price
Conv.
Value
Debt
Value
Baa 71,50 Aluminum Co. of America 5 l/4s91 960.00 841.18 641.00
Baa 21.00 Amerace 5s92 690.00 567.76 612.00
Baa 57.62 Becton Dickinson 4 l/8s88 1171.25 1152.50 560.00
Baa 72.25 Black & Decker 4s92 1500.00 1548.10 516.00
Baa 24.12 FMC 4 l/4s92 720.00 581.33 540.00
Baa 47.25 Grant (WT) 4s90 1690.00 1687.50 531.00
Baa 55.50 Kresge 4 l/8s92 2300.00 2312.50 528.00
Baa 23.12 Lone Star Cement 5 l/8s93 945.00 889.42 619.00
A 28,50 McGraw-Hill, Inc. 3 7/8s92 730.00 456.00 523.00
Baa 62.00 Owens-Illinois, Inc. 4 l/2s92 1075.00 1050.85 564.00
A 49 .25 Penny 4 l/4s93 1122.50 985.00 553.00
Baa 34.50 RCA 4 l/2s92 762.50 584.75 564.00
Baa 26.50 Ralston Purina 4 7/8s92 1050.00 1000.00 600 .00
Baa 34.12 Stauffer 4 l/2s91 778.75 637.85 570.00
Baa 25.62 Sprague 4 l/4s92 670.00 563.19 540.00
Baa 65.00 Trane 4s92 940.00 902.78 516.00
Baa 30. 87 White Motor 5 l/4s9 3 765.00 566.51 631.00
Baa A Aa
Estimated December 31, 1969 Bond Yields 9.05 8.76 8.40
2
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APPENDIX C 
LIST OF OBSERVATIONS USED IN TESTING THE 
CONVERTIBLE BOND MODEL
1960 DATA
1-4-60* 1-4-60 1-2-61 Change 1-4-60
Common Bond Bond In Bond Debt Conv. Model
Ratinq Price Company Price Price Price Value Value Value
Baa 27.87 Combustion Eng. 3 3/8s81 103.00' 94.75 -.080 774 929 (1069)
Ba 32.12 Food Fair Stores 4s79 95.75 99.25 + .037 832 780 961
Ba 44.37 Grace (WR) & Co. 3 l/2s75 97.00 94.75 -.023 802 831 10 32B
Baa 10.50 Libby McNeil 5376 102.50 107.00 + .044 987 629 1099s
Ba 38.75 McDermott (J. Ray) & Co. 5s72 98.25 96.12 -.022 964 6S5 1102s
Ba 16.37 Rohr Aircraft 5 l/4s77 102.50 109 .00 + .063 983 885 119 8s
A 78.50 Scott Paper 3s71 102.50 111.12 + .084 851 1019 1173s
Ba 19.00 Seiberling Rubber 5s79 93.50 82.25 -.120 935 760 1031s
Ba 15.12 SCM 5 l/4s79 100.25 99.00 -.012 982 644 1Q99B
Ba 30.62 Vanadium Corp. 4 l/4s76 95.50 83.00 -.131 875 581 982
Net Total -.160 + .034
Average Change -.016 + .002
Initial Inves tment 100.000 100.000
Endina Balance 98.400 100.200
" — - A Baa Ba B
Estimated December 1959 Bond Yields 4.69 5.12 5.40 5.70
*Prices are taken from the first issue of Barron's and The Commercial and Financial Chron­
icle each year, and the dates pertain to the issue date of the newspapers.
Brackets are enclosed on all convertible bonds that are outside the relevant range of the 
model. Buy signals are not given on these convertibles even though model values, exceed the 
bond's price by more than 3 per cent. Buy signals on the relevant range convertibles are 
indicated with the letter B.
to
to
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Ratinq
1-2-61
Common
Price
1961 DATA
Debt
Value
Conv.
Value
1-2-61
Model
ValueCompany
1-2-61
Bond
Price
1-2-62 Change 
Bond In Bond 
Price Price
Baa 34.50 Allegheny Lud. St. 4s81 97.50 110.50 +.133 861 627 998
Ba 36.75 Boeing 4 l/2s80 101.00 119.50 +.183 896 735 1060B
Ba 30.87 Copperweld Steel 5s79 95.00 106.50 +.121 950 551 1040Bn
Ba 16.00 Eastern Stainless Steel 5s73 101.50 109.00 +.074 967 593 1069
Ba 31.75 Food Fair Stores 4s79 99.25 123.25 +.242 841 771 963
Ba 20.87 Gen. Amer. Oil 4 3/4s84 96.00 107.50 +.120 918 531 953
Ba 14.75 General Time 4 3/4s79 100.00 106.00 +.060 928 615 1041b
B 12.87 Kayser-Roth 5 l/2s80 102.75 170.50 +.659 976 632 1090
B 31.00 NAFI 5 l/4s80 102.87 118.00 +.147 946 873 116 3b
A 38.75 Sinclair Oil 4 3/8s86 100.25 102.50 +.022 975 517 1053B
Net Total +1.761 +1.266
Averagei Change + .176 + .181.
Cumulative Balance 98.400 100.200
Ending Balance 115.718 118.336
A Baa Ba B
Estimated December 1960 Bond Yields 4.54 5.10 5.37 5.70
224
1962 DATA
Ratinq
1-2-62
Common
Price Company
1-2-62
Bond
Price
1-7-63
Bond
Price
Change 
In Bond 
Price
Debt
Value
Conv.
Value
1-2-62
Model
Value
Ba 16.62 CF & I 4 7/8s77 105.00 84.25 -.198 • 935 519 1016
Ba 39.50 Copperweld Steel 5s79 106.50 103.00 -.028 944 705 1089
Baa 28.50 Dresser Ind. 4 l/8s77 98.87 97.25 -.016 887 518 922
A 24.12 Flintkote 4 l/2s80 3 04.00 102.00 -.019 988 536 1019
Ba 15.12 General Time 4 3/4s79 106.00 89.00 -.160 916 630 1036
Baa 18.75 I-T-E Cir. Breaker 4 l/4s82 95.00 94.75 -.003 882 424- 950
B 18.75 Lionel Corp. 5 l/2s80 106.00 61.50 -.420 961 572 1057
Ba 23.12 National Cylinder 5 l/8s77 108.00 104.00 -.037 961 595 1005
Baa 12.75 Royal McBee 6 l/4s77 105.37 103.00 -.022 10 45 447 1100 B
Baa 37.62 Sinclair 4 3/8s86 102.50 100.62 -.018 887 470 958
Net Total -.921 -.022
Average Change -.092 -.022
Cumulative Balance 115.718 118.336
Ending Balance 105.072 115.733
A Baa Ea B
Estimated December 1961 Bond Yields 4.60 5.20 5.50 5.35
i
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1963 DATA
1-7-63
Common
1-7-63 1-6-64 Change
Bond Bond Pn Bond Debt Conv.
1-7-63
Model
Rating Price Company Price Price Price Value Value Value
Baa 35.87 Allegheny Lud. St. 4s81 101.00 97.50 -.035 891 652 1022
Baa 26.37 Combustion Eng. 3 3/8s81 102.50 107.50 + .049 816 879 1068®
Ba 35.00 Copperweld Steel Co. 5s79 103.00 104.00 +.010: 983 625 1094B
Ba 20.37 Crowell-Collier 4 l/2s81 ! 99.75 90.00 -.098 923 485 995
Ba 23.12 Food Fair 4s79 96.25 94.12 -.022 873 702 959
Ba 16.62 Grand Union 4 l/8s78 96.12 103.50 + .077 891 635 953
Ba 34.00 Hunt Foods 4 3/8s86 102.25 98.00 -.042 895 694 975
Baa 9.50 Royal HCBee 6 1/4s77 103.00 105.50 + .024 1030 306 1057
Baa 36.75 Sinclair Oil 4 3/8s86 100.62 101.50 + .009 927 459 992
Ba 15.00 SCM 5 l/4s79 103.00 104.00 + .010 1011 717 1151
Net Total -.018 + .069
Average Change -.002 + .023
Cumulative Balance 105.072 115.733
Ending Balance 104.862 118.395
A Baa Ba B
Estimated December 1962 Bond Yields 4.35 4.90 5.15 5.50
226
1964 DATA
Ratinq
1-^64'™
Common
Price Company
Ba 56.00 Allied Stores 4 l/2s81
Ba 35.25 American Distilling 4 3/8s86
Ba 14.12 Automatic Canteen 4 3/’4s81
Ba 37.37 Boeing 4 l/2s80
Baa 23.75 Burroughs 4 l/2s81
Baa 49.00 Continental Baking 4 3/8s83
Baa 14.37 Fansteel Metal. 4 3/4s76
Ba 18.00 Grand Union 4 3/8s78
Ba 27.87 Hunt Foods 4 3/8s86
Ba 16.25 SCM 5 l/4s79
Net Total 
Average Change 
Cumulative Balance 
Ending Balance
Estimated December 1963 Bond Yields
-6-64 1-4-65 Change 1-6-64
Bond Bond In Bond Debt Conv. Model
Price Price Price Value Value. Value
103.25 118.75 + .150 925 800 1113B
104.62 101.50 -.030 897 816 1024
98.50 100.50 + .020 954 438 1012 n
102.50 150.37 + .567 928 748 109 3
103.12 104.50 + .013 953 610 1062
103.12 111.00 + .076 934 817 1052
99.12 93.00 -.062 986 324 993
103.50 121.00 + .169 921 715 1003
98.00 102,,62 + .047 897 569 94i
104.00 115.00 + .19$. 1011 824 1194B
+ .956 + .723
+ .096 + .241
104.862 118.395
114.887 146.928
A Baa Ba B
4.41 4.90 5.15 5.50
1965 DATA
1-4-65
Bond
Price
1-3-66
Bond
Price
Change 
In Bond 
Price
Debt
Value
Conv.
ValueRatincr
1-4-65
Common
Price Company
1-4-65
Model
Value
Ba 17.00 Automatic Canteen 4 3/4s81 100.50 122.00 + .214 961 511 1038®
Baa 25.25 Burroughs 4 l/2s81 104.50 142.50 + .364 961 648 1082®
Ba 19.00 Collins Radio 4 3/4s8'3 100.50 182.00 + .811 958 691 1095®
Ba 25.12 Crowe11-Collier 4 l/2s81 100.37 130.00 + .295 934 598 1041®
Ba 21.75 Food Fair Stores 4s79 95.25 97.50 + .024 888 660 958
Ba 12.12 General Time 4 3/4s79 99.00 111.75 + .129 964 505 1039®
Ba 30.00 Hunt Foods Ind. 4 3/8s86 102.62 97.75 -.048 906 663 974
B 17.50 LTV 5 3/4s76 92.00 144.25 + .567 920 456 984®
Ba 20.12 Stokely-Van Camp 4 l/4s82 102.50 117.50 + .146 903 577 1006
B 3Q.12 Vornado Inc. 5s82 103.50 168.00 + .623 950 615 1060
Net Total +3.125 +2.380-
Average .Change + .313 + .397
Cumulative Balance 114.887 146.928
Ending Balance 150.847 205.258
' A Baa Ba B
Estimated December 1964 Bond Yields 4.50 4.85 5.10 5.45
to
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1966 DATA
Ratinq
1-3-66
Common
Price Company
1-3-66
Bond
Price
1-2-67
Bond
Price
Change 
In Bond 
Price
Debt
Value
Conv.
Value
Model
Value
B 19.87 Crescent Corp. 5 l/2s80 105.50 81.00 -.232 980 795 1156B
Ba 21.87 Food Fair Stores 4s79 97.50 75.25 -.228 875 664 948
Ba 19.62 Amer; Mach. & F. 4 l/2s81 92.62 72.00 -.223 916 315 948
Ba 19.00 Eastern Stainless Steel 5s73 108.00 92.00 -.148 982 777 1075
Ba 28.12 Hunt Foods 4 3/8s86 97.75 77.50 -.207 885 622 944
Ba 32.00 Amer. Distill. 4 3/8s86 104.00 86.00 -.173 885 741 984
B 17.75 CF & I 4 7/8s77 100.00 86.12 -.139 931 555 1024
Baa 48.00 Continental Baking 4 3/8s83 104.00 86.50 -.168 922 738 1012
A 20.75 Flintkote 4 l/2s80 107.37 90.00 -.162 974 461 995
Baa 61.50 Sinclair 4 3/8s86 108.50 101.75 -.062 914 879 1090
Net Total -1.742 -.232
Average Change - .174 -.232
Cumulative Balance 150.847 205.258
Ending Balance 124.600 157.638
A Baa Ba B
Estimated December 1965 Bond Yields 4.75 5.05 5.30 5.70
2
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1967 DATA
Ratina
1-2-67
Common
Price Company
1-2-67
Bond
Price
1-1-68 Change 
Bond In Bond 
Price Price
Debt
Value
Conv.
Value
1-2-67
Model
Value
Ba ■ 18.00 Cluett Peabody & Co. 4 l/4s84 96.25 120.00 + .247 761 871 1025s
Ba 14.50 General Time 4 3/4s79 92.00 103.00 + .120 848 604 9 67®
Ba 49.75 Grace (WR) & Co. 4 l/4s90 94.50 85.00 -.101 724 765 945
Ba 44.25 Inter. Min. & Chem. 4s91 96.62 73.87 -.235 690 759 916
Baa 42.37 Macy (RH) Co. 4 l/4s90 93.50 120.50 + .289 764 706 948
Ba 15.25 Outlet (The) Co. 5 l/2s86 100,12 140.00 + .398 885 813 1087s
A 49.75 Phillips Petrol. 4 l/4s87 99.50 119.50 + .201 839 829 1059s
Ba 50.12 Reynolds Metals 4 l/2s91 10 3.50 96.25 -.070 750 796 981
Baa 38.12 Stauffer Chemical 4 l/2s91 95.00 104.00 + .095 791 713 965
Ba 40.75 Storer Broad. 4 l/2s86 97.00 97.00 .000 775 799 995
Net Total + .944 + .966
Average Change + .094 + .242
Cumulative Balance 124.600 157.638
Ending Balance 136.362 195.786
A Baa Ba B
Estimated December 1966 Bond Yields 5.75 6.18 6.55 7.00
sa
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1968 DATA
Ratlna
1-1-68
Common
Price Company
1-1-68
Bond
Price
1-6-69
Bond
Price
Change 
In Bond 
Price
Debt
Value
Conv.
Value
1-1-68
Model
Value
Baa 33.25 Amerace 5s92 100.50 103.00 + .025 780 899 1057
Ba 46.00 Armstrong Rubber 4 l/2s87 102.50 113.50 + .113 715 902 (1014)
Ba 29.87 Collins & Aik. 4 5/8s91 102.00 148.12 + .452 706 964 (1044)
B 23.50 Fairchild Hiller 4 3/8s92 99.75 95.00 -.048 632 964 (10 40)
Baa 36.25 FMC 4 l/4s92 101.25 108.00 + .067 691 873 (1016)
Ba 72.73 Grolier 4 l/4s87 100.25 87.50 -.127 689 827 951
Ba 29.50 Revere 5 l/2s92 100.62 113.75 + .130 801 868 1057
Ba 32.75 Skil Corp. 5s92 100.25 116.75 + .165 744 819 988
Baa 56.00 Trane 4s92 100.00 89.00 -.110 661 778 937
Ba 81.50 United Aircraft 4 l/2s92 99.00 «8.00 -.111 687 815 978
Net Total + .556 + .155
Average Change + .056 + .077
Cumulative Balance 136.362 195.786
Ending Balance 143.944 210.959
A Baa Ba B
Estimated December 1967 Bond Yields 6.37 6.85 7.25 7?75
2
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1969  DATA
1-6-69 1-6-69 1-5-70 Change 1-6-69
Common Bond Bond In Bond Debt Conv. Model
Rating Price Company Price Price Price Value Value Value
Ba 39.12 Allied Stores 4 l/2s92 102.00 77.00 -.245 656 879 { 996)
Ba 44.25 Belco Petroleum 4 3/4s88 101.75 63.00 -.381 706 770 929
Ba 34.37 Ceco Corp; 4 3/4s88 102.00 65.25 -.360 706 917 (1018)
Ba 30.25 Gidding‘Lewis 4 5/8s87 102.12 61.12 -.401 700 807 946
Ba 36.00 Green Giant 4 l/4s92 100.00 77.50 -.225 629 818 ( 939)
Ba 39.75 Gruman Aircraft 4 l/4s92 99.62 71.50 -.282 629 914 (1003)
B 24.37- Helmerich 5s87 ; 102.12 71.00 -.305 694 894 { 996)
Baa 47.50 RCA 4 l/2s92 103.00 76.25 -.260 692 805 975
Ba 33.87 Riegel T. 5s93 100.00 57.00 -.430 706 779 939
B 19.87 Standard Pack. 5 l/4s90 101.00 64.50 -.361 700 828 960
Net Total -3.250 -0-
Average Change - .325 -0-
Cumulative Balance 143.944 210.959
Ending Balance 97.162 210 .959
A Baa Ba B
Estimated December, 1968 Bond Yields 6.75 7.25 7.70 8.25
e
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